WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

APR 27 1972

Volume XXIV, Number 3 April 1972

Price $9.00 per year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

KLAUS KNORR, *Chairman*

GRAHAM T. ALLISON
CYRIL E. BLACK
ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN
WILLIAM T. R. FOX
TED ROBERT GURR
CHALMERS JOHNSON
ROBERT O. KEOHANE
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
RAYMOND TANTER

Editors: KLAUS KNORR, CYRIL E. BLACK, GERALD GARVEY, HENRY BIENEN (*review articles*)

Associate Editors: MORROE BERGER, FRANCINE R. FRANKEL, JAMES T. C. LIU, RONALD R. ROGOWSKI, PAUL E. SIGMUND, EDWARD R. TUFTE

Executive Editor: ELSBETH G. LEWIN

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers. WORLD POLITICS does not usually accept manuscripts for which subsequent publication, even in somewhat different form, is planned.

Manuscripts should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Rates: $9.00 per year; $15.00 for two years; $20.50 for three years. Foreign postage, 50 cents additional per year. Single issue, $2.50.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Public Affairs Information Service*, and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Abstracts of articles appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts*, and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Back issues: WORLD POLITICS is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Volumes I-XVII are available from Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003, at $20.00 per volume. Volumes XVIII on are available from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Reprint permission: Permission to reproduce or translate material from WORLD POLITICS should be sought from the Permission Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Copyright © 1972 by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. April 1972. Vol XXIV, No. 3. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. XXIV · APRIL 1972 · No. 3

CONTENTS

Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying? *Walker Connor* 319

The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia
An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries *Franklin B. Weinstein* 356

The 1971 Soviet Central Committee:
An Assessment of the New Elite *Robert H. Donaldson* 382

REVIEW ARTICLES

Communist Power in a War of National Liberation: The Case of China *Tetsuya Kataoka* 410

Social Structure and Political Competition: The Italian Case *Alan Zuckerman* 428

Social Science and Soviet Administrative Behavior *Erik P. Hoffmann* 444

The Contributors ii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

WALKER CONNOR is Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Brockport. He is currently working on a book on ethnic nationalism.

FRANKLIN B. WEINSTEIN is a Research Associate at the Modern Indonesia Project and the Project on the International Relations of East Asia, Cornell University. He is the author of *Vietnam's Unheld Elections* (1966) and *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation* (1969). At present he is engaged in a study of the impact of a resurgent Japan on Southeast Asia.

ROBERT H. DONALDSON is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University. He is author of a forthcoming book on Soviet policy toward India, and co-author (with D. J. Waller) of *Stasis and Change in Revolutionary Elites: A Comparative Analysis of the 1956 Party Central Committees in China and the USSR* (1970). He is currently engaged in further cooperative research on political leadership in Communist systems.

TETSUYA KATAOKA is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He is currently finishing a monograph concerning the war of national liberation in China.

ALAN ZUCKERMAN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Brown University. He is currently at work on a book dealing with party factions in the Italian Christian Democrat Party, and a study of the links between social divisions and political groups.

ERIK P. HOFFMANN, Associate Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Albany, is co-editor of *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* (1971). He is presently engaged in research on the development of the social sciences in the Soviet Union and on Soviet administrative behavior.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATION-BUILDING OR NATION-DESTROYING?

By WALKER CONNOR*

SCHOLARS associated with theories of "nation-building" have tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as merely one of a number of minor impediments to effective state-integration. To the degree that ethnic identity is given recognition, it is apt to be as a somewhat unimportant and ephemeral nuisance that will unquestionably give way to a common identity uniting all inhabitants of the state, regardless of ethnic heritage, as modern communication and transportation networks link the state's various parts more closely. Both tendencies are at sharp variance with the facts, and have contributed to the undue optimism that has characterized so much of the literature on "nation-building."

It is not difficult to substantiate the charge that the leading theoreticians of "nation-building" have tended to slight, if not totally ignore, problems associated with ethnic diversity. A consultation of the table of contents and indices of books on "nation-building" will quickly convince the doubtful that the matter is seldom acknowledged, much less accorded serious consideration.[1] In order to be justified, such omissions

* This article is an expanded version of a paper presented at the Seventh World Congress of the International Sociological Association, held at Varna, Bulgaria, in September, 1970.

[1] A representative sampling of the literature on integration theory might well include the following titles: (1) Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960); (2) Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966); (3) Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston 1963); (4) David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965); (5) Willard A. Beling and George O. Totten, eds., *Developing Nations: Quest for a Model* (New York 1970); (6) Karl W. Deutsch and William Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York 1966); (7) Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., *Political Development and Social Change* (New York 1966); (8) Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia 1964); (9) Lucian Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963); and (10) Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston 1966). The inclusion of five readers on the list, with an aggregate of well over fifty separate contributions, substantially broadens the sample.

None of these ten works dedicates a section, chapter, or major subheading to the matter of ethnic diversity. By contrast, the roles of the military, the bureaucracy, social classes, personality, industrialization, urbanization, and transaction flows and other modes of communication are common entries in tables of contents. In instances in which the tables of contents contain categories that might be expected to include a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must be occasioned either by the fact that most states are ethnically homogeneous or that ethnic diversity poses no serious problems to integration.

The former possibility is readily eliminated by reference to the actual ethnic composition of contemporary states. The remarkable lack of coincidence that exists between ethnic and political borders is indicated by the following statistics. Of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 (9.1 per cent) can be described as essentially homogeneous from an ethnic viewpoint. An additional 25 states (18.9 per cent of the sample) contain an ethnic group accounting for more than 90 per cent of the state's total population, and in still another 25 states the largest element accounts for between 75 and 89 per cent of the population. But in 31 states (23.5 per cent of the total), the largest ethnic element represents only 50 to 74 per cent of the population, and in 39 cases (29.5 per cent of all states) the largest group fails to account for even half of the state's population. Moreover, this portrait of ethnic diversity becomes more vivid when the number of distinct ethnic groups within states is considered. In some instances, the number of groups within a state runs into the hundreds, and in 53 states (40.2 per cent of the total), the population is divided into more than *five* significant groups.[2] Clearly,

---

serious discourse on the ramifications of ethnicity—categories such as "Internal Legitimacy" or "National Identity"—further investigation proved unrewarding.

The slighting of ethnicity is further evidenced by the indices. Six of the ten show not a single reference to ethnic groups, ethnicity, or minorities. Two make a single passing reference to ethnicity, and still another accords to all types of minorities less than two pages, limiting the discussion to their impact upon democracy. The tenth work, a collection of papers, represents only a partial exception. Discussion of the impediments that ethnicity, *per se*, poses to state-integration is limited to general comments in an introductory essay. Moreover, in this essay the author assumes that the matter is one of relatively short duration, in line with the second tendency described in this paper's introductory sentence.

It should be acknowledged that readers dealing with "nation-building" are apt to contain a few regional or country studies whose authors are well aware of the fissiparous impact of ethnic diversity therein. (In one of the above works, for example, a contribution on sub-Sahara Africa and another on Ceylon clearly demonstrate such an awareness.) But the significant fact is that the issue of ethnic diversity is not perceived by the editors as one that transcends the particular case(s). If the format of a book, as reflected in both its table of contents and index, fails to recognize the problem of ethnicity as more than a local phenomenon, the user of the book is hardly likely to do so.

The above ten works, as noted, are believed to be representative. But two decidedly nonrepresentative titles should be noted: The concept of ethnicity pervades Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston 1960); and an important segment of Charles W. Anderson and others, *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs 1967) is dedicated to a serious treatment of the issue.

[2] The 132 units include all entities that were generally considered to be states as of January 1, 1971, with the exception of a few microunits such as Nauru and Western Samoa. However, East and West Germany, North and South Korea, and North and South Vietnam were treated as single entities in the belief that such treatment would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

then, the problem of ethnic diversity is far too ubiquitous to be ignored by the serious scholar of "nation-building," unless he subscribes to the position that ethnic diversity is not a matter for serious concern.

The validity of this position apparently also rests upon one of two propositions. Either loyalty to the ethnic group is self-evidently compatible with loyalty to the state, or, as mentioned earlier, ethnic identification will prove to be of short duration, withering away as modernization progresses. More consideration will be later given to the matter of the two loyalties (i.e., to the ethnic group and to the state), but clearly the two are not naturally harmonious. One need only reflect on the ultimate political dissection of what was once known as the Habsburg Empire, or contemplate the single most important challenge to the political survival of Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Guyana, Kenya, Nigeria, the Sudan, Yugoslavia, and a number of other multiethnic states. The theoretician of "nation-building" may well contemplate some proposal that he believes will reduce the matter of competing loyalties to manageable proportions (such as confederalism or cultural autonomy); but, if so, his proposal is an important element in his model and should occupy a prominent place in his writing.[3]

As to the assumption that ethnic identity will wither away as the processes collectively known as modernization occur, it is probable that those who hold this premise have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by the writings of Karl Deutsch. It is debatable, however, whether such an opinion concerning the future of ethnic identity can be properly inferred from his works. His perception of the intereffects

minimize their distorting effects. It should not be assumed that the inclusion of all microunits would substantially alter the statistics in favor of homogeneity. In the case of Nauru, for example, despite a population of only 6,500, the largest ethnic element fails to constitute a majority.

[3] See, for example, Arnold Rivkin, *Nation-Building in Africa* (New Brunswick 1969). After reviewing a number of problems throughout Africa, many of which he readily acknowledges are essentially ethnic (e.g., pp. 35-37, 195, 196, and 226), the author concludes (p. 238): "Although the divided populations of Africa—of different tribes, ethnic origin (as the Watusi and Bahutu in Rwanda and Burundi), religions (Christian, Islamic, animistic, etc.), and historical background—pose serious and major problems for nation-building, compared to the Latin American divisions, developed over centuries, and involving an intermixture of race, social structure, and economic status, they seem relatively manageable and over time susceptible of solution." No further details concerning a solution are offered, however, and the reader is therefore asked to accept this optimistic forecast solely on faith.

One of the most perplexing illustrations of a failure to confront a problem of ethnic diversity is offered by Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1962). Although the politically dominant Burmese have been involved in open ethnic warfare with that country's minorities almost uninterruptedly since that state achieved independence, and although this continuing struggle unquestionably represents that state's most visible and significant barrier to integration, a passing reference to some of the minorities is limited to a single page.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of what he calls "social mobilization" and of assimilation (i.e., "nation-building," so far as identity is concerned) is not always clear and appears to have undergone significant fluctuations. But given the magnitude of his influence, a closer scrutiny of his works appears warranted in order to define and evaluate more clearly his conclusions concerning the significance that ethnic identity possesses for "nation-building."

Deutsch's most famous work, *Nationalism and Social Communication*,[4] illustrates the problem of defining his position with precision. On the one hand, this work contains a few passing acknowledgements that increasing contacts between culturally diverse people *might* increase antagonisms.[5] On the other hand, there are several passages that might lead the reader to conclude that Deutsch was convinced that modernization, in the form of increases in urbanization, industrialization, schooling, communication and transportation facilities, etc., would lead to assimilation. Even the development and extensive discussion of the concept of social mobilization, in a book ostensibly dedicated to the analytical study of nationalism, implied an important relationship between the two. Moreover, it was in a chapter entitled "National Assimilation or Differentiation: Some Quantitative Relationships" that Deutsch discussed the factors that determined, in his view, the rate of social mobilization. Then, after discussing the rates of mobilization and of assimilation separately, he strongly intimated a causal or reinforcing interrelationship:

> Thus far we have treated all the rates of change as completely independent from each other. . . . However, we already know empirically that the rate of assimilation among a population that has been uprooted and mobilized—such as immigrants coming to America—is usually considerably higher than the rate of assimilation among the secluded populations of villages close to the soil. . . . Probably the theoretical investigation of these quantitative aspects of the merging or splitting of nations could be carried still further. One reason to stop here might be that we know now what statistical information is worth looking for, but that there seems little point in going further until more of the relevant statistics have been collected.[6]

[4] *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, Mass.). The first edition was published in 1953 and the second, which contains no substantive changes, in 1966. All references to page numbers in this paper correspond to the second edition.

[5] See, for example, p. 126: "Linguistically and culturally, then, members of each group are outsiders for the other. Yet technological and economic processes are forcing them together, into acute recognition of their differences and their common, mutual experience of strangeness, and more conspicuous differentiation and conflict may result."

[6] *Ibid.*, 152.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Later, in summarizing the same chapter, Deutsch noted:

> A decisive factor in national assimilation or differentiation was found to be the process of social mobilization which accompanies the growth of markets, industries, and towns, and eventually of literacy and mass communication. The trends in the underlying process of social mobilization could do much to decide whether existing national trends in particular countries would be continued or reversed.[7]

In the following chapter, Deutsch discussed the rate of assimilation in terms of six balances of both quantitative and qualitative factors, and then restated what he conceived to be the relationship between the rates of mobilization and assimilation.

> Assimilation among people firmly rooted in their own communities and their native setting usually proceeds far more slowly than it would among the mobilized population, but it does proceed even though it may take many generations. . . . Any more general quantitative comparison between the relatively high assimilation speeds among mobilized persons and the considerably lower assimilation speeds among the underlying population remains to be worked out. Likewise to be worked out would have to be the *mutual interaction* of the different rates of change which thus far have been discussed as if they were wholly independent of each other.[8]

Such citations would appear to justify the interpretation that Deutsch felt that modernization, by socially mobilizing large segments of the population, would increase both the likelihood and the tempo of their assimilation. Such a conclusion was lent further credence by Deutsch's optimistic view that the matter of assimilating diverse ethnic groups is subjectable to social engineering. Concluding a discussion of the role of the policy-maker, he noted: "Too often men have viewed language and nationality superficially as an accident, or accepted them submissively as fate. In fact they are neither accident nor fate, but the outcome of a discernible process; and as soon as we begin to make the process visible, we are beginning to change it."[9]

By 1961, Deutsch's view of the relationship between social mobilization and assimilation appeared to have undergone a fundamental change. Mobilization was now seen as being apt to have the opposite effect upon assimilation.

> Other things assumed equal, the stage of rapid social mobilization may be expected, therefore, to promote the consolidation of states whose peoples already share the same language, culture, and major social in-

[7] *Ibid.*, 188. [8] *Ibid.*, 162, 163; emphasis added. [9] *Ibid.*, 164.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> stitutions; while the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life.[10]

The practical consequences of this altered view, in terms of what it portended for the survival of that preponderant number of non-industrialized states which are multiethnic, was blunted, however, by Deutsch's immediate addendum that all things, in any event, are not equal. More specifically, he contended that ethnic identity would prove no match for the power of self-interest.

> In the last analysis, however, the problem of the scale of states goes beyond the effects of language, culture, or institutions, important as all these are. In the period of rapid social mobilization, the acceptable scale of a political unit will tend to depend eventually upon its performance. . . . At bottom, the popular acceptance of a government in a period of social mobilization is most of all a matter of its responsiveness to the felt needs of its population.[11]

An essay written by Professor Deutsch two years later indicated a swing back to his earlier position. In a return to his earlier optimism concerning the impact of modernization upon ethnicity, he chided unnamed authors for maintaining that ethnic divisions constituted a long-run challenge to "nation-building."

> Tribes, we know from European history, can change their language and culture; they can absorb other tribes; and large tribes come into existence through federation or mergers of smaller tribes or through their conquest and absorption by a larger one.
>
> In contrast to this picture of plasticity and change, many writings on African and Asian politics still seem to treat tribes as fixed and unlikely to change in any significant way during the next decades. Yet in contemporary Asia and Africa, the rates of cultural and ethnic change, although still low, are likely to be faster than they were in early medieval Europe. . . . Research is needed to establish more reliable figures, but it seems likely from the experience of ethnic minorities in other parts of the world that the process of partial modernization will draw many of the most gifted and energetic individuals into the cities or the growing sectors of the economy away from their former minority or tribal groups, leaving these traditional groups weaker, more stagnant, and easier to govern.[12]

[10] Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 501.

[11] *Ibid.* It may be instructive that Deutsch offered negative examples of this phenomenon (e.g., the secession of the U.S. and Ireland from Britain), but no examples of ethnic groups submerging their identity because of effective government.

[12] Karl Deutsch, "Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research," in Deutsch and Foltz (fn. 1), 4-5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Later in the essay, Deutsch specified four stages by which he anticipated assimilation would take place:

> Open or latent resistance to political amalgamation into a common national state; minimal integration to the point of passive compliance with the orders of such an amalgamated government; deeper political integration to the point of active support for such a common state but with continuing ethnic or cultural group cohesion and diversity; and, finally, the coincidence of political amalgamation and integration with the assimilation of all groups to a common language and culture—these could be the main stages on the way from tribes to nation. Since a nation is not an animal or vegetable organism, its evolution need not go through any fixed sequence of these steps. . . . Yet the most frequent sequence in modern Asia and Africa may well be the one sketched above. How long might it take for tribes or other ethnic groups in a developing country to pass through some such sequence of stages? We do not know, but European history offers at least a few suggestions.[13]

In sharp contrast to this optimistic prediction concerning the fate of the new states of Africa and Asia are the views expressed by Deutsch in his most recent work on nationalism,[14] views which more closely approximate those expressed in his 1961 article. As in that article, and unlike the position he took in the still earlier *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Deutsch now treated assimilation and mobilization as two causally isolated processes.[15] The only relationship between the two that was discussed is chronological, i.e., the question of which antedates the other:

> The decisive factor in such situations is the balance between the two processes that we have been discussing. If assimilation stays ahead of mobilization or keeps abreast of it, the government is likely to remain stable, and eventually everybody will be integrated into one people. . . . On the other hand, where mobilization is fast and assimilation is slow the opposite happens.[16]

Although this position echoed that expressed by Deutsch in 1961,[17] he no longer contended that the logical consequences of this analysis could be avoided by increasing state services and benefits. The result is

[13] *Ibid.*, 8-9. It is worth noting that in discussing these prospective stages of assimilation, Deutsch cited several of his own works, including *Nationalism and Social Communication*, thereby indicating his feeling that that work was fully compatible with this view of the ultimate eradication of ethnic divisiveness.

[14] Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (New York 1969).

[15] One indication of a change of attitude toward the problem of assimilation is that while it played a central role in *Nationalism and Social Communication*, the process of assimilation is allocated less than two pages in his most recent work and is treated in terms of its "dimensions" rather than its "components." See pp. 25-27.

[16] Deutsch (fn. 14), 27.

[17] See above, pp. 323-24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a note of pessimism not detected in his 1961 analysis, and one that seems to be diametrically opposed to his unequivocal optimism of 1963:

> We have seen that the more gradually the process of social mobilization moves, the more time there is for social and national assimilation to work. Conversely, the more social mobilization is postponed, the more quickly its various aspects—language, monetization, mass audience, literacy, voting, urbanization, industrialization—must eventually be achieved. But when all of these developments have to be crowded into the lifetime of one or two generations, the chances for assimilation to work are much smaller. The likelihood is much greater that people will be precipitated into politics with their old languages, their old outlook on the world and their old tribal loyalties still largely unchanged; and it becomes far more difficult to have them think of themselves as members of one new nation. It took centuries to make Englishmen and Frenchmen. How are variegated tribal groups to become Tanzanians, Zambians, or Malavians in one generation?[18]

If Deutsch's most recent analysis of the interrelationship between social mobilization and assimilation is accepted, that is, if it is granted that the connection between the two is in no way causal but purely chronological, then it is difficult to perceive what predictive value the concept of social mobilization holds for the "nation-builder." To say, "if assimilation stays ahead of mobilization or keeps abreast of it . . . eventually everybody will be integrated into one people" is in fact to say very little. If assimilation progresses, then clearly assimilation will be achieved.[19] And to add, as Deutsch does, "where mobilization is fast and assimilation is slow, the opposite happens," is not to furnish the state planner with a guide for action, but is to deny that the matter is subjectable to social engineering. If assimilation, in those cases where and when it can be achieved, is a lengthy process requiring generations, and if Professor Deutsch is not recommending that the states of the third world be immunized from modernization (and in the preceding quotation he states that such an immunization is impossible), then what is left is the conclusion that where assimilation has not yet been achieved, it is highly unlikely to be.

Professor Deutsch's most recent book therefore provides no brief for

[18] Deutsch (fn. 14), 73.

[19] Another example of this tautology can be found on page 68, *ibid.* Referring to earlier cases of national integration, Deutsch concludes that "*the combined processes of social mobilization and* assimilation eventually turned them into consolidated peoples and nations." If the italicized words are omitted, the statement is an evident truism in that it defines assimilation. Indeed, to the degree that social mobilization presupposes the industrial age and relatively modern transportation and communication networks, the statement as worded is false. The Chinese nation, and nearly all others, antedate the Industrial Revolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those who assume that ethnicity will wane as modernization progresses. The opposite is the case. On the other hand, some of his earlier comments, and particularly those in which he propounded four stages of assimilative growth, could indeed be cited as supporting this school of thought. Regardless of the interpretation one places upon Deutsch, however, the doctrine that modernization dissolves ethnic loyalties can be challenged on purely empirical grounds.

If the processes that comprise modernization led to a lessening of ethnic consciousness in favor of identification with the state, then the number of states troubled by ethnic disharmony would be on the decrease. To the contrary, however, a global survey illustrates that ethnic consciousness is definitely in the ascendency as a political force, and that state borders, as presently delimited, are being increasingly challenged by this trend.[20] And, what is of greater significance, multiethnic states at all levels of modernity have been afflicted. Particularly instructive in this regard is the large proportion of states within the technologically and economically advanced region of Western Europe that have recently been troubled by ethnic unrest. Examples include (1) the problems of Spain with the anti-Castilian activities of the Basques, the Catalans, and on a lesser level, the Galicians; (2) the animosity indicated by the Swiss toward foreign migrant workers, and the demands of the French-speaking peoples of Berne for political separation from the German-speaking element; (3) the South Tyroleans' dissatisfaction with Italian rule, currently muffled by recent concessions on the part of the Italian Government; (4) evidence of Breton unhappiness with continued French rule; (5) the resurgence of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, the conflict in Northern Ireland, and the wide-scale popularity of anti-immigrant sentiments epitomized in the figure of Enoch Powell—all within the United Kingdom; and (6) the bitter rivalry of the Walloon and Flemish peoples within Belgium. Outside of Europe, the challenge to the concept of a single Canada represented by the Franco-Canadian movements, and the existence of black separatist movements within the United States also bear testimony that even the combination of a lengthy history as a state and a high degree of technological and economic integration does not guarantee immunity against ethnic particularism.

That social mobilization need not lead to a transfer of primary allegiance from the ethnic group to the state is therefore clear. Can we go beyond this to posit an inverse correlation between modernization

[20] For a treatment of this trend as a global phenomenon, see Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, XX (October 1967), 30-53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the level of ethnic dissonance within multiethnic states? Admittedly, there is a danger of countering the assumption that the processes of modernization lead to cultural assimilation with an opposing iron law of political disintegration which contends that modernization results, of necessity, in increasing demands for ethnic separation. We still do not have sufficient data to justify such an unequivocal contention. Nonetheless, the substantial body of data which is available supports the proposition that material increases in what Deutsch termed social communication and mobilization *tend* to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate interethnic conflict. Again, the large and growing number of ethnic separatist movements can be cited for substantiation.

There are many statesmen and scholars, however, who would protest this macroanalytical approach because the data cited for support contain a number of former colonies. The inclusion of former dependencies in a list purporting to substantiate a correlation between modernization and ethnicity is improper, they would contend, because ethnic consciousness was deliberately kept alive and encouraged by the colonial overseers as an element in a policy of divide-and-rule. The prevalence of ethnic consciousness and antagonism in these territories is therefore held to be the product of the artificial stimuli of colonial policy. Otherwise, ethnicity would not constitute a serious problem for the new states.

The validity of such a conviction can be tested by contrasting the experience of former colonies with that of industrially retarded, multiethnic states that did not undergo a significant period as a colony. No important distinctions are discernible on this basis. Consider, for example, the cases of Ethiopia and Thailand, both of which have enjoyed very lengthy histories as independent states.[21] Diverse ethnic elements were able to coexist for a lengthy period within each of these states because the states were poorly integrated, and the ethnic minorities therefore had little contact, with either their (mostly theoretic) state-governments or with each other. Until very recent times, then, the situation of the minorities was not unlike the situation of ethnic groups within colonies where the colonial power practiced that very common colonial policy of ruling through the leadership of the various ethnic groups. In all such cases, the conflict between alien rule and the ethnic group's determination to preserve its lifeways was minimized. The governments of these underdeveloped states may well have long desired to make their rule effective throughout their entire territory, but advances in communications and transportation were necessary before

[21] It is assumed that Ethiopia's very short period of domination by Italy in the 1930's does not invalidate its use as an example of a state without a colonial history.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a governmental presence could become a pervasive reality in the remote territories of the minorities.

As a result of this new presence, resentment of foreign rule has become an important political force for the first time. In addition, quite aside from the question of who rules, there is the matter of cultural self-preservation. An unintegrated state poses no serious threat to the lifeways of the various ethnic groups. But improvements in the quality and quantity of communication and transportation media progressively curtail the cultural isolation in which an ethnic group could formerly cloak its cultural chasteness from the perverting influences of other cultures within the same state. The reaction to such curtailment is very apt to be one of xenophobic hostility.

Advances in communications and transportation tend also to increase the cultural awareness of the minorities by making their members more aware of the distinctions between themselves and others. The impact is twofold. Not only does the individual become more aware of alien ethnic groups; he also becomes more aware of those who share his identity. Thus, the transistor radio has not only made the formerly isolated, Lao-speaking villager of northeast Thailand aware of linguistic and other cultural distinctions between himself and the politically dominant Siamese-speaking element to the west; it has also made him much more aware of his cultural affinity with the Lao who live in other villages throughout northeast Thailand and across the Mekong River in western Laos.[22] Intraethnic as well as interethnic communications thus play a major role in the creation of ethnic consciousness.

As an end result of these processes, Thailand is today faced with separatist movements on the part of the hill tribes in the north, the Lao in the northeast, and the Malays in the south.[23] Similarly, as a result of growing cultural self-awareness by minorities and an increasing presence of the central government, the state of Ethiopia, despite its three-thousand-year history, is also currently faced with a number of ethnic separatist movements.[24] Other underdeveloped, multiethnic states

[22] For a more complete discussion of the relationship of communications distance to physical distance, see Connor, "Myths of Hemispheric, Continental, Regional, and State Unity," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXIV (December 1969), particularly 565-67.

[23] For a fascinating account of how increased contacts have strengthened Lao identity, see Charles F. Keyes, "Ethnic Identity and Loyalty of Villagers in Northeast Thailand," *Asian Survey*, VI (July 1966), 362-69.

[24] See the perspicacious comment concerning Ethiopia by a newspaper reporter: "Lack of communications helped hold this empire together. Now developing communications and the political awareness they encourage are straining its unity." (Frederick Hunter in the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 1970.)

Problem areas include not just the rather recently acquired Eritrea, but also Bale and Gojam Provinces. See the *New York Times*, April 1, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without a history of colonialism indicate a similar pattern.[25] The colonial and noncolonial patterns are not significantly different.

Another challenge to the contention that modernization tends to exacerbate ethnic tensions may also be anticipated. As was noted earlier, the recent upsurge in ethnic conflict within the more industrialized, multiethnic states of Europe and North America seriously challenges the contention that modernization dissipates ethnic consciousness. But does not this upsurge also run counter to the assertion that modernization increases ethnic consciousness? Given the fact that the Industrial Revolution was introduced into each of these states more than a century ago, should not the high-tide mark of ethnic consciousness have appeared long ago? Part of the answer may be found in what Marxists term "The Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality," a paraphrase of which might read "enough of a quantitative difference makes a qualitative difference." The processes of modernization prior to World War II did not necessitate or bring about the same measure of international contacts as have developments in the postwar period. With fewer and poorer roads, far fewer and less efficient private cars, local radio rather than state-wide television as the primary channel of non-written mass communications, lower levels of education and of knowledge of events beyond one's own experience, and lower general income levels that kept people close to home, ethnic complacency could be maintained: Brittany's culture appeared safe from French encroachment, Edinburgh felt remote and isolated from London, most Walloons and Flems seldom came into contact (including artificial contact through media such as television) with members of the other group. In short, the situation of ethnic groups within these states was not totally dissimilar from that which was described earlier with regard to non-industrialized societies.[26] The difference was only one of degree until that point was reached at which a qualitative change occurred. However, the point at which a significant number of people perceived that the cumulative impact of the quantitative increases in the intensity

[25] Cases in point would include Afghanistan, Iran, and Liberia. Many of the Latin American States would also qualify. For a treatment of the latter, see Anderson and others (fn. 1), 45-56. For more details on growing ethnic awareness in Thailand and South Asia, see Connor, "Ethnology and the Peace of South Asia," *World Politics*, XXII (October 1969), 51-86.

[26] One piece of evidence that there are substantial distinctions in the pervasiveness of pre- and post-World War II *inter*group, *intra*state contacts is offered by American regionalism. As will be noted below, regionalism, in contradistinction to ethnicity, does tend to evaporate in direct proportion to the intensity of interregional communication and transportation networks. Yet regionalism, as manifested in concepts like "states' rights" and in voting blocs and voting patterns, was still strong following World War II. The most enduring manifestation of American regionalism, "the Solid South," has shown symptoms of dying only in recent years.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of intergroup contacts now constituted a threat to their ethnicity represented, in political terms, a qualitative transformation.

Perhaps an even more important factor in explaining the recent upsurge of militant ethnic consciousness in advanced as well as less advanced states involves not the nature or density of the communications media, but the message. Although the expression "self-determination of nations" can be traced to 1865,[27] it did not receive great attention until its endorsement by a number of world-renowned statesmen during the World War I era. Moreover, by their failure, after the war, to apply this doctrine to the multiethnic empires of Belgium, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, the statesmen indicated that they did not consider self-determination an axiom of universal validity. Not until after World War II was the doctrine officially endorsed by an organization aspiring to global jurisdiction.[28] It is therefore of very recent vintage. But despite its short history, it has been widely publicized and elevated to the status of a self-evident truth. Today, lip service is paid to it by political leaders of the most diverse persuasions. Admittedly, the doctrine has often been misapplied, having been regularly invoked in support of all movements aimed at dissolving a political allegiance, regardless of the basis for secession. But in its pristine form, the doctrine makes ethnicity the ultimate measure of political legitimacy, by holding that any self-differentiating people, simply because it *is* a people, has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself. In recent years, with its wide acceptance as a universal truth, the doctrine has induced minorities in Europe and North America, as well as in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to question the validity of present political borders. It has therefore been more than a justification for ethnic movements: it has been a catalyst for them. The spreading of effective communications has had an evident impact upon ethnic consciousness, but the full impact of the communications media did not precede the message of self-determination.

Still another element contributing to the upsurge in ethnic consciousness is the evident change in the global political environment, which makes it much more unlikely that a militarily weak polity will

[27] The expression appeared as part of the Proclamation on the Polish Question, endorsed by the London Conference of the First International. The Proclamation noted "the need for annulling Russian influence in Europe, through enforcing the right of self-determination, and through the reconstituting of Poland upon democratic and social foundations." Cited in G. Stelkloff, *History of the First International* (New York 1968), 85. For a reference to a still earlier use of the expression by Karl Marx in his *Herr Vogt* (1860), see Stefan Possony, "Nationalism and the Ethnic Factor," *Orbis*, x (Winter 1967), 1218.

[28] United Nations Charter, art. I, par. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be annexed by a larger power. During the age of colonialism, the probability of that eventuality was sometimes so great as to encourage independent units to seek the status of a protectorate in order to be able to select rule by the lesser evil. By contrast, a number of relatively recent developments, including what is termed the nuclear stalemate, cause independence to appear as a more enduring prospect for even the weakest of units. Thus, a favorable environment, the generating and justifying principle of self-determination, an expanding list of successful precedents, and a growing awareness of all these factors because of increased communications, are all involved.

A summary of our findings thus far would consist of the following points. The preponderant number of states are multiethnic. Ethnic consciousness has been definitely increasing, not decreasing, in recent years. No particular classification of multiethnic states has proven immune to the fissiparous impact of ethnicity: authoritarian and democratic; federative and unitary; Asian, African, American, and European states have all been afflicted. Form of government and geography have clearly not been determinative. Nor has the level of economic development. But the accompaniments of economic development—increased social mobilization and communication—appear to have increased ethnic tensions and to be conducive to separatist demands. Despite all this, leading theoreticians of "nation-building" have tended to ignore or slight the problems associated with ethnicity.

If we turn to an analysis of the reasons for this wide gap between theory and reality, twelve overlapping and interrelated possibilities offer themselves.

(1) CONFUSING INTERUTILIZATION OF THE KEY TERMS, NATION AND STATE:

It may appear whimsical to begin with the often picayune matter of semantics. It is very doubtful, however, that any discipline has been more plagued by the improper utilization of its key terms than has international relations. Anthropologists often bemoan the nebulosity underlying the concept of race—an ambiguity which has been reflected in many unscientific theories, which, in turn, have required time-consuming repudiations. But, though the concept of race is a matter of great significance to anthropology, it is not the key concept, that being *man*. By contrast, the concept of the state and of man's relationship to the state are at the heart of international relations. Yet, despite their key roles, both of these concepts are shrouded in ambiguity because of careless use of terms.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Consider first the concept of the state and the manner in which it is commonly treated as synonymous with the vastly different concept of the nation. The League of Nations, the United Nations, and, indeed, the expression *international relations* are but a few of the many available illustrations of the fact that statesmen and scholars are inclined to the indiscriminate interuse of the two concepts.[29] Why this confusion in terminology has been perpetuated is difficult to explain, for authorities are certainly well aware of the distinctions between the state and the nation. Thus, a dictionary designed for the student of global politics defines the state as "a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political institutions and an effective government."[30] By contrast, a nation is defined as "a social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity." It carefully adds: "A nation may comprise part of a state, be coterminous with a state, or extend beyond the borders of a single state." Writers of textbooks and monographs in international relations generally also detail these same distinctions between state and nation. Unfortunately, however, these same writers are then apt to revert to the indiscriminate interutilization of the two terms.[31]

It is probable that the tendency to equate the two expressions de-

[29] *The Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations* [*sic*], 3d ed., I (New York 1967), 254-57, lists fifty intergovernmental organizations whose names begin with *International.* Not one of them has anything to do with nations.

[30] Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary* (New York 1969).

[31] See, for example, A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (2d rev. ed., New York 1968), 12: "The story we are about to tell is a tale of nations. Nations are the major characters, and it is with their actions, their goals and plans, their power, their possessions, and their relations with each other that we shall be concerned." See also Deutsch (fn. 14), where, despite defining the word nation to mean a people (i.e., an ethnic group) in charge of a state (p. 19), the author refers to the multiethnic populations of Spain (p. 13), and of Belgium (p. 70), as nations. See, too, the concluding paragraph of Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington 1967) in which he notes that "more than 130 nations, real or so-called, will each make its contribution to the history of the late twentieth century." The author had earlier (e.g., p. 36) differentiated between state and nation. For evidence that studies dealing specifically with the problems that ethnic diversity poses for state integration are also not necessarily immune from improper interuse of terminology, see Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution," *World Politics*, XXII (July 1970), particularly 597-98. "First, in spite of the oft-used distinction between a fairly coercive domestic order and a fairly noncoercive international order, the jockeying for power of ethnic groups within states corresponds markedly to that of *nation* and *nation*. . . . New and more productive 'decades of development,' with their presumed attempts at re-allocation, may be as indispensable to the comity among ethnic groups within the state as they are among the *nations* of the world." (Emphasis added.) Examples abound of this tendency to use key terms improperly, so the authorities who are singled out in this and the following footnotes are *not* selected because they have been unusually uncircumspect in their terminology. On the contrary, they have been selected, in part, because they are acknowledged scholars.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

veloped as alternative shorthand substitutes for the hyphenate, *nation-state*. This term is also supposed to have a precise meaning, referring to a situation in which the borders of the nation approximate those of the state. We have noted that, technically speaking, less than 10 per cent of all states would qualify as essentially homogeneous. But authorities nevertheless tend to refer to all states as nation-states.[32]

The confusion wrought by the misuse of these terms has long hampered the study of many aspects of interstate relations, but it has especially impeded the understanding of nationalism. More particularly, loyalty to the nation has often been confused with loyalty to the state. Again, this confusion has been reflected in, and largely caused by, inappropriate terminology.

The definitions of state and nation quoted above make clear that what we have thus far been calling self-differentiating ethnic groups are in fact nations. Loyalty to the ethnic group, therefore, should logically be called nationalism. But nationalism, as commonly employed, refers to loyalty to the state (or to the word *nation*, when the latter has been incorrectly substituted for state).[33] Thus, the same dictionary whose precise definitions of state and nation we have just cited defines *nationalism* as a mass emotion that "makes the *state* the ultimate focus of the individual's loyalty." (Emphasis added.) With the term *nationalism* thus preempted, scholars have felt compelled to offer a substitute to describe loyalty to the nation. Regionalism, parochialism, primordialism, communalism, ethnic complementarity, and tribalism are among those that have been advanced. Unfortunately, however, the perpetuation of the improper use of the word *nationalism* to refer to devotion to the state, while using other terms with different roots and with fundamentally different connotations to denote devotion to the nation, is hardly conducive to dissolving the confusion surrounding the two loyalties.[34] On the contrary, it is conducive to dangerously

[32] See for example Norman J. Paddleford and George A. Lincoln, *The Dynamics of International Politics* (2d ed., New York 1967), 7: "The actors in the international political system are the independent nation-states." Or Louis J. Halle, *Civilization and Foreign Policy* (New York 1952), 10: "A prime fact about the world is that it is largely composed of nation-states." And Elton Atwater and others, *World Tensions: Conflict and Accommodation* (New York 1967), 16: "Since there are some 120 different nation-states in the world . . ." Karl Deutsch also regularly refers to all states as nation-states. See, for example, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (fn. 14), 61, 125, and 176. For his description of the multiethnic states of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia as nation-states, see 62-63.

[33] Meanwhile, expressions such as *statism* or *étatisme*, which should refer to loyalty to the state, have been assigned still other meanings that have little to do with loyalty of any sort.

[34] See, for example, the section in Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague 1968), entitled "Parochialism, Nationality, and Nationalism," 32-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

underestimating the magnetism and the staying power of ethnic identity, for those terms simply do not convey the aura of deeply felt, emotional commitment that *nationalism* does. Every schoolboy is made aware, for example, that the German and Celtic tribes of antiquity became obliterated in a higher identity; that regionalism within the United States or Germany has steadily receded in significance. By contrast with these vanquished forces, the schoolboy learns that nationalism is a vibrant force that has largely shaped the direction of global politics for the past two hundred years. But since *nationalism* is equated with loyalty to the state, the student has been preconditioned to perceive the state as the certain ultimate victor in any test of loyalties with these lower-form anachronisms that have been proven to be ephemeral.

If the nation-state were in fact the universal form of polity, the confusion would not be important. In those cases in which the nation and the state essentially coincide, the two loyalties mesh rather than compete. A common pitfall of scholarship, however, has been to equate the resulting emotional attachment to a nation-state with loyalty to the state alone. The study of nationalism in the late twentieth century has been heavily influenced by the experiences of Germany and Japan, perceived as illustrations of the extreme dedication that nationalism is able to evoke. The implication is that other states have the potential for evoking the same type of mass response, though, it is to be hoped, in a less fanatical form. Largely ignored is the fact that these two states are among the very few that are ethnically homogeneous.[35] As such, *Deutschland* and *Nippon* have been something far more profound to their populations than mere territorial-political units called states; they have been ethno-psychological inclinations called nations. To perceive German or Japanese nationalism as loyalty to the state is to miss the mark badly. It is also to distort beyond recognition the power to evoke loyalty to the state in the absence of a linking of state and nation in the popular psyche. With that linkage, the leaders can voice their appeals in terms of the state (*Deutschland*) or the nation (*volksdeutsch*, *Volkstum*, *Volksgenosse*), because the two trigger the same associations. The same is true for members of the politically dominant group in some multiethnic states. Thus, the Han Chinese are apt to view the state of China as the state of their particular nation, and are there-

33. As used therein, parochialism refers to loyalty to the ethnic group, and nationality and nationalism refer to identity with, and loyalty to, the state.

[35] One manifestation has been the grouping of the *nationalism* of Japan and Germany during the 1930's and early 1940's with that of Italy and of multiethnic Argentina and Spain under the single rubric of Fascism, a doctrine positing the superiority of the corporate state.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fore susceptible to appeals either in the name of China or in the name of the Han Chinese people. But the notion of *China* evokes quite different associations, and therefore quite different responses, from Tibetans, Mongols, Uighurs, and other non-Han people. The confusing use of terminology has diverted scholars for some time from asking the key question: How many examples come to mind of a strong "state-nationalism" being manifested among a people who perceive their state and their nation as distinct entities?

The likelihood of contemporary scholars being diverted from the posing of this question would have been greatly reduced had the misnomer, "nation-building," not been adopted. Since most of the less developed states contain a number of nations, and since the transfer of primary allegiance from these nations to the state is generally considered the *sine qua non* of successful integration, the true goal is not "nation-building" but "nation-destroying." Would scholars have been less sanguine concerning the chances of success if proper terminology had been employed? Certainly they would have been less likely to ignore, or to dismiss lightly, the problem of ethnic identity, the true nationalism.[36]

(2) A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND A RESULTING TENDENCY TO UNDERRATE ITS EMOTIONAL POWER:

In its broadest implications, this reason for the failure of authorities to pay proper heed to ethnicity is the end product of all other reasons. If so understood, it is a statement of the problem rather than an explanation. However, as used here, it is intended to point to the tendency of scholars to perceive ethnic nationalism in terms of its overt mani-

[36] See, for example, Rothchild (fn. 31), 598. "Second, the interethnic confrontation raises questions about the unifying potential of nationalism. Although nationalism has effectively repulsed the claims of metropolitan hegemony in a number of crucial confrontations, it has still to demonstrate the ability to overcome 'primordial sentiments' and to foster a sense of common purpose." By equating nationalism with loyalty to the state, Rothchild is unwittingly criticizing nationalism for not being able to overcome itself. Nonetheless, if his pessimism persisted, his basic analysis concerning the relative strength of ethnic and state loyalty would be sound. However, he later criticizes the authors of a number of books dealing with ethnic problems for emphasizing the depth of the cleavages rather than the positive possibilities for "ethnic balancing." They represent "an all-too-general preoccupation with the nature of past cleavages and conflicts instead of with the evolving dimensions of the process of political integration" (p. 612). "They tell us more about cleavages than about links, more about conflict than about cooperation and reciprocity. Their details are sharply delineated; however, the complete picture requires somewhat greater attention to adjustment, interrelatedness, adaptation, and exchange" (p. 615). One suspects that the author might have been more likely to question whether he was not asking for answers to the unanswerable if he had been aware that nationalism was on the side of state-disintegration rather than state-integration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

festations rather than in terms of its essence. The essence of the nation is not tangible. It is psychological, a matter of attitude rather than of fact.

In accordance with an earlier quoted definition, we can describe the nation as a self-differentiating ethnic group. A prerequisite of nationhood is a popularly held awareness or belief that one's own group is unique in a most vital sense. In the absence of such a popularly held conviction, there is only an ethnic group. A distinct group may be very apparent to the anthropologist or even to the untrained observer, but without a realization of this fact on the part of a sizable percentage of its members, a nation does not exist.

Because the essence of the nation is a matter of attitude, the tangible manifestations of cultural distinctiveness are significant only to the degree that they contribute to the *sense* of uniqueness. Indeed, a sense of vital uniqueness can come about even in the absence of important, tangible cultural characteristics of a distinctive nature, as evidenced by the ethnopsychological experience of the American colonists, the Afrikaners, and the Taiwanese with regard to their former British, Dutch, and Han Chinese identities. Conversely, the concept of a single nation can transcend tangible cultural distinctions, such as the Catholic-Lutheran division within the German nation.[37]

Any nation can, of course, be described in terms of its particular amalgam of tangible characteristics, for example, in terms of the number of its members, their physical location, their religious and linguistic composition, and so forth. But one can so describe any human grouping, even such an unimportant categorization as the New Englander. By intuitively valuing that which they have in common with other Americans more than that which makes them unique, the New Englanders have self-relegated themselves to the status of a subnational element. By contrast, the Ibos clearly place greater importance on being Ibo than on being Nigerian. It is, therefore, the self-view of one's group, rather than the tangible characteristics, that is of essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a nation.

The abstract essence of ethnic nationalism is often not perceived by the observer. There is an understandable propensity, when investigating a case of ethnic discord, to perceive the struggle in terms of its more readily discernible features. Thus, Ukrainian unrest is popularly re-

[37] Since the concept of the nation does not preclude significant internal divisions, it actually embodies two important levels of attitudes. Relative to *intranational* distinctions and similarities, the stress, when need be, is upon those traits that unite; relative to distinctions and similarities among nations, the ultimate stress is upon those that divide.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ported as an attempt to preserve the Ukrainian language against Russian inroads; Belgium's major problem is also viewed as essentially linguistic; the Ethiopian-Eritrean, as well as the Northern Ireland conflict, is seen as religious; the Czecho-Slovak, the West Pakistani-Bengali, and the Serbo-Croatian disputes are characterized as essentially matters of economic differentiation. Linguistic, religious, and economic distinctions between peoples are all easily discerned and, what is of at least equal moment, are easily conveyed to one's audience.

This propensity to perceive an ethnic division in terms of the more tangible differences between the groups is often supported by the statements and actions of those most involved. In their desire to assert their uniqueness, members of a group are apt to make rallying points of their more tangible and distinguishing institutions. Thus, the Ukrainians, as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity, wage their campaign for national survival largely in terms of their right to employ the Ukrainian, rather than the Russian, tongue in all oral and written matters. But would not the Ukrainian nation (that is, a popular consciousness of being Ukrainian) be likely to persist even if the language were totally replaced by Russian, just as the Irish nation has persisted after the virtual disappearance of Gaelic, despite pre-1920 slogans that described Gaelic and Irish identity as inseparable?[38] Is the language the essential element of the Ukrainian nation, or is it merely a minor element which has been elevated to *the symbol* of the nation in its struggle for continued viability? National identity may survive substantial alterations in language, religion, economic status, or any other tangible manifestation of its culture. Nevertheless, not only do those involved in an ethnic dispute tend to express their own national consciousness in terms of tangible symbols, but they also tend to express their aversion to the other nation in terms of ostensibly readily identifiable attributes. Seldom will a person acknowledge that he dislikes a member of another group simply because the latter is Chinese, Jewish, Ibo, Afro-American, Italian, or what have you. There is a very common compulsion to express what are fundamentally emotional responses to foreign stimuli (prejudices) in more "rational" terms. "They" are inclined to laziness (or aggressiveness), crime, having too many children, and, if a minority, to disloyalty. "They" are prejudiced toward us, haughty in their dealings, disparaging of our culture, determined to take unfair economic advantage, intent on forcing their

[38] Still other examples would include the resurgence of Scottish and Welsh nationalism even among those who are linguistically assimilated to English.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

culture and standards upon us, and relegating us to an inferior status.[39] Employment, crime, birth, income, emigration, life-expectancy, and bilingual statistics of varying reliability and applicability are among the data commonly advanced as tangible evidence of such allegations. Thus is the "idea" made flesh.

As a result of the tendency for both participant and reporter to describe ethnopsychological phenomena in terms of tangible considerations, the true nature and power of ethnic feelings are not probed. Indeed, in many cases analysts fail to realize they are dealing with ethnic nationalism. Northern Ireland offers a contemporary case in point.

Strife in the northern six counties of Ireland has been treated almost exclusively as a religious conflict, a quaint echo of the intranational religious wars of a bygone age that saw Frenchmen pitted against Frenchmen, German against German, and so forth. To the degree that Northern Ireland's problem has not been viewed as religious, it has been treated as a civil rights struggle for political and economic reform. In fact, it is neither in its essence; rather, it is a struggle predicated upon fundamental differences in national identity. Contrary to the typical account, the people of Northern Ireland do not uniformly consider themselves Irish.[40] Indeed, a survey, conducted in 1968 by representatives of the University of Strathclyde, indicates that a majority do not. Although 43 per cent of the respondents thought of themselves as being Irish, 29 per cent considered themselves to be British, 21 per cent Ulster, and the remaining 7 per cent considered themselves to be of mixed, other, or uncertain nationality.[41]

[39] The pioneering efforts of the late Hadley Cantril in the study of the stereotype images that one group holds of another are of great pertinence and value to the study of ethnic nationalism. The value of the work of Cantril and of those scholars most influenced by him is lessened only slightly because the objects described are the populations of countries rather than ethnic groups. When asked to select those adjectives that best describe the people of another country, it is probable that the respondent envisages the politically dominant ethnic group of that state (e.g., British is perceived as English, South African as Afrikaner, Czechoslovakian as Czech, etc.). A more important limitation lies in the fact that the responses are not tabulated according to the ethnicity of the respondents. There is still another factor: the adjectives which are usually employed in such studies cannot adequately convey the depth of irrational hatred which may be involved. Negative attributes, such as *backward, domineering, conceited*, and even *cruel*, are of a different order than are the unarticulated passions that can cause Cambodians to massacre huge numbers of unarmed Vietnamese civilians; Balinese, Javanese, and Malays to massacre Chinese; the Bahutu to massacre the Watusi; the Hausa, the Ibo; or the Turks, the Armenians.

[40] For an example of a typical account, see Linda Charlton's article in the *New York Times*, August 15, 1969, in which she describes the crisis as "Irishman against Irishman" and "Prods" (Protestants) against Catholics.

[41] Richard Rose, *The United Kingdom as a Multinational State* (Glasgow 1970), 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unfortunately, the survey failed to correlate national identity with the religion of the respondents, but it is safe to assume, on the basis of the ethnic and religious histories of the island, that there exists a close correlation between self-identification as Irish and adherents to Catholicism.[42] The important distinction, however, lies between those who consider themselves Irish, and those who either do not so consider themselves or are not so considered by the bulk of the Irish element. That the religious issue is largely extraneous helps to account for the fact that the consistent urging of tolerance by all but a handful of religious leaders has gone unheeded.[43] Indeed, with at least as much accuracy, the conflict could be described as one of surnames rather than religions. Despite some intermarriage, the family name remains a relatively reliable index to Irish heritage, as compared to English or Scottish.[44] It is for this reason that a surname is apt to trigger either a negative or positive response. One tragic manifestation of this phenomenon has been the tendency of militant Irishmen (described as Catholics) to be particularly aggressive toward Scottish units of the British forces sent from the island of Great Britain, because of the preponderance of Scottish names among Northern Ireland's non-Irish population.[45] In popular Irish perception, their local enemies and the Scottish troops are linked in their common foreignness and Scottishness.

To the knowledge of this writer, there has been only one account of the strife in Northern Ireland that has placed it in its proper context:

> In Ulster, especially, much of the tension dates to the 17th century. After yet another round of fighting the Irish Catholics, the British encouraged Englishmen and Scotsmen to settle in Northern Ireland

[42] The religious composition is 35 per cent Catholic, 29 per cent Presbyterian (Church of Scotland), 24 per cent Episcopal (Church of England), 10 per cent other Protestant, and 2 per cent other. *Ibid.*, 13.

[43] See the *New York Times*, January 24, 1971, for an account of a protest demonstration by Belfast women before a Catholic Bishop's house because he had given a sermon advising Catholics not to have anything to do with the outlawed Irish Republican Army.

Evidence that the basic driving force of Irish militancy has been not simply the desire for civil reform is offered by the fact that reforms promoted by the moderate government of Chichester-Clark were followed by greater militancy on the part of the Irish element.

[44] A notable exception is Terrence O'Neill, the former, moderate Prime Minister. An awareness within Northern Ireland's political community that strong emotions are often associated with surnames caused his colleagues to presume that his name would prove a real asset in gaining the respect and trust of the Irish minority.

[45] See the *New York Times*, April 30, 1970. See also the *New York Times* of two days earlier, where it was reported that order was restored in Belfast only after Scottish troops were replaced by English troops.

As is evident from the above-mentioned survey on national identification, the term Scotch-Irish is a misleading ethnic description. It simply refers to people whose Scottish ancestors emigrated to Ireland, but it need not indicate any Irish ancestry.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> and tame the natives. The native Catholics have hated these invading Protestants ever since—not only as Protestants but also as outsiders with different customs and greater privileges. Then as now, the friction was as much social as religious.[46]

If one substitutes *ethnic* or *nationalistic* for *social* in the last sentence, one will perceive that the conflict in Northern Ireland is not very distinct in its primary cause from the struggle between Flem and Walloon in Belgium, between *les Anglais* and *les Canadiens* in Canada, Lao and Thai in Thailand, Ibo and Hausa in Nigeria, or "Asian" and "African" in Guyana. But how different is the image of the nature, depth, and intractibility of Northern Ireland's problem raised by this analysis from the image raised by C.L. Sulzberger's statement that "they are all Irish and therefore love a fight: formidable men and easily stirred to passion. . . . All Irish, whether they favor Green or Orange, enjoy a fight."[47]

In summary, ethnic strife is too often superficially discerned as principally predicated upon language, religion, customs, economic inequity, or some other tangible element. But what is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is that divergence of basic identity which manifests itself in the "us–them" syndrome. And the ultimate answer to the question of whether a person is one of us, or one of them, seldom hinges on adherence to overt aspects of culture. This issue has been at the core of the Israeli Government's long and still unsuccessful attempt to define a Jew. For political and legal purposes, the government may demand adherence to one of the denominations of the Judaic faith as a test of Jewishness. But, as the government is well aware, there are many self-proclaimed agnostics, atheists, and converts to other faiths who are, in the most thorough and psychologically profound sense of the word, Jewish. And there are practicing members of the Judaic faith who are not ethnically Jewish. The Judaic faith has, of course, been an important element of Jewish nationalism, as, to a lesser degree, Catholicism and Irish nationalism are related. But an individual (or an entire national group) can shed all of the overt cultural manifestations customarily attributed to his ethnic group and yet maintain his fundamental identity

[46] *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 1969. A somewhat similar analysis appeared in the letter to the editor column of the *New York Times* on July 12, 1970, signed John C. Marley. "But the religious persuasions of the opposing elements are only incidental to the underlying political question, which is whether the six counties of Northern Ireland shall be ruled by a foreign power. The overwhelming majority of the Irish people, North and South, are united in their desire that the British get out of Ireland. The only exception to this view comes from a British ethnic group which constitutes a local majority, not in the entire six occupied counties, but in a small enclave within a thirty mile radius of Belfast."

[47] *New York Times*, July 10, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as a member of that nation. Cultural assimilation need not mean psychological assimilation.

(3) AN UNWARRANTED EXAGGERATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF MATERIALISM UPON HUMAN AFFAIRS:

A number of authorities have noted a propensity on the part of American statesmen and scholars of the post-World War II era to assume that economic considerations represent the determining force in human affairs. Programs of foreign assistance, for example, have been promoted and defended on the ground that the economic status of a state correlates directly with its form of government, political stability, and aggressiveness.[48] Policy-makers in the United States have also attempted to defuse a number of highly charged interstate (and interethnic) conflicts by making cooperation between the adversaries a condition of material recompense (for example, the Jordan, Indus, and Mekong River projects). The Marshall Plan, Point Four, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the Alliance for Progress could all be interpreted as attempts to alter attitudes by appealing to material self-interest.

This presumption—that economic considerations constitute the primary force which shapes the basic ideas and attitudes of man—has had an evident impact upon much of the literature concerned with political integration. An ethnic minority, it is implicitly or explicitly held, will not secede from a state if its living standards are improving, both in real terms and relative to other segments of the state's population.[49] Such a prognosis again underestimates the power of ethnic feelings and ignores contrary evidence: With regard to the matter of economic inequity among groups, for example, there are a number of cases in which the ethnic consciousness of a minority and its animosity toward the dominant element became accentuated although the income gap between the group and the dominant element was being rapidly closed. The Flemish of Belgium and the Slovaks of Czechoslovakia are cases in point.[50] Indeed, there are even cases in which separatist movements exist despite the fact that the group from which they emanate is more advanced economically than is the politically dominant element. The Croatians and Slovenes of Yugoslavia and the Basques and Catalans of Spain exemplify this situation. As to the matter of real rather than

[48] For descriptions of this tendency, see Hans Morgenthau, "The American Tradition in Foreign Policy," in Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (3d ed., Englewood Cliffs 1967), 254, and Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles in the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York 1968), 120-21.

[49] As noted earlier, Karl Deutsch explicitly held this opinion in 1961.

[50] Afro-Americans within the United States may offer a comparable case.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comparative economic status, we have noted earlier that multiethnic states at all economic levels have been troubled by growing ethnic discord. Economic considerations may be an irritant that reinforces ethnic consciousness. And, as noted, those most involved in the conflict may present the issue in economic terms. But economic factors are likely to come in a poor second when competing with the emotionalism of ethnic nationalism. Numerous colonial ties were severed irrespective of whether or not they were economically beneficial to the colonial people. Separatists (whether Anguillan, Eritrean, Naga, or Welsh) are not apt to be dissuaded by the assertion that the nation is too small to comprise an economically viable unit. There is a simple, yet profound message of the broadest applicability in the slogan, "Better a government run like hell by Filipinos than one run like heaven by Americans."

(4) UNQUESTIONED ACCEPTANCE OF THE ASSUMPTION THAT GREATER CONTACTS AMONG GROUPS LEAD TO GREATER AWARENESS OF WHAT GROUPS HAVE IN COMMON, RATHER THAN OF WHAT MAKES THEM DISTINCT:

A number of authorities have also noted that American foreign policy is heavily influenced by an optimistic view of human affairs in which man is seen as essentially rational and possessed of good will, and therefore preordained to find reasonable answers to problems.[51] As applied to ethnicity, this optimism is manifest in the conviction that misunderstandings among nations are due to lack of knowledge concerning each other. Greater contacts, it would follow, should lead to greater understanding and harmony. One manifestation of this belief is the person-to-person diplomacy that forms the rationale of the Peace Corps and official sanctioning of massive cultural and educational exchange programs. It is also evident in the lack of official concern that the presence of large numbers of Americans in a foreign state is apt to trigger a xenophobic response.[52] This view also probably helps to account for the slighting of ethnicity in works dealing with political in-

[51] Particularly significant for the present discussion is the comment of Gabriel Almond: "This overt optimism is so compulsive an element in the American culture that factors which threaten it, such as failure . . . are pressed from the focus of attention and handled in perfunctory ways." *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York 1961), 50-51. See also Frederick Hartman, *The New Age of American Foreign Policy* (New York 1970), 58.

[52] Contrast, for example, the American practice of encouraging huge numbers of American troops to furlough in Bangkok, to the Soviet practice of minimizing the Russian presence in such states as the United Arab Republic. For a discussion of the impact of a foreign presence upon a guerrilla struggle, and the sharp contrast in awareness of this impact between the United States on the one hand, and China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam on the other, see Connor (fn. 25), 51-86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tegration. If greater contacts, brought about by more intensive communication and transportation networks, promote harmony, ethnic heterogeneity is not a matter worthy of serious consideration.

We have noted, however, that the contacts occasioned by modernization have in fact had the opposite tendency. The optimistic position fails to consider that, while the idea of being friends presupposes knowledge of each other, so does the idea of being rivals. Indeed, the self-awareness which is the *sine qua non* of the nation requires knowledge of non-members. The conception of being unique or different requires a referent, that is, the idea of "us" requires "them." Minimally, it may be asserted that increasing awareness of a second group is not certain to promote harmony, and is at least as likely to produce, on balance, a negative response. With an empirical eye to the evidence of growing ethnic consciousness and discord, we can add that the latter is much more likely.

(5) IMPROPER ANALOGIZING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:

Many works on political integration contain direct reference to the successful assimilationist history of the United States as evidence that the basic identity of people can be rather easily transferred from the ethnic group to a larger grouping coterminous with the state.[53] It is probable, moreover, that the "melting pot" idea has had an unarticulated influence upon much larger numbers. If broad-scale assimilation could occur within the United States, practically without design, why not elsewhere? If an extremely diverse ethnic hodgepodge became quite naturally a single American nation, one may well expect the same process to occur quite naturally elsewhere. The analogy is a dangerous one, however.

A denial of the pertinence of the American experience does *not* rest upon the recent surge of interest in ethnic matters within the United States. There has been a recent spate of monographs and articles clearly documenting that the melting process has not yet caught up with the myth, and that pre-American national heritage remains an important index to neighborhood, voting patterns, associations, and so forth.[54] Moreover, large numbers of people within the United States who formerly played down their pre-American heritage have recently been demonstrating a new pride in it. But these facts are not necessarily germane to the study of ethnic nationalism. Nor do they materially

[53] See, for example, Karl Deutsch's comment, cited above on p. 322.

[54] Particularly recommended for their incisiveness are the works of Norman Glazier, Milton Gordon, and Daniel Moynahan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alter the fact that an impressively high level of assimilation has been achieved within the United States. Total melting has not yet occurred and may never occur, but it has made great strides and is progressing on a significant scale. In addition, even if the upsurge in ethnic pride should prove to be more than a vogue, it does not follow that the upsurge is a manifestation of ethnic nationalism. It was noted earlier that the concept of a single nation does not preclude internal divisions. Lesser "us–them" relationships can exist within a single nation, so long as in any test of allegiance the larger "us" of the nation proves more powerful than the divisive call of a particular region, religion, pre-American ethnic heritage, or whatever. There is nothing necessarily incompatible between stressing one's Italian or Polish cultural heritage and the American nation.

Black nationalism, by contrast, may directly challenge the larger "us" of the American nation. Although many diverse attitudes and goals are cloaked under the single rubric of black nationalism, an essential element is its insistence that what has hitherto been known as the American nation has in fact been a white nation. In refusing to identify with the American nation, and in postulating a rival black nation, black nationalism constitutes a nationalism in the most correct sense of the word.[55] This is so whether the nationalist advocates "two nations, one state" or actual political separation. Black nationalism is therefore a legitimate object of inquiry in the study of ethnicity as a global phenomenon. But, as noted, assimilation among white Americans is not an appropriate model for situations elsewhere.

The key factor that differentiates the process of assimilation in the United States is that the impetus for assimilation has come principally from the unassimilated, not from the dominant group. The typical non-African immigrant *voluntarily* left his cultural hearth and traveled a substantial distance, in both a physical and a psychological sense, to enter a different ethnopolitical environment which recognized no notable political or psychological relationship with his former homeland. Moreover, in any one generation, he and other immigrants of

[55] It is not implied that most Afro-Americans are black nationalists. The percentage is not known. An incisive study would have to learn also what percentage of black nationalists are separatists. It is highly probable that a substantial percentage of those who would be apt to identify themselves as black nationalists have not speculated concerning the precise goal they have in mind beyond a concept of true equality. Attitudes concerning the desirability of various forms of assimilation (schools, business, sports, marriage, etc.) would probably represent the best index as to whether or not one envisaged a separate nation. But it does not follow that attitudinal surveys can validly determine such attitudes. For a thoughtful critique of such surveys by an experienced practitioner, see Arnold Rose, *Migrants in Europe* (Minneapolis 1969), 100 ad passim.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his particular ethnicity were few in number relative to the dominant, Anglo-Saxonized, American population. Although he may well have lived (and his descendants may still live) in an ethnic ghetto where his native language and customs lingered on, the ghetto was neither sufficiently large nor economically adequate to permit the fulfillment of his most ambitious aspirations, whether of an economic-, prestige-, or power-oriented nature. He was constantly aware of being part of a larger cultural entity that pervaded and shaped the ghetto in countless ways,[56] and he realized that cultural assimilation was necessary if the more obvious limits to his ambitions were to be pushed back. As a result of all this, ethnic problems within the United States have not been characterized primarily by the resistance of minorities to assimilation, but by the unwillingness or inability of the dominant group to permit assimilation at the rate desired by the unassimilated.

Elsewhere, the typical ethnic problem is reversed, with the pressure for assimilation popularly being viewed by the minority as originating with the dominant group. Consider the case of a French-Canadian living within the large, predominantly French Province of Quebec. He lives in an ethnic homeland, which has been continuously inhabited by Frenchmen since before the coming of *les Anglais* and which is laden with emotional overtones. English-speaking people and their culture are therefore seen as invaders, aliens in a French-Canadian land. Moreover, the French-Canadian community is sufficiently large to accommodate visionary success totally within the ethnic confines.[57] As a result, there is little to entice the individual to surrender his own culture, and much—in terms of the reinforcing quality of the forces and symbols of his environment—to cause him to resent and resist the intrusion of the outside culture. In contrast to the United States where assimilation has, on balance, been viewed by the minority as a voluntary act, anything that necessitates a degree of assimilation takes on an aura of either physical or psychological coercion.[58] The universality of this response has led to the rapid spread of the expression "cultural imperialism." And the response is self-generating, as it exacerbates ethnic sensibilities and causes what was considered innocent yesterday

[56] Government institutions and services (particularly schools), trans-ghetto communications media, advertising, and elections are but a few of the outside forces affecting the ghetto.

[57] This aspect of size helps to account for the fact that professional people are often disproportionately represented among those desiring total separation. Belgium, Canada, and Ceylon all offer cases in point. Since goals in a less sophisticated society are apt to be of lesser magnitude, a smaller community may suffice in less modern situations.

[58] The need to be fluent in the dominant tongue in order to obtain a decent position in the central bureaucracy is a common example.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be perceived as offensive today. Interethnic tensions are thereby magnified and the pale hopes of assimilation made still more dim.

In sum, then, analogies drawn from the experience of the United States are apt to be specious. A proportionately small number of people who have voluntarily left their cultural milieu to enter an alien politico-cultural environment in which cultural assimilation is perceived positively as indispensable to success is one thing; a situation characterized by two or more large groups, each ensconced in a territory it considers its traditional homeland and cultural preserve is something quite different. The second situation characterizes the overwhelming number of ethnic struggles.

(6) IMPROPER ANALOGIZING FROM THE FACT THAT INCREASES IN COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION HELP TO DISSOLVE CULTURAL DISTINCTIONS AMONG REGIONS WITHIN WHAT IS FUNDAMENTALLY A ONE-CULTURE STATE, TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SAME PROCESS WILL OCCUR IN SITUATIONS INVOLVING TWO OR MORE DISTINCT CULTURES:

It is evident that increased contacts between regions of the United States have tended to weaken sectionalism. Country-wide media of communication (particularly television and motion pictures), the interregional movement of people, the geographic suffusion of industry and its products, and the increasing standardization of education have all tended to homogenize the United States. Among the more evident factors that attest to this trend are the fading of formerly clear election patterns along sectional lines (for instance, "the Solid South," or Republican northern New England) and the progressive elimination of sharp distinctions among local customs in matters such as dialect, humor, dress, and music. But if one is dealing not with variations of a single culture-group, but with distinct and self-differentiating culture groups, then increased contacts, as we have noted, tend to produce disharmony rather than harmony. Discord between the Basques and Castilians, the Czechs and Slovaks, the Russians and Ukrainians, the Walloons and Flemish, the Welsh and English, the French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, and the Serbs and Croats has increased with increased contacts. The same development has been noted in the case of Thailand and of Ethiopia. Increased contacts tend to have one impact in a one-culture situation, and quite a different impact in a variegated culture area.[59]

[59] This inverse relationship causes the use of the term *regionalism* to be a particularly dangerous and inappropriate substitute for *ethnic nationalism*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(7) THE ASSUMPTION THAT ASSIMILATION IS A ONE-DIRECTIONAL PROCESS:

If assimilation is assumed to be irreversible, then any evidence of a move toward assimilation becomes an irrevocable gain and a basis for optimism. Thus, because the Scottish and Welsh people had undergone generations of acculturation, including almost total linguistic assimilation, and because the concept of a British national identity did indeed possess an important measure of meaning to the preponderant numbers of Scots and Welshmen, authorities were for years almost unanimous in their conviction that homogeneity of identity had once and for all been achieved.[60] The sudden upsurge in Scottish and Welsh nationalism during the 1960's illustrates, however, that assimilation may indeed be reversed so long as some glimmer of a separate ethnic identity persists.

(8) INTERPRETATION OF THE ABSENCE OF ETHNIC STRIFE AS EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF A SINGLE NATION:

The existence of a single national consciousness that is shared by all segments of the population of a state *cannot* be deduced simply from the absence of overt ethnic conflict. Such a conclusion is always dangerous, for, just as the fervor with which ethnic nationalism is embraced and the form in which it is manifested can vary substantially among individuals, so too, can it fluctuate widely within a particular nation over time. Few would contend that German nationalism is dead, although it is obviously more subdued, and following different channels, than was the case in the 1930's. Periods in which nationalism takes on more passive forms may be followed by periods of militant nationalism and vice versa. In addition, the bilateral relations between ethnic groups, just as those between states, vary greatly. They may range along a continuum from a genocidal relationship to a symbiotic one. The fact that Canada and the United States have dwelt for generations alongside one another without warfare has not meant that they

[60] Richard Rose is among those authorities. In 1964 he observed that "today politics in the United Kingdom is greatly simplified by the absence of major cleavages along the lines of ethnic groups, language, or religion. . . . The solidarity of the United Kingdom today may be due to fortuitous historical circumstances; it is nonetheless real and important." *Politics in England* (Boston 1964), 10 and 11. But by 1970, the situation had changed so drastically that Professor Rose entitled a work *The United Kingdom as a Multi-National State* (fn. 41). On page 1, Rose lists L. S. Amery, Samuel Beers, Harry Eckstein, Jean Blondel, and S. E. Finer as recent writers who have failed to detect the potential significance of ethnic divisions within the United Kingdom. These men were hardly unique in their failure to anticipate the great change in attitude about to manifest itself in Scotland and Wales. See, for example, Connor (fn. 20), 39n., in which this author acknowledged but underestimated the imminent power of the Scottish nationalist idea. See, also, J. D. Mackie, *A History of Scotland* (Baltimore 1964), 367-70, in which a scholar also fails to appreciate the submerged but emerging power of Scottishness among his own people.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

form a single state. So, too, the absence of hostilities between neighboring ethnic groups does not confirm a single transgroup identity. We have already noted that separate ethnic groups may coexist, at least for a time, within the same political structure. Influential factors include the degree of cultural self-awareness, the minority's perception of the nature and magnitude of the threat to the preservation of the group as a unique entity, and the reputation of the government for the relative ruthlessness with which it is apt to respond to "treasonable" acts. But coexistence—even when peaceful—should not be construed as proof of a single nation.

The error of misconstruing the absence of strife between ethnic groups as indicative of national unity has not been restricted to peaceful situations. Another common pitfall has been to impute a single national consciousness to militant movements whose ranks include members of different ethnic groups. Ethnic consciousness is not an automatic bar to cooperative, nor even to coordinated or integrated, activities against a mutually perceived enemy or in pursuit of a mutually desired goal. A number of ethnic groups can, and often do, march under the same banner and shout the same slogans. All too often, however, such a composite movement has been misidentified as a manifestation of a single, all-embracing nationalism. In the waning days of colonialism, for example, diverse segments of the population of British India were agreed upon the desirability of ridding the subcontinent of alien rule, and this movement for the eradication of British control was generally described as Indian nationalism (further subdivided into Indian and Moslem nationalism after 1930). It would have been more accurate to characterize the movement as a wartime alliance, similar in many respects to those entered into by states. Just as alliances among states tend to weaken as the threat recedes or the goal nears attainment, so too the period dating from the British announcement of intention to withdraw has been one of rather steady deterioration of the interethnic bonds within the successor states. Comparable multiethnic, anticolonial movements exist today in a few remaining colonies, such as Angola and Mozambique. They also prevail in a number of post-colonial situations, as in Burma, northern Borneo, western New Guinea, and throughout the cordillera of Indochina. Any such multiethnic alliance is comprised of a number of national movements, but it is not itself coincidental with a single nation. The absence of ethnic discord between specified ethnic groups—whether manifested by passivity or by positive, cooperative action—cannot be assumed to be evidence of one national consciousness.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The tendency to see ethnic unity in the absence of overt ethnic discord has had an important impact upon theories of "nation-building." It helps to explain the very common habit of describing Western Europe as though it were composed of fully integrated states, which, as we have noted, most certainly is not the case. Western Europe is therefore held up as a model of something it is not, as proof that something can be achieved elsewhere that is in fact far from achieved there.[61] A second outgrowth of this tendency is to view outbreaks of ethnic nationalism on an *ad hoc* basis rather than as only one contemporary manifestation of a more enduring global phenomenon. An outbreak of ethnic hostilities in Malaysia, in Jamaica, in Burundi, in Spain, or in Canada is viewed as an isolated phenomenon, soon forgotten by most outside observers after a more peaceful relationship has been reinstituted. The ubiquity and significance of ethnic nationalism are therefore not fully appreciated.

(9) IMPROPER REGARD FOR THE FACTOR OF CHRONOLOGICAL TIME AND INTERVENING EVENTS WHEN ANALOGIZING FROM ASSIMILATIONIST EXPERIENCES PRIOR TO "THE AGE OF NATIONALISM":

In emphasizing the manner in which the nations of Western Europe and Eastern Asia were created from rather disparate ethnic materials, authorities have failed to consider that the fact that the models predate the nineteenth century may obviate their pertinence to the current scene. No examples of significant assimilation are offered which have taken place since the advent of the age of nationalism and the propagation of the principle of self-determination of nations.

By and large, those peoples who, prior to the nineteenth century, were seduced by the blandishments of another culture—those who became "them"—were not aware of belonging to a separate culture-group with its own proud traditions and myths. There was no keen competi-

[61] For a number of illustrations of this tendency to confuse the absence of ethnic warfare with the presence of nation-states throughout Western Europe, see Connor (fn. 20). Those who have been confused include such notables as John Stuart Mill, Lord Acton, Ernest Barker, and Alfred Cobban; their errors extended *inter alia* to the United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland, and Spain. Similarly, the perspicacious Frederick Engels once wrote: "The Highland Gaels (Scottish) and the Welsh are undoubtedly of different nationalities to what the British are, although *nobody* will give to these remnants of peoples *long gone by* the title of nations, any more than to the Celtic inhabitants of Brittany in France. . . ." Cited in Roman Rosdolsky, "Worker and Fatherland: A Note on a Passage in the Communist Manifesto," *Science and Society*, XXIX (Summer 1965), 333; emphasis added. In his most recent work, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (fn. 14), Karl Deutsch also employs Western Europe as a regional model of successfully integrated states. And in both editions of *Nationalism and Social Communication* (fn. 4), Deutsch describes the Bretons, Flemish, Franco-Canadians, Franco- and German-Swiss, Scots, and Welsh as totally assimilated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion for group allegiance. By contrast, peoples today are everywhere much more apt to be cognizant of their membership in a group with its own mythical genesis, its own customs and beliefs, and perhaps its own language, which *in toto* differentiate the group from all others and permit the typical individual to answer intuitively and unequivocally the question, "What are you?" The spontaneous response, "I am Luo" rather than Kenyan, or "Bengali" rather than Pakistani, does not bode well for the architect of a nation-state.

As we have noted, there are numerous reasons for this increase in ethnic consciousness since the early nineteenth century, among them the great increase in the frequency, scope, and type of interethnic and intraethnic group contacts. At least in terms of "assimilationist time" (the time required to produce full assimilation), the radio, telephone, train, motor vehicle, and aircraft are recent innovations, postdating the advent of the age of nationalism and its standard of ethnicity as the basis of political legitimacy. As noted, there is little evidence of modern communications destroying ethnic consciousness, and much evidence of their augmenting it. The movement prior to the nineteenth century appears to have been toward assimilation into a number of larger nations, but since that time the movement appears to be toward the freezing of existing ethnic groups. Examples from the other side of the watershed must therefore be approached most cautiously.

(10) IMPROPER REGARD FOR DURATIVE TIME BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT ATTEMPTS TO TELESCOPE "ASSIMILATIONIST TIME," BY INCREASING THE FREQUENCY AND SCOPE OF CONTACTS, MAY PRODUCE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE:

If the matter of chronological time could be overcome, there would remain the matter of durative time. As indicated by the resurgence of Scottish nationalism, the total assimilation of a large people predominating in a particular territory requires a period of long duration extending over several generations. To be successful, the process of assimilation must be a very gradual one, one that progresses almost without visibility and awareness.[62] Since the essence of national identity is psychological and involves self-acceptance, a greater intensity of contacts, whether by accident or design, will conceivably not only fail to speed up the process, but will prove to be counterproductive. By their very numbers, the Han Chinese furnish proof of being history's most successful assimilators; but the many people of riverine and coastal China were sinified only over many centuries. Programmed attempts

[62] This statement presupposes that the government is not prepared to take such extreme measures as coercive population transfers and forced intermarriages.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

since 1949 to speed up the process of sinifying the remaining minorities has led to increased ethnic consciousness and anti-Han resentment on the part of the minorities. So, too, the Soviet Union, despite more than a half-century of programmed assimilation, finds its "national question" not only unresolved but growing in intractability. Similarly, Franco's stepped-up attempt to eradicate Basque, Catalan, and Galician self-consciousness seems only to have magnified them. Rather than telescoping the process, more intensive contacts appear to generate a psychological rebuff. Variations in the tempo of contacts may determine whether a people moves slowly toward assimilation or rapidly toward ethnocentrism.

This relationship of assimilation to durative time casts serious doubt on whether the process of assimilation is subjectable to social engineering. Planning is more geared to action than to inaction, and more to a time span of one generation or less than to a multigenerational period. More important, however, is the fact that modernization largely dictates its own timetable. There is an inbuilt accelerator in the technological advances and other forces that causes a continuous "shrinking of the world" and the shrinking of its states as presently defined. The frequency and pervasiveness of intergroup contacts appear, therefore, to be fated to increase exponentially, regardless of the desire of the planner.

(11) CONFUSING SYMPTOMS WITH CAUSES:

Most of the theoretic writings on political integration, as noted earlier, have been characterized by an unwarranted degree of optimism. But as the newly formed states proved less cohesive than had been anticipated, explanations for their political disintegration have become increasingly common. Many of these explanations, however, confuse some of the symptoms and minor contributing elements of political decay with its primary cause.

For example, a paper dealing with political decay in sub-Sahara Africa[63] lists among its causes, in addition to colonialism and neocolonialism, (a) exaggerated notions of the actual power of the centralized government, (b) the weakening of "mass parties," (c) the lessening of political mobilization, (d) the reduction of the links between the state government and segments of the population, (e) inability of the state to satisfy the perceived needs of its human components, (f) the loss of

[63] Christian P. Potholm, "Political Decay in Post-Independence Africa: Some Thoughts on its Causes and Cures." Paper presented at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the New York State Political Science Association.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

charismatic aura earlier enjoyed by the key figure, and (g) a "praetorian impulse." The question of primary loyalty and, more particularly, of ethnic identity, is not listed. And, clearly, those factors which are listed do not constitute causes, but either symptoms [(a), (b), (d), (e), (f)] or minor elements applicable to only a few specific situations [(c) and (g)]. A giant step toward identifying the primary cause would be made by asking *why* the power of the central government proved to be exaggerated, *why* the "mass" parties proved unstable, *why* the government was not able to forge solid links with all segments of the population, and *why* the father-figures could not retain their popularity.

The prime cause of political disunity is the absence of a single psychological focus shared by all segments of the population. Admittedly, ethnic homogeneity is not in itself sufficient to guarantee such a consensus. The intraethnic Vietnamese struggle illustrates this point. But in the case of the multiethnic state, we have noted that, for most of the inhabitants, primary identity will not extend beyond the ethnic group. And all but a handful of the new states are multiethnic.

To illustrate the importance of ethnic consciousness as a barrier to the political integration of the multiethnic state, let us return to the example at hand. Surely ethnic nationalism is the single most momentous political fact of sub-Sahara Africa, and the fundamental identity that it posits goes far toward answering the questions we have posed. Earlier estimates of the strength of the central governments proved exaggerated because the loyalty of the people seldom extended beyond their own ethnic group. Indeed, considering sub-Sahara's short, post-colonial history, a remarkably large number of states (more than one-third) have already experienced ethnic fragmentation in its most flagrant form of civil war along ethnic lines.[64] Similarly, in most states the mass party has been primarily a means of masking ethnic rivalry; identification of the individual with the party has been missing.[65] As to the father-

[64] Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Uganda and Zambia. Congo (Brazzaville) also experienced open ethnic warfare on the eve of independence and Nkrumah suppressed Ashanti and Ewe separatist movements within Ghana early in his reign. Coups that took place in Dahomey and Sierra Leone were also justified as a means of avoiding ethnic warfare. Within Liberia, Tubman's government found an official guilty of treasonably attempting to start a civil, ethnic war. Ethnicity also plays an important role within the anti-Portuguese struggle in Angola and Mozambique, and ethnic violence has occurred in the French Territory of Afars and Issas.

[65] Edward Feit has orally referred to African political parties as "the continuation of tribal warfare by other means." See also his comment to this effect in "Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria," *World Politics*, XX (January 1968), 184.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

figures, they have tended to retain their position in the eyes of those who see them as ethnic leaders. Kenyatta still possesses charisma for the Kikuyu; his problem is with the Luo and other non-Kikuyu who see him as one of "them."[66]

It bears repeating that ethnic homogeneity is not by itself sufficient to guarantee a bond of unity so infrangible that it can withstand any and all fissiparous forces. The impact of institutions, economic opportunities, geography, literacy, urbanization, and a host of other factors may therefore be very germane to the study of the components of an efficacious identity. But the experience of multiethnic states, past and present, strongly suggests that the ethnic nation may well constitute the outer limits of that identity. If there are means of transferring primary identification and allegiance from the nation to the state, or if there are ways of satisfying national aspirations within a multiethnic state, these possibilities should certainly be explored. But the potent fissiparous force of ethnic particularism should not be obscured by ascribing its role of prime mover to its symptoms.

(12) THE PREDISPOSITIONS OF THE ANALYST:

The last in this list of possible contributing factors to the broadscale underassessment of the ramifications of ethnic nationalism is the most difficult to document: it involves the influence that the ideals of the analyst exert upon his perception. Given the multitude of overt manifestations of ethnic nationalism throughout Africa and Asia (as well as elsewhere), it is difficult to reconcile its total absence or cursory treatment in so many studies on development. Even *in toto*, the preceding eleven considerations do not satisfactorily account for this failure to recognize the significance of the ethnic factor. Eventually it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the predispositions of the analyst are

[66] Although not involving an African state, the overthrow of Norodom Sihanouk offers an instructive case concerning a very popular figure who for many years purposefully played the role of—and was popularly viewed by the Khmer people of Cambodia as—the foremost national (read "ethnic") leader. Following the palace coup, it was essential for the coup's leadership that Khmer loyalty to Sihanouk be transferred rapidly to the new government. To this end, the new government publicized a number of charges against the character and record of Sihanouk, most of which were false or exaggerated. The most effective charge, however, was, in effect, that Sihanouk had been "soft on Vietnamese," permitting the Viet Cong and other Vietnamese to violate the Khmer homeland with impunity. This charge, together with the unleashing of a general hate campaign against all ethnic Vietnamese, posed a dilemma for Sihanouk: How to maintain the mantle of Khmer nationalism while simultaneously acknowledging an alliance with Hanoi and the Viet Cong—an alliance he needed if he were to counter the forces at the disposal of the new Cambodian government. The anti-Sihanouk strategy was, therefore, to turn Khmer ethnic nationalism against its former foremost figure by depicting him as a traitor who was aiding the cause of an ethnic enemy of long standing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also involved; that the "nation-builder" passionately wishes the people of his academic purview well; that he is convinced that their ultimate well-being is tied to the vehicle of the state as presently constituted; and that his compassion has colored his perception so that he perceives those trends that he deems desirable as actually occurring, regardless of the factual situation. If the fact of ethnic nationalism is not compatible with his vision, it can thus be willed away. A related factor is the fear that ethnic nationalism will feed on publicity. In either case, the treatment calls for total disregard or cavalier dismissal of the undesired facts. Such an approach can be justified for the policy-maker, but not for the scholar.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE USES OF FOREIGN POLICY IN INDONESIA

An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries

By FRANKLIN B. WEINSTEIN*

MOST of the writing on foreign policy in the less developed countries stresses either the importance of idiosyncratic sources of policy or the identification of a number of relatively long-term factors which influence the formation of policy.[1] These studies are helpful in many ways, but in one important respect they are unsatisfying. They do not give us a clear picture of how foreign policy relates to the political and economic problems that constitute the essence of being a less developed country.[2] In most analyses foreign policy is pictured as having a pecu-

* This is a revised and shortened version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 1970. I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, which made it possible for me to carry out research in Indonesia from 1968 to 1970. The Fellowship Program of course bears no responsibility for any of the statements made in this article.

[1] Examples of accounts which emphasize idiosyncratic sources, especially the personalities and psychological problems of the top leaders, include: Werner Levi, *The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs 1968), 13-14 and 155-56; I. William Zartman, *International Relations in the New Africa* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), 47 and 53; Frederick P. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965," *Indonesia*, II (October 1966), 37-76; and W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966* (Princeton 1969). Long-term factors such as size and geographical location, historical and cultural background, and industrial and military capabilities are stressed in: William C. Johnstone, *Burma's Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963); Roger M. Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy* (Ithaca 1965); and Claude S. Phillips, Jr., *The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy* (Evanston 1964). Ideology is given substantial emphasis in Bunnell, and in Donald E. Weatherbee, *Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution* (New Haven 1966). The importance of domestic politics as a determinant of foreign policy has been argued by Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," *Asian Survey*, IV (June 1964), 904-13; by Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York 1958), 247-48; and by Phillips. Robert Curtis' "Malaysia and Indonesia," *New Left Review*, XXVIII (November-December 1964), 5-32, and George McT. Kahin's "Malaysia and Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVII (Fall 1964), 253-70, are studies that combine analysis of historical and sociological factors with a discussion of domestic political considerations. Bernard K. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), 68-119, and Zartman, 53, have suggested "pure" external goals, like expansionism, as a motivation for policy. Zartman (80-81, 144-48) has also argued that the leaders of weak countries are faced with so many external conditions which they are powerless to control that they fall victim to a kind of "situational determinism."

[2] One study which does contain an enlightening discussion of the relationship between underdevelopment and foreign policy is Robert C. Good, "State-Building as a Determi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liar irrelevance to the real concerns of the nation. Sometimes it appears as little more than a game played by a single performer or by a small band of elite players at the expense of the nation's real interests. Even when long-range factors are adduced to explain and justify certain policies, or when foreign policy is seen as ultimately a product of forces beyond the nation's control, there is a tendency to see foreign policy in isolation from the processes taking place within the nation. Rarely is foreign policy seen as a positive instrument in the promotion of the nation's development or the sustaining of its political system.

A principal reason for our inadequate understanding of the relationship between foreign policy and the problems associated with the state of underdevelopment is the paucity of analyses that explore the interaction among the various factors that influence the formation of foreign policy. There are very few studies that tell us much about how such factors as geography, economic capabilities, a nation's historical experiences, external pressures, domestic politics, and the personal likes and dislikes of presidents relate to and affect one another. Rather than investigating such relationships, most analyses either simply list a series of factors and assert that they are interrelated, or they attempt to rank the variables, an enterprise which seems likely to yield only inconclusive results. It seems futile to hope that it will ever be possible to single out a particular variable as the dominant factor in the formation of a country's foreign policy. In a great many cases, it is simply impossible to discover which variable is most important; often the decision-maker himself does not know. A survey of many cases will tell us which factors appear most frequently as important considerations in foreign policy decisions, but this is not necessarily an accurate indicator of the relative importance of those variables. For example, geography may be a factor in more cases than any other variable, without ever being the decisive influence.

Nor is it clear that, if it were possible to obtain such information, knowing which factor is decisive would be so rewarding. The unanswerable question of rankings is in no sense the key to an understanding of the foreign policy process. Is the factor which provides the final decisive impulse toward a decision really more important than the influences which set the stage so that that decisive factor might be brought to bear? We need to know how the variables affect each other, and, specifically, which combinations will lead to a particular kind of foreign policy. We need to ask, for example, not whether idiosyncracies

---

nant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in Laurence W. Martin, ed., *Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs* (New York 1962), 3-12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are more important than politics or long-term factors like geography and history, but how geography and history encourage certain leadership idiosyncracies and not others; how politics creates incentives to respond to some of the problems generated by geography and history, but not to others; and how certain of a leader's idiosyncracies may alter the political constellation in a way that will affect the foreign policy attitudes of others. Very little attention has been devoted to this more promising line of inquiry. Yet it is the answers to such questions that can be expected to provide clues about the nature of the process of interaction through which the political and economic needs of the less developed country may or may not find expression in foreign policy.

Indonesia is admirably suited to serve as the "case" country for such an analysis. Under Sukarno's leadership in the early 1960's, the foreign policy of Indonesia appeared to exemplify the "troublesome" diplomacy and highly idiosyncratic behavior that has been the concern of many scholars. Under Suharto since 1966, Indonesia has become something of a model of the new state that eschews flamboyance and orients its foreign policy to the needs of economic development. Because Indonesian foreign policy has presented two sharply contrasting faces in recent years, we have an unusually good opportunity to observe some of the relatively permanent sources of foreign policy and to see how changing patterns of interaction among those and other variables produce differing policies.

I. The Inapplicability of Existing Analytical Frameworks

An analysis of the formation of Indonesian foreign policy requires a framework that will facilitate the organization of the data in such a way as to illuminate the relationships among the key variables. Leading theorists in the field of comparative foreign policy have suggested that theory-building can advance only if researchers are willing to process their data through a common framework, thus channeling the masses of data compiled in case studies into categories that will render the data comparable. Faced with an ever-growing number of case studies which, by and large, have failed to produce generalizations in a form conducive to the development of theory, these authors have created frameworks in the hope that they would be used by area specialists who write case studies. In undertaking this study of Indonesian foreign policy, an effort was made to determine whether it would be possible to utilize any of several well-known analytical frameworks proposed to guide re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

search on the sources of foreign policy. None proved applicable. It is necessary, of course, to explain why.

The first framework considered was the pioneering decision-making model advanced by Richard C. Snyder and his colleagues.[3] To begin with, the applicability of the decision-making approach in a less developed country like Indonesia is questionable. Rarely are issues confronted in a clear-cut fashion in terms of alternative policy choices. It is impossible, for example, to locate a single decision which can be fixed as decisive in either the launching or the ending of Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia. Where discrete decisions can be found, it is extremely difficult to amass the kind of detailed information needed for a study in depth comparable to Glenn D. Paige's account of the Korean decision, which is the only application of the Snyder framework to date.[4] In the less developed countries, limitations on freedom of the press make it very hard to get detailed contemporary "insider" accounts of decisions, a deficiency which is aggravated by the passage of time because of the scantiness of documentary materials and the inadequacy of archival facilities.

Snyder suggests that there are three main clusters of variables that determine foreign policy decisions: spheres of competence, communications and information, and motivation. The situation is to be defined in terms of its external and internal settings. His paradigm constitutes a comprehensive checklist of the kinds of factors that might conceivably bear on the formation of foreign policy. But many of his categories are not relevant to the concerns of the present study, while others call for information that is unavailable. The framework offers no guidance on how to proceed in carrying out research when it clearly is not possible to investigate all the conceivable variables. Moreover, his scheme fails to suggest any means of analyzing the relationships among the many variables it lists. This task is left to later empirical research. Paige's study of the Korean decision does describe some relationships, but at the same time it reminds us that the Snyder framework is really designed for the analysis of policy-making in complex organizations. Organizational relationships and communications networks are significant for Paige's study, but such categories would be difficult to apply in a less developed country where policy-making is much less structured, and communications networks are often obscure. Furthermore, a focus on such cate-

[3] Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, eds., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York 1962).
[4] Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950* (New York 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gories leads us away from more fundamental questions on policy formation concerning the interaction among relatively permanent factors, politics, external pressures, and idiosyncracies. Neither Snyder's framework nor Paige's application of it suggests anything about how one might proceed to analyze the relationships among those key variables.

A second important approach to the analysis of the sources of foreign policy is James N. Rosenau's "pre-theory."[5] All foreign policy behavior, Rosenau asserts, can be explained in terms of the relative influence of five sets of variables—idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic.[6] Rosenau's work has been criticized on a number of grounds —among them the ambiguity of his categories, insufficient precision as to criteria by which the variables are to be ranked, and the static nature of his model.[7] But the considerations which here preclude use of the Rosenau framework go beyond those criticisms.

First, the hypotheses that Rosenau's model suggests take us back to where we started. According to his pre-theory, idiosyncratic sources are the most important influence on foreign policy formation in an underdeveloped country like Indonesia.[8] He says nothing about where to go from there. He does not operationalize his own model, nor does he provide guidance as to how others might do so. Second, there is a problem with Rosenau's basic assumption that all foreign policy behavior can be explained in terms of his five sets of variables. His choice of categories determines the nature of the ultimate theoretical product to a much greater extent than he is willing to admit. It may be possible to squeeze all of the factors that influence foreign policy into his five groups of variables, but his categories miss what are, for present purposes, the crucial distinctions. To say that domestic political competition, for example, can be subsumed under societal variables is to bury it amid a host of other "nongovernmental" factors, including historical experience, economic capability, and elite attitudes. The result is to blur

[5] James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston 1966), 27-92.

[6] *Ibid.*, 42-43. Rosenau defines his variables as follows: idiosyncratic—all those aspects of a decision-maker that distinguish his foreign policy behavior from that of every other decision-maker; role—behavior that is generated by the roles decision-makers occupy; governmental—those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices of decision-makers; societal—the nongovernmental aspects of a society which influence its external behavior; systemic—aspects of the external environment that influence foreign policy choices.

[7] For general critiques of Rosenau, see Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIII (March 1969), 79; and Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "International and Comparative Politics: Toward a Synthesis?" *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 487-89.

[8] Rosenau (fn. 5), 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the distinctions among those factors and thus to impede efforts to discover relationships among them. Far from facilitating an analysis of the relationships among those key variables, to the extent that they fall within a single Rosenau category, his framework precludes it.

Moreover, Rosenau tells us nothing about the kinds of limits each set of variables can impose, or about the manner in which one set may affect another. He simply chooses four conditions—size, level of economic development, degree of political openness, and extent of penetration—which he proposes to correlate with his five sets of variables. Except to the extent that his four conditions can be subsumed under one or another of his sets of variables, there is no suggestion in his framework as to how the five sets of variables interact with each other—for example, how societal variables relate to idiosyncratic ones, or role to governmental. In his concern about promoting the futile endeavor of ranking the variables, Rosenau neglects to tell us how to go about relating them.

A foreign policy framework which appears to overcome some of the deficiencies of Rosenau's model is that of Michael Brecher.[9] Brecher operationalizes his framework and demonstrates a procedure for determining the relative importance of the ten variables he defines as important. A simple frequency count of articulated elite images, derived through content analysis of public documents, and supplemented by the analysis of unarticulated images, is said to permit a ranking of the variables in order of importance. But without deprecating the value of content analysis when it is used as a supplementary technique, it is necessary to ask whether Brecher's reliance on a simple frequency count as the chief source of his data does not raise doubt about the validity of his findings. It has yet to be demonstrated that the frequency with which a given variable is mentioned indicates its influence accurately. Brecher attempts to deal with this problem by inserting speculations about unarticulated images into his quantitative framework. Somehow these speculations are to be combined with frequency counts to yield a single figure that will reflect importance, but precisely how this is to be accomplished is not indicated.

Furthermore, there is a tautological character to the assumption that a knowledge of elite images, drawn from the statements of government spokesmen, will enable us to project probable outcomes.[10] Are the images that are reflected in the public utterances of government offi-

[9] Brecher and others (fn. 7), 79-93.

[10] Brecher is not alone in this assumption. See, for example, Philip M. Burgess, *Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway* (Columbus 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cials the *source* of policy decisions or the *product* of them? After all, one can hardly expect that statements issued to defend a policy decision will reveal images that do not support that decision. The question is whether images taken from such materials really constitute a variable that can be distinguished from the decisions themselves. Knowing the images that exist in the decision-makers' minds before they decide certainly will help us understand the subsequent decision. But to speak of predicting outcomes based on images contained in official statements is no more meaningful than to say that one who knows in advance the arguments that will be used to justify a given decision can predict that decision. Finally, the concept of elite images is overextended in Brecher's model. Some influences are too subtle to be analyzed solely in terms of elite images. For example, a foreign policy that promises political benefits for the leaders of a pluralist democracy may have nothing to offer to rulers of a monolithic system. The decision-makers may well fail to perceive the relationship between political incentives or risks and the structure of the system, but that does not lessen the importance of political structure as an influence on foreign policy.

Does the fact that none of the models considered seem appropriate for this study mean that the effort to build theory is being abandoned? Or might it not, on the contrary, suggest some of the limitations of the single-framework approach to theorizing? The point is that it may be neither feasible nor necessary that all use a common framework. If the problems encountered here are at all typical, it is hard to imagine a framework that all, or even most, foreign policy analysts will find appropriate.[11] Perhaps the idea of inducing all writers to "process" their data through one political scientist's concept of "pre-theory" is unrealistic.

And what are the probable consequences of abandoning the single-framework approach? The assumption on which this study has proceeded is that the prospects for theorizing will be enhanced if each researcher devises his own framework, using what he can from others, but assuring above all that his model is suited to his own data and his own theoretical concerns. Such frameworks are likely to be more fruitful than those which begin with general "pre-theories" and theories,

[11] A good example of the difficulty of getting analysts to use a common framework under even the best of conditions is Rosenau's attempt to produce a volume of essays in which a framework he devised for researching linkages between national and international systems was to be applied. In a volume consisting of essays by authors who had agreed to use Rosenau's framework, Rosenau candidly notes that fewer than half the chapters closely followed the initial format. See Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York 1969), 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seek to force all research into a highly structured mold, stimulate endless arguments about whose definitions and categories are best, and run a serious risk of amounting in the end to little more than sterile typologizing. The possibility of comparative analysis, it seems reasonable to assume, depends less on the use of a common framework than on the willingness of writers of case studies to put their conclusions in the form of general hypotheses, using well-known, loosely-defined variables capable of easy translation from one study to the next. There does not seem to be any logical reason why theory-building cannot begin at such modest levels, close to the data, moving upward as studies accumulate.

II. A Framework Based on the Uses of Foreign Policy

The approach of this study has been not to impose at the outset a model based on deductions about foreign policy but rather, to build an analytical framework step by step as the research progressed. The organizing concepts and the model of the foreign policy process which guide this study thus emerged gradually out of the accumulating data. Because of the manner in which this framework was developed, it will be useful to discuss first the nature of the research project and then the framework itself.

A fundamental premise underlying this research has been that it should be possible to combine fruitfully a traditional historical approach with an analysis of elite attitudes that uses some of the newer behavioral techniques. Rarely do historical studies attempt an in-depth analysis of attitudes; nor do attitude or "political culture" studies normally examine the manner in which attitudes mix with other factors to produce a policy. It seemed reasonable to hope that an investigation of attitudes would make the historical analysis more meaningful, while the historical research would make it possible to evaluate the relevance of those attitudes to political action.

The basic source of attitudinal data was a series of depth interviews carried out during 1969 and 1970 with members of the Indonesian foreign policy elite. This group was selected on a reputational basis, using a panel of 12 prominent Indonesians representing a wide variety of political perspectives. Of the 75 individuals rated most influential by the panel, 53 were given depth interviews averaging about 7½ hours. Another 11 of the top 75 were interviewed at least once, while some 30 lower-echelon leaders were interviewed one or more times to add another dimension to the views of particular groups.

The depth interviews did not follow a rigid schedule of questions,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and usually contained a mixture of historical and attitude questions, since most of the key sources of historical information were members of the foreign policy elite. Although the sequence, wording, and depth of the questions were kept flexible in order to enhance the possibility of a frank discussion, essentially the same areas were covered in all the completed depth interviews. Attitudes concerning the following subjects were probed: foreign aid and development strategies; the meaning of Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy; potential threats to Indonesia's independence; prospects for regional cooperation; international trends and conflicts; socialization of the elite with respect to foreign policy attitudes; and the nature of the foreign policy-making process. Besides the depth interviews, there were several supplementary sources of attitudinal data, including a wide range of Indonesian newspapers, government documents, political party statements, and an essay contest on Indonesia's national identity.[12]

The historical analysis focuses on two policies which seem to epitomize the principal expression of foreign policy in the two periods with which this study is concerned. With respect to the 1962–1966 period, the analysis concentrates on the development of the policy of confrontation with Malaysia. In the 1966–1970 period, the chief concern is with efforts to secure economic aid. The principal sources of the historical analysis are interviews with Indonesians and with foreign diplomatic officials, newspaper reports, and government documents, including some unpublished ones.

In the course of carrying out this attitudinal and historical research, it became increasingly clear that one way of relating foreign policy to the problems of underdevelopment would be to begin by recognizing that a fundamental dynamic of foreign policy in Indonesia is the condition of weakness. Most informed Indonesians see their nation's problems as overwhelming and its capacity to deal with them as extremely limited. This kind of weakness is perhaps endemic to the state of underdevelopment. Indonesia's size, natural resources, military capability, and highly developed culture make this sense of weakness all the more oppressive. Many sensitive, educated Indonesians have confidence in their own personal capabilities and are convinced that Indonesia's material and intellectual potential make her a natural leader of Southeast Asia. Precisely because of their aspirations and expectations, they find Indonesia's weakness especially frustrating. It would not be inappropriate to say that many of them consider Indonesia's situation humiliating.

[12] A similar contest was conducted in 1957 by the Pembangunan Publishing Company. An analysis of the essays was published in Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesian Images of Their National Self," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXII (Fall 1958), 305-25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Foreign policy in such a country is bound to reflect the condition of weakness. Indeed, a number of analyses of foreign policy in the less developed countries have alluded to the importance of weakness.[13] It should be stressed, however, that to speak of weakness is by no means to suggest that the less developed countries are wholly without leverage in their relations with more powerful countries. Under certain circumstances, it can be argued, underdevelopment can be advantageous. Could a modern state like Belgium have defied American military might as the Vietnamese have done? North Vietnam's lack of a highly specialized economy undoubtedly helped to minimize the disruptive effects of American bombardment. The Saigon government, too, has demonstrated an ability to work its will on the United States. If it is too much to say that the Vietnamese "tail" is wagging the American "dog," surely all can agree that the tail can at least cause the dog to stumble, should he begin to run in a direction of which the tail disapproves. The same kinds of relationships can be observed with regard to Indonesia. Her success in more than once forcing her will on the Dutch exemplifies the triumph of the weak over the strong. At the present time, Indonesian officials who are worried about the influence of foreign agencies on policy-making in Djakarta take consolation from their knowledge that the foreigners' stake in the success of Indonesia's development effort is now so great that to deny Indonesia's requests for aid would be to invite consequences which the foreigners themselves would find unacceptable. Clearly, then, weak states are not without the capacity to influence the behavior of stronger ones.

The real importance of weakness for the formation of foreign policy is not that it places a state at the mercy of stronger powers, but rather that it dictates some of the chief concerns of the policy makers. Foreign policy in a country like Indonesia is bound to be preoccupied with the task of overcoming or making palatable the humiliating condition of weakness. And indeed, it is not difficult to demonstrate that Indonesia's foreign policy, notwithstanding all the changes it has undergone in recent years, has consistently sought to alleviate or to provide an explanation for that state of weakness. Under both Sukarno and Suharto, foreign scapegoats have been found to explain Indonesia's inability to solve its problems. According to Sukarno, neocolonialist machinations were to blame; Suharto holds international Communist subversion, especially that which emanates from China, responsible for many of Indonesia's ills. If both leaders produced foreign scapegoats, both

[13] For examples, see Johnstone (fn. 1), 248-49, and Michael Brecher, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World* (New York 1968), 306.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also promised that their foreign policies would help rid Indonesia of its embarrassing weakness. Sukarno's confrontation with Malaysia rested on the assumption that Indonesia could advance only if neocolonialism were smashed first. In Suharto's Indonesia, the search for foreign economic aid is seen as key to the success of a development program which promises to overcome Indonesia's weakness.

From this understanding of the importance of weakness and the political impulses it generates emerges this study's central organizing concept—the uses of foreign policy. What are the uses to which foreign policy is put in Indonesia? A focus on the uses of foreign policy makes it possible to develop a framework in which the relationships among the variables that determine policy are illuminated. Both attitudinal and historical data can be incorporated within that framework to yield propositions about the relation between foreign policy and the political and economic problems associated with the state of underdevelopment.

In Indonesia from 1962 to 1970, foreign policy appears to have served three principal uses: defense of the nation's independence against perceived threats, mobilization of the resources of the outside world for the country's economic development, and achievement of a variety of purposes related to domestic political competition. These three uses—independence, development, and political competition—are central to the thinking of the Indonesian elite with respect to foreign policy. They are the main concerns expressed by the elite in discussions of foreign policy and the principal considerations offered by them to explain recent Indonesian policies. For the Indonesian elite, foreign policy is essentially the interplay among independence, development, and political competition.

Independence, it has often been asserted, means more than the ending of colonial rule and the transfer of sovereignty to an indigenous administration. When we speak of the use of foreign policy to defend the nation's independence, we are talking not merely about the preservation of sovereignty. Independence means, in the first place, avoiding dependence. It is the task of foreign policy to assure that Indonesia does not come to rely so heavily on others as to jeopardize the government's ability to determine its own policies. Neocolonialism is taken by most Indonesians as a fact of contemporary life. They are convinced that, at the very least, they must remain ever alert to the danger that they may find their formal independence a sham, and their fate dictated by foreign forces. Some also fear a kind of cultural neocolonialism, perceived to be threatening to destroy Indonesia's national identity and, in so doing, to weaken her capacity to resist outside pressures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For many Indonesian leaders, the definition of independence is broader still. Given their country's size, resources, and history, they see independence as entailing the "resumption" of Indonesia's rightful and natural position of leadership in Southeast Asia. Efforts by major powers from outside the region to gain a predominant influence over Southeast Asia and to exclude Indonesia from deliberations about the fate of the region are viewed by many leaders as an infringement of Indonesia's independence. Their image of Indonesia as a regional leader tends to make many Indonesian leaders especially sensitive to real or imagined insults. Thus, the failure of the British to consult Indonesia on the formation of Malaysia in 1963 was widely viewed as a deliberate insult; the furor that followed the 1968 execution by Singapore of two Indonesian marines accused of sabotage during the days of confrontation shows that sensitivities about perceived insults have not diminished with the fall of Sukarno. To say that Indonesian leaders are inclined to see independence as entailing a position of some authority and dignity in the region is not to say that Indonesia has expansionist ambitions. Most of the leaders are convincing in their denials of such aspirations. But they do feel that an Indonesia that is isolated, her influence boxed in, is somehow less than fully independent. Ultimately, for many, it is a matter of self-respect.

The key assumption underlying the view that foreign policy must be used to defend the country's independence is that the outside world is basically a hostile place in which there are always forces at work seeking to exploit and subjugate Indonesia. Every nation, of course, has its enemies. But those who perceive the outside world as predominantly a hostile place are worried about their friends as well. In other words, the independence function of foreign policy rests on the assumption that Indonesia's independence is in fact seriously threatened. Where this assumption is present, it tends to be reflected in a particular pattern of attitudes. Indonesia is seen as becoming excessively dependent on foreign aid. The "independent and active" policy is defined as requiring the constant maintenance of a balance in Indonesia's relations with the big powers, lest one of them come to dominate Indonesia. There is substantial agreement with Sukarno's thesis that the principal division in the world is between "new emerging forces" and "old established forces" that constitute an obstacle to the progress of the former. Indonesia's position is seen as analogous to that of a pretty young girl who is constantly being approached by men who want to take advantage of her. Japan and China are seen as the principal specific threats, and the Soviet Union and the United States as less serious

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dangers. There are also manifestations of what has been characterized as "nonspecific insecurity,"[14] a general sense of vulnerability without having in mind a clear source of the danger.

Indonesians who are especially conscious of a hostile outside world tend to have had a high formal education, a formative experience in a study club or in some other group in which ideological debates took place, extensive experience abroad, and, in many cases, recent unpleasant experiences in the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy, especially with Japan. It seems fair to conclude that high political sensitivity and wide experience abroad tend to bring home not only Indonesia's high potential as compared with other less developed countries, but also the weakness and vulnerability of the country. In some cases, the perception of hostility in the outside world cannot be disassociated from personal insecurity arising out of individual experiences and reflecting the crisis of identity to which some political scientists have referred.[15] It is interesting how frequently the problem of inferiority complexes arises, either directly or indirectly, in prolonged discussions of Indonesia's relations with the outside world. But it would be a mistake to see the perception of a hostile world mainly as a manifestation of paranoia or xenophobia. Many of those who view the outside world as hostile and exploitative are self-confident, pragmatic, and sensitive men who simply see important conflicts of interest between Indonesia and some of the world's major powers.

Development has always been an important concern of Indonesian foreign policy, and it is certain to remain so, barring momentous and highly unlikely changes that might lead Indonesia to adopt a development strategy similar to that of Communist China. If the outside world is seen as a source of threats and a cause of insecurity, it is also perceived, on many levels, as a place where things that are unavailable in Indonesia can be obtained. Most Indonesians are sharply aware that their country lacks the capacity to finance its own economic development. Few would claim that development can advance without foreign aid. Thus it becomes a task of foreign policy to secure the funds for development from abroad. This encompasses not only negotiations for aid, but also debt rescheduling, solicitation of foreign investment, and fixing of trade terms. In some respects, economic development has come to be seen as a panacea in Djakarta, and it is foreign policy that must provide the funds that make development possible.

[14] Zartman (fn. 1), 48-49.

[15] See Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The central assumption underlying the use of foreign policy to facilitate economic development is that the outside world is not hostile and avaricious,[16] but rather, that it is basically willing to help Indonesia. No major conflict of interests between Indonesia and other countries is perceived, except with China and the Soviet Union to the extent that they are seen as aiding the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Great hope is placed in a foreign policy aimed at getting substantial foreign aid from the West; there is neither serious concern about becoming too dependent on others nor an expectation that donor nations will attempt to exploit their position to Indonesia's disadvantage. The "independent and active" policy is narrowly defined, its meaning restricted to the prohibition on entering a formal military pact; even that condition is sometimes considered necessary only because of a belief that Indonesian society would not accept so radical a departure from its traditional foreign policy. No truth is seen in either the new emerging forces/old established forces division or the harassed-pretty-girl analogy. The socialization experiences associated with this attitude construct are a relatively low level of education, the absence of study club experience or anything comparable to it, limited experience abroad, and Catholic religious training.

Independence and development express the two sides of the basic problem confronting most newly independent countries. Political scientists have for some time observed a conflict between problem-solvers and solidarity-makers in Indonesia,[17] between administrators and politicians in Burma,[18] and between reds and experts in China. It is not surprising that this basic cleavage characterizing the politics of the less developed countries should find a particular expression in their foreign policies. There is a basic element of conflict in the relationship between independence and development as uses of foreign policy. As outlined above, a contradictory set of assumptions and attitudes underlies the two uses. To some extent, each use has been defined in terms of opposition to the other. Thus, when Indonesia followed a fairly extreme form of a foreign policy of independence, as it did from 1962 to 1966, a principal criticism concerned its failure to fulfill the developmental needs of the country. Since 1966, with the government following an extreme form of the foreign policy of development, a frequent criticism has been that the country is in danger of sacrificing its independence in the search for economic aid.

[16] This formulation is also found in Phillips (fn. 1), 144.

[17] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca 1962).

[18] Pye (fn. 15).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is important to note, however, that in some ways the two uses are complementary; in fact, they feed on and stimulate one another. Development is a means of guaranteeing independence. Most Indonesian leaders believe that an underdeveloped state will always be dependent on others. Economic underdevelopment, one of the most prominent legacies of colonialism, remains a symbol of the limitations of Indonesia's independence. Development is seen as giving meaning to independence. Moreover, development is associated with the longing for a position of leadership appropriate to Indonesia's self-image. Like independence, development is also a matter of self-respect. Many Indonesians approach development with the feeling that this is the only area in which Indonesia lags behind other countries in Southeast Asia, and that, once this embarrassing failure has been rectified, Indonesia's leadership will surely be recognized and her independence assured. On the other hand, it is widely believed that real development is impossible without independence. This view is deeply rooted in the expectations aroused by the anticolonial struggle: it was generally assumed that the end of colonialism would bring not only independence but prosperity and economic development. Independence and development remain inextricably linked in the minds of many members of the Indonesian elite. To the extent that Indonesia's independence is impaired, any development that occurs is likely to benefit the foreigners who control Indonesia's destiny more than it is likely to help Indonesia. That kind of development is seen as indistinguishable from colonialism. As one Indonesian leader puts it: "What was the point of freedom? If all we wanted was the kind of development you get when outsiders hold control, we could have had that by staying under the Dutch."

The independence and development uses of foreign policy coexist in the policies pursued by Djakarta and in the minds of most Indonesian leaders. Throughout the 1962–1970 period, there have been policies directed at getting foreign aid for economic development and initiatives taken to safeguard the nation's independence. Where the one has been dominant, undercurrents of the other have always been visible. Though the interviewed leaders generally incline toward one attitude construct or the other, the attitudes of most reflect some mixture of the two. Thus, the Indonesian foreign policy elite's view of the world is characterized by a pronounced ambivalence: many leaders alternately tend to express feelings of security and insecurity, strength and weakness, and superiority and inferiority.

The interplay between independence and development as uses of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign policy is not fully comprehensible without continuous reference to the political functions of foreign policy—that is, the uses served by foreign policy in the domestic political competition, apart from the great issues of independence and development. The exploitation of foreign policy for political purposes is not, of course, peculiar to the less developed countries, but it does tend to take a somewhat different form there than in more developed states. The heavy degree of foreign penetration in many less developed countries automatically tends to give relationships with the great powers a more significant bearing on the domestic power struggle than they might otherwise possess. Thus, perhaps the most pointed criticism of foreign policy from 1962 to 1966 was that, by isolating Indonesia from the West, it tended to help tip the internal balance in favor of the PKI. Similarly, critics of foreign policy since 1966 often see it as creating foreign relationships which help the present ruling elite to maintain its political dominance.

The political uses of foreign policy in Indonesia are numerous.[19] Foreign policy can be used to isolate one's domestic enemies from their foreign allies, as suggested above. It can be used to lend legitimacy to domestic political demands. For example, advocates of a diversity of conflicting political purposes all attempted to give their goals respectability by asserting that their fulfillment was necessary in order to make a success of the confrontation with Malaysia. By focusing attention on certain kinds of issues rather than on others, foreign policy can serve as a means of maximizing the usefulness of one's political skills and tools. There is no question that an agitational campaign like the confrontation with Malaysia appealed to Sukarno because it gave him an opportunity to use his considerable "solidarity-making" skills. Foreign policy can be used to create symbols of nationalism and patriotism, adherence to which may be seen as validating one's own nationalist credentials; these symbols may be used to embarrass adversaries who fail to accept them. Foreign policy is commonly used as a means of buttressing calls for national unity under whatever leaders happen to be in power. Criticism which may embarrass the present government can be silenced on the grounds that it will tarnish Indonesia's image abroad, and thus jeopardize chances of getting needed foreign aid. Sukarno, of course, was a master at exploiting, to his own political advantage, the appeal for national solidarity.

Foreign policy can also be used to generate a sense of pride, self-

[19] For an extended discussion of the political uses of Indonesian foreign policy, see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry into the Functions of Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Ithaca 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

respect, and, in a variety of ways, psychological reassurance. Such sentiments constitute a political asset for the leadership that can claim credit for the deeds which instilled them. Sukarno's foreign policies gave at least some Indonesians the satisfying feeling that their country was an important international force, one which had always to be considered in the calculations of others concerning Southeast Asia. And, to the extent that policies win the plaudits of members of the international community, foreign policy can provide a gauge of the government's achievements and a means of countering the claims of critics. Indonesians are extraordinarily sensitive to foreign evaluations of them, as is evidenced by the attention paid, in the press and elsewhere, to such commentary. However, if an International Monetary Fund report praising Indonesia's economic achievements constitutes a political asset for the government, it can also be exploited by critics who seek to portray government officials as more interested in earning the praise of foreigners than in taking steps that would be more likely to improve living conditions in Indonesia. The foregoing discussion is by no means a comprehensive list of the possible political uses of foreign policy, but is intended to suggest some of the ways in which it has been used for political purposes in Indonesia since 1962.

The political uses of foreign policy reflect the distinctive features of the country's political life. Politics takes basic desires, like that for independence and development, and reshapes them to fit the conditions imposed by each actor's desire for political survival. Those who rule have the capacity to define independence and development in a way that serves their own political needs. Foreign policy thus can be a powerful political instrument in the hands of the governing group. Indonesian foreign policy since 1962 has consistently served to compensate for, or at least to mitigate the effects of, some of the key political weaknesses of the ruling elite. Thus, the anti-Western campaigns of Sukarno not only expressed deeply held feelings, but also, among other things, constituted a way in which a basically conservative elite could provide the illusion of revolutionary progress without undertaking the risks to its own position that a real internal revolution would have entailed. Similarly, by basing Indonesia's economic development on a heavy reliance on foreign aid, the Suharto government is able to avoid the kind of reforms that might endanger its own existence and, at the same time, to compensate for its lack of the social controls needed to mobilize domestic resources for development.

An essential element in defining the political uses of foreign policy is the structure of the political system. The degree of political competi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tiveness in the system exercises great influence on the determination of the political uses that foreign policy might be made to serve. Although political rivalries exist in even the most monolithic of regimes, it is fair to say that some systems are essentially competitive—meaning that there are at least two serious contenders for power—while other systems are basically noncompetitive. Political uses which promise substantial rewards in a competitive system may have little to offer the ruling elite of a noncompetitive system. If a political group has virtually unchallenged control, it may see little need to use foreign policy to legitimize political demands it can easily fulfill. The use of foreign policy to isolate one's domestic enemies from their foreign allies assumes that there are significant domestic adversaries whose position would be materially affected by changes in relations with certain countries. Similarly, political risks which may exist in a competitive system are often absent in a noncompetitive polity where the views of potential critics can more easily be ignored because their capacity to use foreign policy to embarrass the government is limited by their own political weakness.

The interaction among independence, development, and political competition as uses of foreign policy is a complex process. On the one hand, the character of the dominant attitudinal pattern helps to determine which political uses can profitably be exploited. The prevalence of attitudes supporting a foreign policy of independence means that certain political uses will be especially exploitable, while attitudes supporting a development-oriented foreign policy will suggest another set of political uses. To take an obvious example, if the outside world is widely perceived as a hostile place, it will be easier to make political capital out of appeals for solidarity in the face of an ambiguous external threat than it would be if people were not deeply suspicious of foreigners. On the other hand, the possibility of deriving political advantage, or the fear of suffering politically, may influence the policymakers' perceptions of the outside world, thus leading them to think along lines conducive to a foreign policy of independence or a development policy. Some regimes, of course, may be almost exclusively concerned with the retention or expansion of power, and they may follow foreign policy lines that bear little relation to either the requirements of independence or the needs of development.

Taking the three uses of foreign policy as the basic organizing concept, it is now possible to outline the model of the foreign policy process used in this study. At the base is a set of relatively long-term internal and external environmental givens—for example, geography, national history and historical relationships with certain countries, culture,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideology, economic capabilities, military capabilities, and the nature of the international system. These are long-term variables in the sense that they generally change only slowly, but they may in fact be constantly updated by the latest information.

The foreign policy elite's perception of these environmental variables constitutes the elite's view of the world. This view can be characterized as a mixture of the two attitude constructs which underlie independence and development as uses of foreign policy. That is to say, the basic environmental factors are interpreted by the elite as necessitating one use of foreign policy or the other. With regard to geography, for example, Indonesia's strategic location and wealth of natural resources may be seen as placing the country in an unusual state of jeopardy, because those geographic advantages constitute incentives for larger powers to seek to dominate Indonesia. Alternatively, they may be perceived as important assets for development, a way of inducing foreigners to invest in Indonesia's development, and ultimately a source of strength which makes it unnecessary for Indonesia to fear domination. Indonesia's history, if it is interpreted as full of attempts by other nations to subjugate Indonesia, will generate suspicion of the motives of others; to the extent that the elite's view of the world does not reflect such a dismal reading of history, there may be an inclination to trust other nations.

The elite's view of the world thus generates impulses to use foreign policy for the defense of independence or the furthering of development, and these impulses interact with political structure and the requirements of domestic political competition. Out of this confrontation between attitudes and politics emerge impulses pointing toward a foreign policy that will express some combination of the three uses.

With the general direction thus set, the final policy choice and the style of its implementation may be significantly influenced by the idiosyncracies of the top leadership, by accident, and by chance. There is always at least some scope for idiosyncratic factors to influence policy formation, but few leaders who care about their political future will allow themselves to express personal eccentricities which run counter to dominant attitudinal patterns and political realities. In other words, to the extent that Sukarno's personal dislike for Malaysia's prime minister could be related to broader elite suspicions about Malaysia, Sukarno could allow himself to be influenced by his personal feelings toward the Malaysian leader. But he obviously could not have made a personal dislike of the ruler of, for instance, Sweden the basis for a policy of confrontation against that state, toward which Indonesians tend to be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

either apathetic or favorably disposed. Only those idiosyncracies which neither violate dominant attitudes nor radically alter the domestic political configuration are likely to find expression in foreign policy.[20]

The foreign policy that results from this interaction of attitudes, politics, and idiosyncracies ultimately encounters certain objective realities; ultimately the policy will succeed, or it will fail to achieve its goals. Reports of success or failure, along with changes in the environmental variables, are continually fed back into the policy-making process. It is through this feedback that the country's real capabilities, reflecting actual domestic and international conditions rather than elite perceptions of them, are brought to bear on policy-making. Though leaders act on their perceptions and not reality, repeated failures are likely to produce a change either in the perceptions or in the leadership itself.

There is always the danger that a model like the one sketched out above will be regarded as a mechanistic sequence of stages leading to the output of a policy. The present framework is not intended to provide a history of the evolution of a foreign policy from environmental variable to policy output. The process need not follow the step-by-step progression from basic variables through attitudes, politics, and idiosyncracies, to policy. Actually, images of the outside world and domestic political requirements may be revised through feedback at any stage in the process. Moreover, foreign policy should be seen as an independent, as well as a dependent, variable. For example, prolonged adherence to a foreign policy involving heavy dependence on foreign aid may itself contribute to the rise of pressures for a foreign policy of independence, just as an extended policy emphasizing the need to struggle against real or imagined threats to independence may bring weariness and an intensified desire for a foreign policy that stresses development. The chief purpose of the framework, and the preceding discussion of the uses of foreign policy, has been to show how the various sources of policy relate to the three uses, and how policy results from the interplay among those uses. Whatever value the model may possess derives less from its replication of the foreign policy process than from its suggestions as to how the interaction of the variables

[20] For a discussion of the limited capacity of even a dictator to convert his whim into foreign policy, see Werner Levi, "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, XIV (March 1970), 26. As Levi puts it, a dictator may be able "to go a bit farther than others, but he cannot go all the way," because he too is bound by both internal and external constraints. A useful account of the conditions under which personal idiosyncracies can influence policy is found in Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Influence, and Conceptualization* (Chicago 1969), 33-62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that bear on the formation of foreign policy in Indonesia can be analyzed.

III. An Application of the Framework

To demonstrate how the framework is applied, a brief examination of the relationship among attitudinal patterns, political structure, and emphasis on either the independence or the development use of foreign policy in Indonesia from 1962 to 1970 is appropriate. The data suggest that, throughout the period, a pattern of attitudes prevailed that emphasized the hostility of the outside world, implying the need for a foreign policy of independence. Few would disagree with the assertion that elite images prior to 1965 pictured the Western nations as avaricious neocolonialists; at the same time, doubts about the benign intentions of Indonesia's principal ally, China, were frequently articulated.[21] When General Yani, the army commander, declared in 1965 that the main threat to Indonesia was from the north (meaning China), Sukarno countered that the threat was from all sides;[22] he made no effort to deny that China was a threat. There was really no one who could be trusted.

The sharp reversal of policies in 1966 was accompanied by much less change in underlying attitudes than one might have expected. The depth interviews reveal that attitudes stressing the hostility of others toward Indonesia still prevail, though there is a considerable amount of ambivalence and inconsistency in the views of many members of the foreign policy elite. This perception of hostility is shared even by a number of the younger members of the elite (25 to 35 years old), known for their leadership of the anti-Sukarno movement and for their criticism of the former President's failure to attend to the needs of economic development. Unlike many of their elders, for whom the perception of a hostile world is a legacy of the ideological and psychological turmoil of the anticolonial struggle and the revolution, these young people draw their conclusions mainly from their analysis of Indonesia's present weakness and vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis Japan. Given their basis, these perceptions seem likely to persist for some time.

A pattern of attitudes supporting the use of foreign policy to eliminate threats to the nation's independence thus underlay both the foreign policy of independence from 1962 to 1966 and the foreign policy of development from 1966 to 1970. Because policies have changed dramati-

[21] See Kahin (fn. 1), 264.

[22] The Yani-Sukarno exchange was described by army officers interviewed in Bandung in October 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cally while underlying attitudes have not, the change in policy cannot be explained simply as a reflection of a new set of attitudes on the part of the ruling elite.

The explanation of the change lies in the relationship between the structure of the political system and elite attitudes. In the 1962–66 period, the political system was competitive in the sense that there were three real contenders for power—Sukarno, the army, and the PKI. In that situation, given prevailing attitudes, a foreign policy emphasizing the need to defend Indonesia's independence against external threats served a variety of political uses. The policy of confrontation with Malaysia was used by all three of the chief political elements to legitimize domestic policies which each felt would enhance its political position vis-à-vis the others.[23] In the name of confrontation, the army could hope to maintain both a strong military establishment and a strong political position, while the PKI could legitimize its own hopes for a peasant militia and for an anti-Western trend in foreign policy that would weaken the army's political position. At the same time, confrontation lent legitimacy to Sukarno's contention that national unity under his revolutionary leadership was indispensable to Indonesia's survival.

From Sukarno's standpoint, moreover, confrontation facilitated the task of conflict management, insofar as it strengthened his appeal for solidarity, and, at least for a time, appeared to absorb the conflicting demands of the army and the PKI in a manner so as to reduce the likelihood of domestic strife. There is a close relationship between the legitimization function and conflict management: so long as each group felt that confrontation could still be used to legitimize its demands and might lead to their acceptance, it could accept a stabilization of conflict in the hope of future success. Similarly, confrontation helped to obscure the inherent contradictions among the conceptions of Indonesia's future held by Sukarno, the PKI, and the left wing of the PNI (Indonesian National Party)—not to mention the army and the NU (Nahdatul Ulama, the leading Islamic party)—by providing a pretext for postponing the day when those hard issues would have to be faced. In the absence of any mechanism for resolving such basic conflicts as those, the political system required a means of keeping conflict under control; confrontation contributed to that process of submerging, if not solving, conflict.

For all the principal actors, confrontation provided a standard against

[23] The following discussion is drawn from Weinstein (fn. 19), 2-11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which nationalist and revolutionary credentials could easily be measured. To be sure, confrontation continued to express the widely held belief that the manner of Malaysia's formation was an affront to Indonesia and that the Malaysians were less than fully independent. But at a time when demonstrated nationalist ardor and loyalty to the revolution were not only a matter of ideological conviction but a prerequisite for political survival, declarations of adherence to the "Crush Malaysia" policy undoubtedly were employed by many to avoid the pejorative label "rightist."

If the interaction between prevailing attitudes and the existence of a competitive political system created substantial incentives for all of the principal contenders to support a foreign policy of independence, it also made the risks of a foreign policy of development almost prohibitive. It is very hard to imagine that a foreign policy emphasizing primarily the search for aid and heavy reliance on foreign advice in the planning and execution of an economic stabilization program could have been adopted in a competitive political situation. The stabilization plan of 1963 drew opposition from practically every quarter; all of the political parties were critical, and the army leadership exhibited no enthusiasm for the plan. In the first place, stabilization, a precondition for economic aid from the West, required painful sacrifices on the part of many people; it is almost never a popular policy in any country, though it may be accepted as necessary. But beyond the difficulties inherent in any stabilization program, the widespread perception of a hostile world created particular dangers for advocates of a foreign policy of development. Anyone who might have dared to propose such a course would immediately have laid himself open to the accusation that he was selling out the country, making a mockery of independence, and lacking in nationalist spirit. Had any one of the major competitors for power openly advocated such a course, the result would have been to give its rivals an excellent opportunity to gain political advantage.

Once the political competition was resolved in favor of one of the contenders, as it was when the army effectively came to monopolize political power in 1966, the political attractions of a foreign policy of independence became irrelevant. At the same time, the political costs, to the government, of a development policy were substantially reduced. The stabilization plan of 1966, the new foreign investment law, the role of international agencies like the IMF, and the country's dependence on foreign aid, all have met with substantial hostility from a broad spectrum of Indonesian leaders. Many Indonesians regard their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country's dependence on foreign aid and advice as compromising their independence, and privately they sometimes ridicule the government's "independent and active" foreign policy as neither independent nor active. The particular development strategy of the present government has stirred widespread discontent, some of it public.

But for the most part, few have dared to express publicly their misgivings about the government's foreign policy of development. Some of its principal backers have acknowledged that it was possible to enact it only because the political opposition had been so badly intimidated that it kept silent.[24] The reticence of the critics was due to a number of considerations. Fundamentally, they feared the political consequences of opposing the government at a time when their own positions were politically insecure. Only the most courageous would want to risk being branded "old order" sympathizers, or, if their anti-Sukarno credentials were impeccable, dupes. Besides, there was, and still is, a feeling that opposition would be futile. It would raise risks of embarrassing oneself politically without any real chance of having an impact on the government's policies. Apart from the political dangers of expressing their doubts, there is also the profound ambivalence of men who sincerely want to see their country develop and do not wish to hinder that effort, even if they have misgivings about the foreign policy implications of the present development strategy. In interviews, many Indonesians were clearly uneasy about expressing sentiments that might conceivably jeopardize their country's chances of obtaining the aid it needs.

Capitalizing on this deep-rooted desire for development, the government has succeeded in making the idea of economic development a legitimizing symbol that fills a role not dissimilar to that of confrontation in the earlier period. Many conflicting political goals have been advocated on the grounds that they will help make a success of development. The rhetoric surrounding the Five Year Development Plan is in this respect strikingly reminiscent of that which once focused on confrontation. It is therefore development as a domestic symbol that is used to legitimize the related foreign policy. That foreign policy, on the other hand, has only a limited capacity for legitimizing domestic political goals because it lacks the inherent legitimacy which would derive from a fuller acceptance of its own underlying assumptions. There is always the danger, for example, that arguing for a particular domestic policy on the grounds that it will help get foreign aid may backfire, leaving its advocates vulnerable to criticism that they have

[24] These assertions are based on interviews conducted in Djakarta in 1968-1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indeed sold Indonesia's independence. Thus it is that, in this noncompetitive political situation, with the political risks of development reduced and economic development established as a widely adhered-to legitimizing symbol, the leadership feels free to pursue a foreign policy of development despite the existence of broad skepticism and discomfort about policies seen by many as compromising the country's independence.

To summarize: given the prevailing perception of a hostile world, a competitive situation creates strong incentives for carrying out a foreign policy emphasizing defense of the nation's independence, while the liabilities accompanying a policy designed to serve the needs of economic development are formidable; in a noncompetitive political situation, however, the liabilities of a development-oriented foreign policy can easily be overcome, while the political incentives to carry out an independence policy are reduced. It is worth pointing out here that stressing the importance of political incentives and risks in the determination of foreign policy should not be construed as suggesting that either the independence-oriented foreign policy of 1962–1966 or the development policy of 1966–1970 is in any way insincere or merely a reflection of political expediency. Both policies represented genuinely felt convictions, but in each period the two impulses coexisted, and the degree of political competition helped to determine which of them would be dominant. The really essential point is that it was not the attitudinal base alone—the perception of a hostile world—that determined foreign policy from 1962 to 1970; nor was it the presence or absence of political competition alone. It was the interaction between attitudes and political structure, the effect that the one had on the other, that resulted in the policies pursued. Many of the political uses of foreign policy were possible only because of the prevailing attitudes. One cannot single out politics or attitudes as the most important source of policy. Rather, one must look to the relationship between these two variables for an explanation.[25]

The general proposition emerging from this examination may be stated as follows: given a predominant perception of the outside world as a hostile place, a competitive political system will tend to produce an independence-oriented foreign policy, whereas a noncompetitive system is more likely, though not certain, to lead to a foreign policy of development. This statement, of course, needs further refinement and testing before it can be considered fully validated even for Indo-

[25] Idiosyncratic variables also need to be considered in their relationship to attitudes and politics, but that is beyond the scope of this limited illustration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nesia. With respect to other countries which appear to have experienced foreign policy transformations similar to that of Indonesia—Algeria and Ghana are prominent examples—it is purely a hypothesis. If it is validated, this finding will, at the very least, require modification of the assertion that there are generally strong incentives for charismatic leaders in the less developed countries to embark on "adventurous" foreign policies. The extent to which such incentives may exist would depend on the relationship between attitudinal patterns and the degree of political competition in the system. More generally, validation of this finding will necessitate reexamination of the popular view[26] that the fewer the subsystems in a nation's political system, the greater that country's vulnerability to strong charismatic leadership and, by implication, to "reckless" foreign policies pursued in the name of independence and opposition to neocolonialism. And strong doubt will be cast on the related proposition that a "rational" development-oriented foreign policy is more likely to occur in a system which is politically competitive than in one which is not.

[26] See Gordon (fn. 1), 120-40; Levi (fn. 1), 155-56; and Rosenau (fn. 5), 47n.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE 1971 SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE: An Assessment of the New Elite

By ROBERT H. DONALDSON*

ON March 30, 1971, as the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union opened, the prediction was widely voiced in the West that no surprises were in the offing. Basing their judgments on the aura of "business as usual" which had emanated from the Soviet leadership in the months prior to the Congress, Western specialists predicted a dull gathering, keynoted by signs of stability and ostensible unity—a far cry from the lively Congresses, full of unanticipated developments, over which Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev had presided.

And indeed, these sages proved to be right. Little press copy emanated from the Twenty-fourth Congress. Those reports which were written stressed the evident preeminence of Leonid Brezhnev at the Congress. Articles in the press concerning the new Central Committee elected on April 9 consisted largely of attempts to trace personal ties between newly-elected members and the General Secretary.

For political scientists who study the Soviet system, however, the selection of a new Central Committee is more than just a temporary manifestation of the personal power of particular Soviet leaders. In recent years, the Central Committee has been the focus of studies of the Soviet *political elite*,[1] and the enlistment of new members and removal of old ones has been analyzed as a primary source of information concerning the degree to which the Soviet political leadership has adapted to changes attendant upon modernization in the social and economic systems. Some political scientists have concluded from their analyses of the Soviet political elite over time that the CPSU is now "so structured that in its personnel policy it becomes, almost unknowingly, inimical to talent and hostile to personal innovation," and that

* This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Northeastern Slavic Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 5-8, 1971. Assistance in gathering and compiling the data reported on in the paper was provided by Alex Dragnich, Eugene Gregory, Jack Perry, Richard Pride, Derek Waller, and Judy Donaldson. Robert V. Daniels made helpful comments on the first draft. A grant from the Vanderbilt University Research Council facilitated the revision of the paper.

[1] For an examination of the reasons for defining the Central Committee as constituting the "political elite" of a Communist system, see Robert H. Donaldson and Derek J. Waller, *Stasis and Change in Revolutionary Elites: A Comparative Analysis of the 1956 Party Central Committees in China and the USSR*, Sage Professional Papers: Comparative Politics Series, I, No. 11 (Beverly Hills 1970), 614-15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consequently, "decay is bound to set in. . . ."[2] Others have challenged this thesis, arguing that even though the Soviet system has not adapted to modernization in the same way as Western systems, and has not evolved in the direction of political pluralism, the leadership has apparently succeeded in obtaining access to the skills and talents necessary to meet the challenge of modernization.[3]

The present study of the 1971 Soviet Central Committee is an attempt to make a further inquiry into the issue. A study of background and career characteristics of the new elite admittedly leaves unanswered many vital questions concerning the explicit policy and value orientations of the Central Committee's members,[4] but it does allow a test of several questions of theoretical significance.

Though we will pay some attention to the extent to which the Soviet political elite is a "vanguard" rather than a "representative" reflection of the larger society, the chief focus of this study lies in the question whether the evolution in the Soviet political leadership—widely commented upon in the literature—from revolutionary veterans to a group of "managerial modernizers" has continued unchanged. That is, to what degree has the leadership demonstrated a continuing capacity for bringing into its ranks men capable of managing a modern society while at the same time maintaining the Party's monopoly over the political functions within the society?

Moreover, in this paper we inquire whether the 1971 Central Committee constitutes a "new generation" of Soviet leaders, or whether the older generation is clinging to power by admitting primarily persons of an age and experience similar to that of the incumbents to the ranks of the elite. Thus, it asks to what extent the newly-elected members differ from their senior colleagues on the elite, not only with respect to age but also with respect to the type of experiences to which they have been exposed during their formative years.

Finally, we seek to assess the current institutional balance within the Soviet Central Committee. By examining the career ties and current occupations of the membership, we hope to determine whether the dominance of the party *apparatchiki* is continuing or disappearing,

[2] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" *Problems of Communism*, XV (January-February 1966), 5.

[3] See, for example, Frederic Fleron, "Cooptation as a Mechanism of Adaptation to Change: The Soviet Political Leadership System," *Polity*, II (Winter 1969), 176-201, and Donaldson and Waller (fn. 1), esp. 621-27, 655-58.

[4] For a discussion of the difficulties involved in linking background variables and elite attitudes, see L. J. Edinger and D. D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (June 1967), 428-45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to what extent persons whose previous careers have been outside either the party or government bureaucracies are being admitted to the political elite. We wish to know whether there is a dominant "career type" among the members of the 1971 Soviet Central Committee; that is, whether one can specify one particular road in the Soviet Union that seems most likely to lead a man to a place on the elite.

The data employed in this study are the biographies of the full members of the 1971 Soviet Central Committee, gathered from primary and secondary sources.[5] For each individual, information was recorded on the following characteristics: sex, date and place of birth, national and social class origin, date of entry into the Party, highest level of education attained and field of higher education, foreign travel, occupation prior to entry into the Party, career pattern while in the Party, type and level of current occupation, and record of service in, or affiliation with, certain "key groups" (military, police, Komsomol apparatus, party apparatus, certain regional apparatuses, diplomatic corps, veterans of agricultural or industrial work in the economy).[6] On most of the variables, sufficient information was available about all but 3 to 5 per cent of the entire group studied (seven to twelve individuals, most of them new members). Except where otherwise noted, the figures reported here will be percentages of the total number of individuals for whom data concerning a particular characteristic were available.

Aggregate figures were compiled not only on the entire group of full members (of whom there were 241, in a Central Committee of 396), but also on three subgroups: (1) members who were elected to full or candidate membership in the Politburo; (2) members (including all in the above category) who had also served as *full* members on the previous Central Committee, labeled as "incumbents"; and (3) individuals newly elected in 1971 to *full* membership on the Central Committee. From the coded data gathered on the entire set of full members and each of the above subsets, frequency distributions were obtained, and a cross-classification program was utilized to produce bivariate tables pairing selected attributes within each grouping. For the distribution of these groupings, by number and percentages, see Table 1.

[5] The following sources were used in compiling biographical data: *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Vosmoi Sozyv* [Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: Eighth Convocation] (Moscow 1970); *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii* [Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia] *1966* (Moscow); Edward L. Crowley and others, eds., *Prominent Personalities in the USSR* (Metuchen, N.J. 1968); George W. Simmonds, ed., *Soviet Leaders* (New York 1967); and, for recent changes in occupation, the pages of *Pravda* and *Izvestiia.*

[6] Certain of these variables are not reported on in this paper due to space limitations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF FULL MEMBERS OF THE 1971 CENTRAL COMMITTEE BY RANK AND TIME OF ELECTION

	Number	*% of Whole*
Full Members of Central Committee	241	100.0
Politburo	21	8.7
Incumbent Members (including Politburo)	153	63.5
New Full Members	88	36.5
Of Whom:		
Candidates in 1966, promoted	38	15.8
Not on 1966 CC in any capacity[a]	50	20.7

[a] Two men, N. P. Tolubeev and N. D. Khudaiberdyev, had been on the 1961 CC (the former as a full member, the latter as a candidate), but had not been reelected to the 1966 CC.

Worth emphasizing is the fact that only thirty-seven living full members of the previous Central Committee were *not* reelected to full membership. But in addition, the size of the Central Committee was itself increased, thus allowing for the selection of fifty persons who had not served on the previous body in any capacity, in addition to thirty-eight promoted candidates. The backgrounds and careers of this group of eighty-eight will be of special concern in this paper, since these data constitute the best available evidence for discerning trends in the process of elite recruitment.

The selection of new members for the Ceneral Committee may be viewed as a test of the strength of certain of the top leaders of the Party, to whom, through past or present personal affiliation or institutional linkages, some of the new recruits may be presumed to owe loyalty. The presence among the new members of a sizable number of individuals whose careers touch that of Leonid Brezhnev has already been commented upon in the press as testimony to the growing preeminence of the General Secretary.[7]

Our main concern here, however, is to focus upon two functions that may be fulfilled by the process of adding new members to the elite. First, by selecting members of key functional groups for recruitment to the elite the political leadership creates or strengthens access to these groups. Representatives of such groups may thus be allowed to partici-

[7] See, for example, Theodore Shabad, "Central Committee Newcomers Reflect Prestige of Brezhnev," *New York Times*, April 11, 1971. My own research indicates that eleven of the full members were employed in Dnepropetrovsk *oblast* during Brezhnev's years in that province. Of these, six were *newly* elected to full membership.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pate in the decision-making and decision-legitimizing process without thereby overtly raising a challenge to party dominance of this process. Second, recruitment may serve the symbolic function of providing representation on the elite to various non-elite sectors of society, such as women, workers and peasants, or national minorities. Both functions can serve to increase the legitimacy of the Party and to increase societal stability.[8]

In a society that professed to the complete liberation of womankind long before the issue gained its current import in the West, the status of women on the Central Committee seems to belie such assertions of equality of the sexes. Although the current Soviet census reports that women now constitute 53.9 per cent of the total population,[9] only 2 per cent (6 of 241) of the full members of the 1971 CPSU Central Committee are women. Moreover, none of the six currently occupy full-time positions in the party apparatus, and only one (Furtseva) sits on the Council of Ministers.

Also smacking of symbolic "tokenism" is the presence of eleven persons (including two of the women) currently employed as "leading" workers or collective farmers. Ten of these eleven were newly elected at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress. Though manual workers are still clearly underrepresented, given their weight in the population and even in the party rank and file, it is worth recalling that at the Twentieth Party Congress, fifteen years before, there were *no* workers or peasants elected to either full or candidate status on the Central Committee. It is tempting to speculate that the recent workers' revolt in Poland is not unrelated to the decision of the Soviet party leadership to give a symbolic nod to the proletariat and peasantry in the composition of the new Central Committee.

Not so easy to classify as "token," but still in the realm of symbolic representation, is the selection of members of minority nationalities to the Central Committee. Although the proportion of Russians in the Soviet population has fallen to 53.3 per cent, and that of the Ukrainians and Belorussians to 20.5 per cent, members of these Slavic nationalities continue to occupy a disproportionate number of seats on the Central Committee, as Table 2 demonstrates. A slight redress of the imbalance has occurred, however, through the enlistment, among the new full members, of a higher proportion of Central Asian and other non-European minorities than existed among the incumbents. Thus, in 1966, only

[8] This argument is made in Donaldson and Waller (fn. 1), 629.
[9] Results of the 1970 Soviet census were reported in *Izvestiia*, April 17, 1971, pp. 1-2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

NATIONALITY OF 1971 CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND DEGREE OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, BY SENIORITY

Nationality	*% of Soviet Population, 1970*[a]	*All Full N=224*		*Politburo N=21*		*Incumbent Full N=149*		*New Full N=75*	
		%	*Index*[b]	%	*Index*[b]	%	*Index*[b]	%	*Index*[b]
Russian	53.3	59.8	1.12	52.4	.98	61.1	1.15	57.3	1.08
Ukrainian and Belorussian	20.5	25.0	1.22	28.5	1.39	26.0	1.27	22.7	1.11
Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaidzhani	4.6	3.1	.67	4.8	1.04	3.4	.74	2.7	.59
Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Moldavian, Jewish	4.1	3.1	.76	4.8	1.17	3.4	.83	2.7	.66
Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Tadzhik	8.1	5.4	.67	9.5	1.17	4.7	.58	6.7	.83
Other Minority	9.4	3.6	.38	0	[c]	1.3	.14	8.0	.85
Total	100.0	100.0		100.0		99.9[d]		100.1[d]	

[a] Source of 1970 population figures: *Izvestiia*, April 17, 1971, pp. 1-2.
[b] The quotient obtained by dividing the percentage of the elite known to be of a particular national origin by the proportion of the whole population constituted by that nationality. The degree of overrepresentation is indicated by quotients greater than one, underrepresentation by quotients less than one.
[c] No index can be obtained, as no members came from these nationality groups.
[d] In this and subsequent tables, some totals may not add to 100.0 per cent because of the statistical error caused by rounding.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

13.6 per cent of the full membership of the Central Committee was non-Slavic, compared with 15.2 per cent of the 1971 full members.

Although the female members of the Central Committee rose to elite status through careers outside the party apparatus, it appears much less likely that a non-Slav will gain access to the Central Committee through any non-party route. Only 45.5 per cent of the Slavic members have pursued a career primarily in the party apparatus, but 58.8 per cent of the non-Slavic members have centered their careers in the party bureaucracy. More telling is the evidence concerning current occupations: 35.8 per cent of the Slavic members are employed in the party apparatus, compared with 67.6 per cent of the non-Slavs. To look at the data in another way, all but three of the fifty-six USSR Ministers on the Central Committee are Slavic, as are all but one of the nineteen military officers and *all* of the nineteen members currently employed as officials of mass organizations, as agitprop personnel, as scientists or academicians, or as specialists in the economy.

Moreover, although non-Slavs constitute 15.2 per cent of the full membership of the Central Committee, they make up only 6.3 per cent of those members who are working in a central party, state, or mass organization apparatus. (Only one of the fifteen non-Slavic *new* members is so employed.) With respect to positions in the central party apparatus, the Ukrainians and Belorussians are likewise underrepresented: sixteen of the seventeen full members currently employed in the central party apparatus are Russians. Thus, members of a minority nationality who do gain a place on the political elite are likely to have travelled a more narrowly circumscribed road to status than their Russian counterparts, and are less likely to be currently employed in the capital. In fact, those who are not Slavic usually serve in their home regions, where their designation to elite status is more readily displayed to their co-nationals.

Yet another respect in which the new Soviet Central Committee is unrepresentative of the general population is in its age. While one would not expect that the average age of the political elite of any society would closely approximate that of the citizenry at large, the gap in the Soviet case seems unusually wide.[10] Thus, although the mean age of the Soviet population is slightly under twenty-nine, the mean age of the full members of the 1971 Central Committee is 57.8. For the Politburo,

[10] William B. Quandt, in a study of the average ages of political elites in twenty countries, cites 42 as the mean age of elites in 11 countries classified as "ideological," and 51 as the average in 9 "nonideological" systems. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, Sage Professional Papers: Comparative Politics Series, I, No. 4 (Beverly Hills 1970), 209.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the figure is now 60.2, and for the incumbent full members, it is sixty. Though 18.4 per cent of the new full members were born in 1925 or later (compared with only 3.2 per cent of the incumbents), even this group averages fifty-three years of age. When we place these figures in the perspective of the last two decades, it is evident that the Soviet elite is an increasingly aging group. The average age of the full members of the Central Committee in 1952 was forty-nine; in 1956, it was fifty-one; in 1961, fifty-two; in 1966, fifty-six.[11] If (as Boris Lewytzkyj has asserted) the present leadership seemed determined in 1966 to keep younger men out of power, the Twenty-fourth Party Congress does not appear to evidence a significant change in this policy.[12]

Further insight into the relationship between age and acquisition of political responsibility in the Soviet Union is gained from figures concerning the age at which Central Committee members first attained a high office. Following George Fischer (but including state as well as party posts), a "top political post" is defined as any of the following: first secretary in an *oblast* or *krai*; first or second secretary of a Republic Central Committee; first secretary of the Moscow or Leningrad city party committee; department head or secretary of the all-union Central Committee apparatus; USSR minister or chairman of a state committee; chairman of a *sovnarkhoz* (1957-65); chairman or first deputy chairman of a Republic council of ministers; chairman of an all-union mass organization.[13] For the age distribution of full Central Committee members in all categories, see Table 3.

TABLE 3

AGE AT WHICH FULL MEMBERS OF THE 1971 CENTRAL COMMITTEE ATTAINED INITIAL "TOP POLITICAL POST"

Age	*% of All Full Members (N=188)*	*% of Politburo (N=21)*	*% of Incumbents (N=129)*	*% of New Members (N=59)*
30-34	7.4	14	9.3	3.4
35-39	16.0	33	17.1	11.9
40-44	30.9	33	29.5	27.1
45-49	29.8	10	28.7	39.0
Over 50	15.9	10	15.5	18.6
Total	100.0%	100%	100.1%	100.0%

[11] These figures are from Jerry F. Hough, "In Whose Hands the Future?" *Problems of Communism*, XVI (March-April 1967), 19.

[12] "Generations in Conflict," *Problems of Communism*, XVI (January-February 1967), 36-40.

[13] For Fischer's list, see *The Soviet System and Modern Society* (New York 1968), 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

About one-fourth of the full members who reached a "top post" had done so before they entered their forties. Not surprisingly, almost half of the members of the Politburo had achieved such distinction in their thirties. More interesting is the comparison between incumbent and new full members: only half as large a proportion of new members as incumbents had reached their first high office in their thirties; 57.6 per cent of the new members (compared with 44.2 per cent of the incumbents) reached such a job only after forty-five. The ranks of Central Committee members who got a very early start in positions of political influence thus appear to be dwindling. The hypotheses of Hough and Lewytzkyj, picturing an older generation increasingly blocking the access of its juniors to high positions, thus seem to gain further confirmation. For the new members of the 1971 Central Committee the period of "apprenticeship" seems to be longer than it was for their senior colleagues. That this is indeed "no accident" can be determined from the speeches at both the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Party Congresses hailing the halt in frequent shifting of personnel and the introduction of a cadre stabilization policy by Khrushchev's successors. As Brezhnev stated in the Central Committee Report to the Twenty-fourth Congress: "The aim of our cadres policy is to promote young, promising functionaries while maintaining a considerate attitude to veteran cadres and making the maximum use of their experience and knowledge."[14] Thus far, with respect to Central Committee membership, the emphasis appears to have been placed on the latter facet of this policy.

Not only are the new full members somewhat younger than the incumbents, but, as one might expect, they tend to have entered the Communist Party at a later time. As Figure 1 indicates, 17.5 per cent of the incumbents entered prior to 1928 (and three of them are Old Bolsheviks who entered prior to the Revolution); only 1.3 per cent of the new members entered during that period. A majority of the incumbents date their entry into the Party in the period between the beginning of rapid industrialization and the outbreak of war, with 31.8 per cent of the total having been brought into the Party in the immediate post-purge years, 1938–40. By contrast, two-thirds of the new full members entered the Party after 1941 (with half of this group joining during the war). Most of the new members, then, began their political careers only after the trials of industrialization, collectivization and the Great Purge; they cut their political teeth during the (still harsh) years of the war and of High Stalinism. As Jerry Hough hy-

[14] This translation of Brezhnev's report is from *New Times*, No. 15 (1971), 62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1

1971 CENTRAL COMMITTEE: DATE OF ENTRY INTO CPSU, BY SENIORITY



pothesizes, the different experiences with which these individuals began their party service may have influenced their outlooks in a peculiar way. After 1941, "the party was no longer engaged in warfare against the peasants or against its own members. On the contrary, it was leading the country in the defense of the motherland against a foreign invader. At this time the party de-emphasized Marxist-Leninist ideology and even restored fairly close relations with the Orthodox Church. Many hoped that it would make peace with the Russian people after the war. . . ."[15]

In examining the educational level of the Central Committee, we are provided with another indicator of the degree to which this group is truly an elite. As of 1970, only 5.5 per cent of the Soviet population twenty years of age or older had completed a higher education; in contrast, 91.8 per cent of the full members of the 1971 Central Committee had completed their education above the secondary level. Included in this figure are those individuals who obtained a higher education in a military academy or at the Central Committee's Higher Party School; these constituted 10.3 per cent and 9.5 per cent of the Central Committee, respectively. The remaining 72 per cent had graduated

[15] Hough (fn. 11), 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from a higher technical institute or a university. Indeed, a sizable number of the full members had done substantial graduate work (12.5 per cent) or had won degrees from both a regular higher educational institution and the Higher Party School (9.9 per cent). In fact, this high level of educational achievement is not a new phenomenon: a total of 85.6 per cent of the full members of the 1956 Central Committee had obtained a higher education (including higher political and military training).

Since the educational level of the Soviet political elite has been high for some time, we would not expect a significant variation in the level of educational attainment of the new and incumbent members. And indeed, there is little difference. The only variations worth noting are a rise in the proportion of new members who have had a military education (12.7 per cent, compared with 9.2 per cent), and a decline in the proportion who have done postgraduate work (from 16.2 per cent to 10.4 per cent). This contrasts with the situation in 1956, when the newer members were significantly better educated than the incumbents. In that case, it was found that the newer members, by virtue of their relative youth, had been exposed to greater educational opportunities than the 1956 incumbents.[16] By 1971, the great majority of even the incumbent members had been of school age at about the time of the expansion of opportunity for technical training which occurred in the Soviet Union in the 1930's. For those members who lack higher education, the age factor (and consequently, the degree to which educational opportunities were available) may have been a decisive one. Indeed, when education is tabulated against date of birth, it is discovered that over 83 per cent of the incumbent full members who lack a higher education were born prior to 1910, though only 40.6 per cent of the incumbents as a whole were born before that date.

In the case of the eight new members who lack a higher education, it is not age but career pattern which best explains these exceptions: seven of the eight have spent their careers as workers or peasants. All of the new members (and even 94 per cent of the incumbents) who have spent their careers mainly in the party or state apparatus have received a higher education. Exploring other relationships between education and career patterns, we may note that all but two of the twenty-two men who have received a military education pursued careers in the military, and all but five of the forty-four individuals who graduated from a higher party school have centered their careers in the party apparatus. The remaining full members—those with a higher education

[16] Donaldson and Waller (fn. 1), 644-49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in a non-political technical specialty—are distributed, for the most part, between party and state careers. Over 85 per cent of the Central Committee's full members whose careers have centered in the state apparatus have received a specialized higher technical education, while almost as large a proportion (78 per cent) of those who have had careers in the party apparatus have received such training. Judging from this similarity in formal training, it would appear that many party and state jobs might be easily interchangeable. And indeed, over 51 per cent of the current full members have, at some point in their careers, made one or more shifts between the party and state apparatus.

Not only have a substantial proportion of the political elite been *trained* for skilled work in the economy, but a significant number of them have actually worked in such positions. Almost one-fifth (19.4 per cent) of the full members in 1971 have at some point in their careers been involved with work in the agricultural sector of the economy; 36.6 per cent have had experience in a white-collar management position (factory director, chief engineer, etc.) in a factory.

Thus, at least at its top level, the CPSU cadre has become a collection of highly trained persons, experienced in performing tasks of direct management of the economy as well as of political supervision. As Brezhnev defined the qualifications for cadres in his recent report to the Party Congress: "Life is continuously making greater demands on cadres. We need people who combine a high level of political consciousness with a sound professional training, people who can knowledgeably tackle the problems of economic and cultural development and are well-versed in modern methods of management."[17]

Before leaving our examination of education, let us note the distribution of fields in which those individuals who have obtained a higher education were trained. Here we find further confirmation of the degree to which possession of specialized skills involved in management of the economy has come to characterize the Soviet political elite. As many as 62 per cent of the full members with a non-military, non-party higher education received degrees in the fields of engineering and other industry-related areas. A smaller but still significant proportion (18.7 per cent) were trained as specialists in the agricultural field. Of the remaining full members, 15.8 per cent were trained in the fields of education, law, journalism, or social science; only 3.5 per cent were trained in the remaining arts and sciences. Engineers thus greatly outnumber both agronomists and other specialists, not only among full members as a whole, but also within the subgroups of incumbents and

[17] Brezhnev (fn. 14), 62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new members. A distinction between incumbent and new members becomes apparent only when the age variable is introduced. One discovers a steady decline in the percentage of engineers among the younger new members, from 83.3 per cent of those born before 1910 to only 50 per cent of those born after 1925. This decline is matched by almost equal increases in the proportion of agronomists and of specialists in education and the social sciences. Whether the decline in engineering education among the younger new full members augurs a long-run diversification of skills of the elite cannot yet be determined.

We now turn to an analysis of the *career patterns* of the full members of the Central Committee. An individual was coded into a particular career category according to which career accounted for the greatest number of the years since he joined the Party. The categories are: party apparatus; state apparatus; police or military; "symbol manipulators" (propagandists, ideologists, journalists, or writers who employ political themes); mass organization apparatus (officials of the Komsomol or trade unions); specialists in the economy, such as factory directors; personnel in scientific research institutes or academies, or other "intellectuals"; workers and peasants.

Table 4 depicts the frequency distribution figures for the 1971 full membership as a whole, for the "incumbent" and "new member" sub-

TABLE 4

CAREER PATTERNS OF FULL MEMBERS
1956, 1966, AND 1971 CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Career	*% of 1956 Full Members (N=122)*	*% of 1966 Full Members (N=195)*	*% of 1971*		
			Full Members (N=235)[a]	*Incumbents (N=153)*	*New Full Members (N=82)*
Party Apparatus	47.9	47.2	45.1	45.1	45.1
State Apparatus	28.6	24.6	26.4	32.7	14.6
Military & Police	7.5	8.2	10.2	8.5	13.4
Symbol Manipulators	7.6	2.6	2.1	3.3	0
Mass Organization Apparatus	3.4	4.1	2.6	2.0	3.7
Specialists in Economy	3.4	8.2	6.4	4.6	9.8
Scientific-Acad.-Intellectual	1.7	3.6	2.6	3.3	1.2
Workers & Peasants	0	1.5	4.7	.7	12.2
Total	100.1%	100.0%	100.1%	100.2%	100.0%

[a] Of these, 41 were also full members on the 1956 Central Committee.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sets, and also, for purposes of longitudinal comparison, for the full members of the Central Committees elected at the Twentieth and Twenty-third Party Congresses.

The juxtaposition of the 1956, 1966, and 1971 career patterns is most interesting for its *lack* of contrast. There is an evident degree of stability over the fifteen-year period in the career patterns of the political elite, with the ratio between party, state, and "other" careers remaining approximately the same. Taken in the aggregate, these figures reveal no marked fluctuations in the career paths to membership on the post-Stalinist Soviet political elite.

The only sharp contrast shown in the table appears when the 1971 membership is divided into "incumbent" and "new" categories. Although the proportion of members with party careers is the same in both groups, there is a sharp drop of over one-half (from 32.7 per cent of the incumbents to 14.6 per cent of the new members) in the proportion of members with careers centered in the government bureaucracy. The offsetting increases appear largely in three categories: military and police (up 5 per cent), specialists in the economy (also up about 5 per cent), and workers and peasants (up 11.5 per cent). Thus, even though the mix of career backgrounds for the whole full membership differs little from that of the previous Central Committee, there is a greater diversification of career patterns among the new full members. In other words, when the "new faces" on the Central Committee are compared with the "old hands," we find that proportionately there are fewer with government-career backgrounds, and proportionately more with careers centered in neither the party nor state bureaucracies.

Further perspective is gained when career patterns are tabulated against age (Table 5). Here we see that the younger full members of the Central Committee are far more likely to have made their careers in the party apparatus than in the state bureaucracy. Contrasting the oldest with the youngest age groups, we see that in the youngest group only one-tenth the number of those in the oldest group followed government careers, while about two-and-one-half times as many pursued careers in the party apparatus. To look at it in another way, 53.2 per cent of the full members whose careers have centered in the state apparatus are currently over sixty, compared with only 16.1 per cent of those who have had careers as party *apparatchiki*. One possible explanation for this phenomenon might be that full members whose careers are in the state bureauracy serve a longer apprenticeship in lower posts than their party counterparts; that is, they are simply older by the time they reach a high post which *might* qualify them for Cen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5

CAREER PATTERNS OF FULL MEMBERS OF THE 1971 CENTRAL COMMITTEE BY DATE OF BIRTH

Career	*% Born Before 1910 (N=70)*	*% Born 1910-14 (N=66)*	*% Born 1915-19 (N=50)*	*% Born 1920-37 (N=45)*
Party Apparatus	24.3	45.5	64.0	60.0
State Apparatus	47.1	30.3	14.0	4.4
Military & Police	14.3	10.6	6.0	8.9
Symbol Manipulators, Mass Org'n. Apparatus	8.6	4.5	2.0	2.2
Specialists in Economy, Scientific-Academic-Intellectual	5.7	9.1	12.0	11.1
Workers & Peasants	0	0	2.0	13.3
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%

tral Committee membership. This hypothesis can easily be verified by cross-tabulating the two variables—career pattern and age at time of initial top post. Fully 30 per cent of those with government careers reached a top post only after age fifty, compared with only 7.7 per cent of the career party *apparatchiki*. Conversely, a greater proportion of those with party careers have achieved a top post by the time they are forty-five than their colleagues with state-centered careers (64.4 per cent as against 36.8 per cent). Once having achieved their first "top" position, however, career government officials on the 1971 Central Committee have waited only slightly longer than their party counterparts before being elevated to full membership on the elite: an average of 6.9 years, compared with 5.9 years for the *apparatchiki*.

Although the above argument has been based on the data concerning overall career patterns of the political elite, we should note that the figures concerning the occupational profile of the full members of the Central Committee at the time of their election bear out the same point. Focusing in Table 6 on the seventy-four full members known to be employed in 1971 in the regional party apparatus and the fifty-six occupied in the USSR Council of Ministers (excluding defense and foreign affairs), we find an age profile showing the latter group to be significantly older than the former. Looking at the data in another way, we discover that, of the full members born prior to 1910, 40 per cent are currently employed in the USSR ministries, compared with only 12.9 per cent who are in the regional party apparatus; conversely,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 6

AGE PROFILE OF FULL MEMBERS OF THE 1971 CENTRAL COMMITTEE CURRENTLY OCCUPIED IN REGIONAL PARTY APPARATUS AND USSR MINISTRIES

Date of Birth	*% of Regional Party Apparatus (N=74)*	*% of USSR Ministries (N=56)*
Before 1910	12.2	50.0
1910-1914	25.7	32.1
1915-1919	29.7	14.3
1920-1937	32.4	3.6
Total	100.0%	100.0%

only 4.3 per cent of those born after 1920 have jobs in the ministries, compared with 52.2 per cent who are working in the regional party apparatus. Thus, with respect to *both* overall career pattern and current occupation, older Central Committee members are more likely to be associated with the government than with the party apparatus.

Before proceeding to a fuller examination of the figures relating to current occupation, let us briefly consider two more variables concerning career associations of Central Committee members. The biography of each of the members of the political elite was examined to determine whether an individual had *ever* in his career been employed in the party apparatus, and whether he had served as a secretary of an *oblast* or *krai* party committee. We discovered that 68.8 per cent of the full members had been employed, at some point in their careers, by the party apparatus, and that 51.9 per cent had gained experience as *oblast* or *krai* secretaries. In neither case was there much variation between incumbent and new members. Both experiences were then correlated with the age variable. Fully 78.3 per cent of the Central Committee members born after 1920 have served in the party apparatus, compared with only 55.1 per cent of those born before 1910; moreover, 66.7 per cent of those born after 1920 have been employed as regional secretaries, contrasted with only 31.4 per cent of the full members born before 1910. Here we see yet again the correlation between relative youth and association with the party apparatus.

This phenomenon may well be related to the fact that the party apparatus, over the years since Stalin's death, has regained its place as the "vital center" of decision-making in the Soviet political system. By the early 1950's, the party machine had become only *one* of the dic-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tator's instruments of control. As Khrushchev testified in the "secret speech" of 1956, Stalin had elevated himself "above the Party" and had ceased to consider its central organs in making his decisions. Thus, when apparently forced to choose after Stalin's death between his posts at the head of the party and state bureaucracies, Malenkov, the heir-apparent, revealed his estimate of the status of the party apparatus by deciding to retain his position as premier. In the years since, and especially after the resolution of the "anti-party" crisis of 1957, Khrushchev and then Brezhnev have restored the Party's place to such an extent that the choice between Party and state must now seem much clearer to ambitious young men embarking upon a political career.

Returning to the "current occupation" variable (that is, distribution of jobs held by full members at the time of the election of the relevant Central Committee), we begin in Table 7 with data on the occupations of the political elite for each of the five Central Committees elected since 1952. The table depicts the gradual transformation of the Central

TABLE 7

OCCUPATIONS OF FULL MEMBERS AT THE TIME OF ELECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Occupation	*% of 1952 CC N=125*	*% of 1956 CC N=133*[a]	*% of 1961 CC N=175*[b]	*% of 1966 CC N=195*[c]	*% of 1971 CC N=241*[d]
Party-related (Central apparatus, regional apparatus, "symbol manipulators")	63.2	54.9	48.8	43.2	40.7
State-related (USSR Ministers, Regional State, Supreme Soviet, Foreign Affairs, Police)	28.8	38.3	32.2	39.5	39.8
Military	4.8	4.5	8.0	7.2	7.9
Other occupations	3.2	2.3	10.9	10.3	11.6
Total	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.2%	100.0%

[a] 80 of these individuals had been full members in 1952.
[b] 66 of these had been full members in 1956.
[c] 139 of these had been full members in 1961.
[d] 153 of these had been full members in 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Committee, over the years since Stalin's death, from a body numerically dominated by the *apparatchiki* and containing only a few individuals from outside the party or state machines, to an institution whose membership, now almost twice as large, is much more diversified occupationally. This steadily broadening array of occupational experiences, brought about by the recruitment of administrators, planners, managers, scientists, soldiers, and even skilled laborers onto the political elite, can be thought of as a reflection of the ongoing skill specialization and division of labor in the larger society. This process of adaptation-by-diversification does not necessarily result from a conscious policy on the part of the political leadership, nor should it be interpreted as a harbinger of "pluralism" or as an erosion in the hegemony of the *apparatchiki*.

We should note two qualifications to the figures in Table 7. First, it should be remembered that the diversification in "current occupations" of the Central Committee membership depicted in Table 7 was *not* accompanied by a parallel diversification in the distribution of career patterns over time. Many individuals whose positions at the time of their election to the Central Committee were outside the party apparatus have nonetheless spent the largest portion of their adult years within the *apparat*. Thus, thirteen of the twenty-two full members who in 1971 occupied positions in the regional state apparatus or in the USSR Supreme Soviet have centered their careers in the Party. The same is true of six of the sixteen diplomatic personnel, and even of thirteen of the fifty-six government ministers elected to the Central Committee. This process works much less frequently in the opposite direction: only seventeen of ninety members (18.9 per cent) currently working in the party apparatus have spent their careers primarily outside the *apparat*.

Second, the *relative* decline of party positions in the occupational profile of the Central Committee is not accompanied by a decrease in the *absolute* size of the party "delegation." Rather, it is the expansion in the size of the Central Committee (with the number of full members almost doubling in nineteen years), and the relatively greater number of "new" seats allotted to personnel employed outside the party machine, that have accounted for the phenomenon depicted in Table 7. It is tempting to speculate that this expansion might be perceived by veteran members of the elite (especially the twenty-four who remain from 1952) as resulting in a deflation in the prestige value of membership on the Central Committee. Whether or not this is so in the case of the Central Committee, few would deny that there is still con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

siderable prestige and political value attached to a seat in the Politburo, and that on this body the *apparatchiki*'s hold remains firm. Fourteen of the twenty-one full and alternate members of this body have centered their careers in the party machine, and thirteen *currently* hold such jobs at either the central or regional level.

Having examined the long-term trend toward greater occupational diversification on the Central Committee, we now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the occupational profile of the 1971 Central Committee. The distribution of jobs, broken down into categories of incumbent members and new members, is graphically depicted in Figure 2. Here again, as in the case of the career patterns of incumbent and new members, we find a sharp drop-off in the proportion of new full members currently employed in the state apparatus (USSR Ministries, foreign affairs posts, and positions in the Supreme Soviet or regional state bureaucracy). Only in two categories can we discern a sharp increase. As has already been noted, one is in the proportion of new members who are workers or peasants. Only three manual laborers had been elected to full-member status in 1966, and another had been added in 1968. Only the latter retained his seat, but he was joined on the Central Committee by ten more workers and peasants newly elected in 1971—a net gain of seven positions for the "proletariat and peasantry."

The other sharp increase is in the proportion of new members occupied in the regional party apparatus: 42 per cent, as compared with

FIGURE 2

CURRENT OCCUPATIONS OF FULL MEMBERS OF THE 1971 CENTRAL COMMITTEE



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

26.8 per cent of the incumbents. This phenomenon, together with the decline in the proportion of new members occupied in the state apparatus, must be placed in the perspective provided by Table 7. There we found that the proportion of full member seats on the Central Committee occupied by the *apparatchiki* had *decreased* slightly since 1966, while the proportion occupied by members of the state bureaucracy had *increased* somewhat. Moreover, an examination of the positions held by the new members reveals that, while a total of thirty-six of the jobs have been upgraded (they did not carry full-member status for their occupants in 1966), these positions are split exactly *evenly* between the party and state apparatuses. How can we explain these seemingly contradictory data concerning the balance of seats between state and party, and do they have any long-term significance?

The most likely explanation would seem to be that a greater proportion of those individuals who, by reason of death, retirement, or demotion, failed to be reelected to the Central Committee in 1971 had been employed in party jobs in 1966. That is, a higher rate of personnel turnover in party occupations would have created more vacancies to be filled; this could account for the greater number of new members holding party jobs, while the balance between party and state positions on the Central Committee as a whole remained relatively stable. In fact, however, of the forty-seven full members on the previous Central Committee who were not reelected, only 30.4 per cent had occupied positions in the party apparatus in 1966, while 47.8 per cent had held jobs in the state bureaucracy (though only 8.5 per cent had been in all-union *ministerial* jobs). Thus, an explanation that focuses on a simple process of filling job vacancies would seem to be inadequate.

Another widely-held hypothesis, also positing a greater degree of turnover among party officials on the Central Committee than among government personnel, is one which holds that members of the state bureaucracy, by reason of their presumed specialized expertise, can naturally lay claim to their jobs for longer periods than the "generalists" who constitute the regional party apparatus. To test this hypothesis, a calculation was made of the length of time that each full member of the 1971 Central Committee had held his present job. Average and median figures were then computed for each occupational category, as shown in Table 8. In fact, the table reveals that there is not much difference in the average job tenure of regional party secretaries and members of the Council of Ministers, who, respectively, comprise the largest contingents on the Central Committee from the party and state apparatuses. The median tenure of most of the various types of party

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and state officials is the same (six years), with the exception of the officials in diplomatic posts and in positions in the Supreme Soviets of the USSR or the individual Republics. Since both of these latter categories are often the temporary abodes of party politicians in disgrace, more frequent rotation in such positions is not unexpected. In fact, eight of the sixteen foreign affairs officials on the Central Committee, and four of the ten officials in "soviet" work, had acquired their jobs within a year of the convening of the Twenty-fourth Party Congress.

TABLE 8

TENURE IN CURRENT OCCUPATION
FULL MEMBERS OF THE 1971 CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Occupation	*Average Tenure (Years)*	*Median Tenure (Years)*
Regional Party Apparatus (N=78)	7.0	6.0
Central Party Apparatus & "Symbol Manipulators" (N=16)	6.4	6.0
USSR Ministers (N=56)	8.0	6.0
Supreme Soviet & Republic Soviet (N=10)	3.3	2.5
Regional State (N=12)	6.9	6.0
Foreign Affairs Officials (N=16)	4.3	2.0
Military (N=19)	5.6	4.0
Police (N=2)	4.5	4.5
Mass Organization Apparatus (N=6)	7.7	6.0
Specialists in Economy (N=4)	8.0	8.0

While it is well known that there is a fairly sizable group of government officials who have occupied their positions for a decade or more (fourteen on the 1971 Central Committee, including Beshchev, Minister of Railways for twenty-three years), it bears remembering that there is an even more sizable contingent of regional and republic party secretaries on the Central Committee who have held their jobs for a similar period (twenty-five in 1971, including Snechkus, Lithuanian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

first secretary for almost thirty-one years, and Toka, first secretary of Tuva *obkom* for twenty-seven years).

Though there is little difference between these two categories in the *average and median* tenure of officials, it should be noted that there has indeed been more frequent rotation among the party apparatus officials than among the ministerial group in the five years between the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Party Congresses. Thirty-five of the seventy-eight full members in the regional party apparatus had held their jobs for five years or less, compared with only twelve of the fifty-six in the Council of Ministers.

However, not all cases of turnover of individuals in party and state jobs carrying Central Committee rank involve the removal of the previous incumbent from the elite,[18] and herein lies a key factor in explaining why the overall balance between party and state jobs could remain stable despite the higher proportion of new members with party positions. By examining the shifting of occupations by *incumbent* members of the Central Committee, we find that sixteen of the full members who had been reelected from the 1966 Central Committee had shifted from a party to a state position in the years between the Congresses. On the other hand, none of the incumbent full members who had held state jobs in 1966 had been shifted into party positions by 1971. Thus, one major reason why the number of state apparatus positions on the Central Committee could remain stable between 1966 and 1971 despite the relative scarcity of government personnel among the new members of the enlarged Central Committee is that a significant number of government positions were taken over in the interim by persons who had formerly held party posts.

Thus, we may conclude that despite the fact that relatively few persons holding positions in the party apparatus failed to gain reelection to the Central Committee, and despite the fact that no more party than state positions were upgraded to full-member status on the elite, there was still considerably more opportunity for men holding party positions to be newly elected to the Central Committee than for men holding state positions. Unfortunately, assessing the significance of this development is far more difficult than identifying it. There are dangers, as Jerry Hough has recently pointed out,[19] in the facile assumption

[18] Of the 28 cases in which party and state jobs carrying full-member rank in 1966 had "turned over" between Congresses, thus allowing their new occupants to acquire seats on the CC, only 11 involved the ouster (or death) of the previous incumbent. The remaining 17 individuals were retained on the CC in new positions.

[19] Jerry F. Hough, "The Party *Apparatchiki*," in H. G. Skilling and F. Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton 1971), 47-92.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that personnel in party and government positions will necessarily be on opposite sides of major political issues, i.e., that they constitute distinctly different "interests" in the Soviet lobbying process. Nevertheless, there may be significance in the fact that, during the past five years of Brezhnev's tenure as General Secretary, a sizable number of new job assignments on the Central Committee level have been made, resulting in an influx of a large number of new faces—many with past ties to the General Secretary—in the *party-apparatus* contingent on the Central Committee. It is perhaps worth recalling that a similar phenomenon occurred at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, when Khrushchev's success in recruiting heavily from among the regional party secretaries to fill vacancies on the new Central Committee proved to have dramatic repercussions at the time of the 1957 showdown between the First Secretary and his rivals in the state bureaucracy.

A final step in this preliminary analysis of the backgrounds of the members of the 1971 Soviet Central Committee remains to be reported. One variable was included in the gathering and coding of career data for the purpose of further testing Frederic Fleron's hypothesis concerning the importance of "cooptation" in the Soviet political elite as a means by which professional politicians have sought to adapt to the modernization of society without, in the process, surrendering to the "experts" the "commanding heights" in the political system. In a number of articles,[20] Fleron has examined the Soviet political elite in terms of the distinction between two types of individuals: "those who entered the political elite at very early stages in their careers and who thus had little opportunity to form close ties with a professional-vocational group" (whom he labels "recruited officials") and "those who entered the political elite in mid- or late career" and who had probably established such ties ("coopted officials"). The criterion used by Fleron in classifying an individual into one category or another is whether he "began occupying political or Party offices more or less regularly before he had spent more than seven years in a professional or technical vocation." By "political office" he means "any formal position in the Party, government, Komsomol, or trade unions," though mere membership in the CPSU or Komsomol does not count.[21] Fleron's research

[20] See the following articles by Fleron, all of which deal with ramifications of this subject: "Toward a Reconceptualization of Political Change in the Soviet Union: The Political Leadership System," *Comparative Politics*, 1, 2 (January 1969), 228-44; "Representation of Career Types in the Soviet Political Leadership," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Chicago 1970), 108-139; and the article cited in footnote 3.

[21] The above quotations are from Fleron's article in Farrell (fn. 20), 123-24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indicates a "sizable increase" in the proportion of coopted officials on the Central Committee from 1952 to 1961, combined with a continuing hold by recruited officials ("professional politicians") on almost all the positions in the Politburo and leading jobs on the staff agencies of the central party apparatus.

For purposes of this study, we will first determine whether the proportion of coopted officials in the Central Committee has continued to increase, and then we will explore, by means of bivariate analysis, some further respects in which coopted officials differ from those who are recruited. Unlike Fleron's research, the present study includes the military contingent on the Central Committee (all of whom qualify as "coopted") and it excludes those twenty full members who lack any form of completed higher education. Thus, when we speak of coopted or recruited officials here, we are in all cases speaking of persons who have acquired a higher education; the only remaining difference is whether they were employed full time in a non-political vocation for seven years prior to assuming political office.

By Fleron's calculation, coopted officials constituted only 24.6 per cent of the Central Committee in 1952 and 30.1 per cent in 1956, but by 1961 they accounted for 50.3 per cent of the political elite on the Central Committee.[22] Our figures for the 1971 Central Committee show that 44.1 per cent of the full members known to have a higher education can be classified as coopted; the ratio among incumbent and new members is almost exactly the same. Thus, while persons with at least seven years' experience in a specialized non-political vocation no longer outnumber recruited officials, they continue to occupy a prominent place on the elite. Moreover, the institutionalized advantage of the recruited officials has continued; recruited officials constitute fully 80 per cent of the Politburo and 82.4 per cent of the Central Committee members currently employed in "non-ideological" jobs in the central party apparatus.

Cross-tabulation of the cooptation/recruitment variable with certain other background and career variables reveals some significant characteristics of the two types of officials.

With respect to age, we discover that coopted officials, both in the full membership as a whole and among new and incumbent members, tend to be older than recruited officials on the Central Committee. Thus, while 62.3 per cent of the members born before 1910 are coopted officials, only 30.8 per cent of those born after 1920 fall into this category. It appears, then, that even though a significant number of coopted

[22] *Ibid.*, 125.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

officials are brought onto the political elite, they tend to be among the older members rather than among the younger cadres. This is not unexpected, since by definition coopted officials get a later start on a political career than recruited officials. Indeed, data on the age at which Central Committee members acquired their first top positions also show, as might be expected, that a smaller proportion of coopted officials (24.3 per cent) than of recruited officials (66.9 per cent) have reached high office by the time they are forty-five years old.

The most statistically significant correlations with the cooptation variable occur in tabulations against the career variables. In the tabulation with career patterns, we would expect high correlations between cooptation and careers in the military, and in economic or scientific and academic specialities, and indeed this is the case. Far more revealing is the relatively small proportion of full members whose careers have been centered in the party apparatus who were coopted into political office: only 18.4 per cent, contrasted with 56.1 per cent of those whose careers have been in the government bureaucracy. Among new members this relationship between recruitment and a party career is even stronger: 86.5 per cent of the career *apparatchiki* among new members have been recruited into political office, compared with only 33.3 per cent of the career government personnel.

The linkage between cooptation and non-party positions appears again when current occupation is cross-tabulated with the cooptation variable. Thus, 82.4 per cent of full members employed in the central party apparatus in 1971, and 72.9 per cent of those in the regional party apparatus, were originally recruited into political office, in contrast with only 40 per cent of those currently occupied in USSR ministries (excluding defense and foreign affairs). The only other occupational fields which show a preponderance of recruited officials are the jobs classified as "symbol-manipulators" and positions in the mass organization apparatus, as well as posts in the field of foreign affairs.

The strongest correlation of all (Goodman-Kruskal gamma=.880)[23] occurs when we examine the relationship between whether a Central Committee member has *ever* served in the party apparatus and whether he has been coopted or recruited. Of those who have ever had experience

[23] For a discussion of this nonparametric technique for measuring the degree of correlation between variables, see L. A. Goodman and W. H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classification," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XLIX (December 1954), 732-64. Another measure of the significance of this correlation is the chi-square value, which is 60.10; thus the null hypothesis is rejected at the .001 level of significance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the party bureaucracy, only 27.3 per cent had gained seven or more years' experience in a non-political vocation prior to entering political office. Of those who have never served in the party apparatus, 85.5 per cent have been coopted! (Among new members, the spread is even greater: 25.5 per cent compared to 90 per cent.) Slightly less strong, but still of high statistical significance, is the relationship between cooptation/recruitment and whether a member of the political elite has worked as a regional party secretary. Only 25.2 per cent of those who had held such positions are coopted officials, compared with 66.3 per cent of those who had not been party secretaries at the regional level.

The conclusion that we may draw from this discussion of the characteristics of coopted officials is that, insofar as the members of the 1971 Central Committee are concerned, the practice of absorbing into political office persons with significant experience in a specialized non-political vocation has been far more common in non-party than in party apparatus positions. This is not to say that career party officials on the elite are necessarily less well qualified in technical skills; as we have already seen, the vast majority of *apparatchiki* on the elite possess a higher education, often in an economic specialty, and many of them have worked (at least briefly) in their learned professions. What it does say, however, is that in the staffing of positions in the party apparatus, Soviet leaders have leaned more heavily on the "recruitment" process; that is, they have preferred to absorb highly trained individuals into party positions shortly after their educational experiences have ended. Those members of the elite who have practiced their learned vocations for seven or more years (and who are thus, as Fleron argues, more likely to be socialized into the standards and values of their non-political professions), constitute a far greater proportion of the officials in non-party careers, especially in the government bureaucracy.

To summarize: We have focused on the process of elite selection in this study of the 1971 Soviet Central Committee, both as a means of giving symbolic place on the elite to various non-elite sectors of society, and as a means of giving the leadership access (for purposes of consultation only, or for allowing fuller participation in the decision-making process) to persons with certain vital talents. With respect to the former function, we found that the new Central Committee had in its ranks only token representation of Soviet women or of the manual workers in the Party, though there had been a sudden jump in the number of the latter segment among the new members of the Central Committee. Members of national minorities were not only underrep-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resented in terms of numbers, but those minority nationals who had been selected for membership seemed to have followed a more narrowly circumscribed road to elite status than had the Russian members.

We found some merit to the argument asserting the existence of a generation gap among Soviet officials. Not only has the average age of the Central Committee increased over time, but there is some evidence that the relatively younger members of the elite, as expected, have served longer apprenticeships in lower posts, and that in several respects they tend, in the aggregate, to have had different educational and career experiences than their older colleagues.

Among the most striking findings was the high level of educational attainment of the elite, and the concentration of this training in fields relating to management of the economy. Though little can be said, from the available evidence, about the *quality* of this education, we must conclude that the possession of a higher degree has apparently become so valued by the party leadership that it has become a virtual prerequisite to membership on the Central Committee.

Especially significant were the findings relating to the current institutional balance within the Central Committee. Though there is long-term stability over the past fifteen years in the distribution of members' careers, there was, in 1971, a sharp decline in the representation of government careers among the new members of the Central Committee. For the younger of the new members, especially, a party career has been by far the most common. Similarly, despite a long-term trend toward diversification with respect to the current occupations of full members of the Central Committee, almost half of the new faces on the 1971 elite belonged to persons holding party jobs at the time of their election. And while the number of state apparatus positions represented on the Central Committee did not fall, quite a few of the occupants of these jobs had been newly brought into them from the party machine.

Finally, with respect to the process of cooptation into political offices of persons experienced in a non-political vocation, we discovered that this phenomenon, while still quite significant, was not equally common among all categories of members. Rather, those Central Committee members whose careers had centered in the party apparatus were far more likely to have been recruited directly into positions of political responsibility than to have been brought into such work only after having established themselves in a non-political career.

The resulting picture of the Soviet political elite elected in 1971 is one which combines elements of both adaptation and continuity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Adaptation to the demands of an increasingly complex and heterogeneous society may be seen in the growing diversity of occupations, type of training, and national origin represented by the members of the Central Committee. Yet at the same time, with respect to its generational homogeneity, high level of education, and overall mix of career experiences, the present Central Committee differs very little from those previously elected in the post-Stalin period. Moreover, there is no evidence that would indicate a trend away from the earlier domination by the Communist Party apparatus of the Soviet political process.

The Twenty-fourth Party Congress was no doubt designed to project an image of unity, continuity, and confidence. As Brezhnev exulted, in the concluding moments of his six-hour report to the assembled delegates:

> Comrades, we have inexhaustible possibilities. Our country's economic might is greater than ever before. New heights have been attained by Soviet science and culture. The moral and political unity of our people is unbreakable. We are moving forward shoulder to shoulder with our socialist friends and allies. . . . We know that we shall achieve all that we are striving for, and successfully carry out the tasks we are setting ourselves.[24]

[24] Brezhnev (fn. 14), 64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

COMMUNIST POWER IN A WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION:

The Case of China

By TETSUYA KATAOKA

Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962, 256 pp., $7.50.

Bo-ei-cho, Bo-ei kenshu-jo, Senshi-shitsu [The Defense Board, Defense Research Institute, The War History Office], *Dai-toa senso kokan-shi* [Publicly Recorded History of the Greater East Asian War], Vol. XVII: *Hokushi no chian-sen* [The Pacification War in North China]. Tokyo, Asagumo shinbun-sha, 1968, Part I, 610 pp., 2.200 yen.

Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970, 225 pp., $8.50.

William Hinton, *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*. New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1966, 626 pp., $12.50.

Isabel and David Crook, *Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn*. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1959, 190 pp., $5.50.

In interpretations of the revolution in China, a view persists which ascribes the success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) primarily to the support of the peasant masses in the countryside. Such a view is often based on the deteriorating social and economic conditions in the countryside that created acute deprivation among the peasantry. Or else, the deprivation is viewed as a consequence of the "destruction and anarchy" wrought by the Japanese invasion. Mobilization of the peasantry is thought to have been spontaneous. Furthermore, such a view is presented as the correct understanding of Mao Tse-tung's own theory of revolution, but it errs in being apolitical. This essay proposes to offer a new interpretation of the Communist victory in the first round of the "wars of national liberation," that is, the War of Resistance against Japan. We suggest that the cities—by far the most politically conscious part of China—played just as important a role in the Communist victory as the rural areas; that the war was from the beginning a revolution guided from above by a leadership with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extraordinary political acumen; and that a large contributory role was played by international politics.

A great strategic debate started among the Chinese Communist leadership both in China and Moscow when the worst disaster in the history of the movement visited it in 1934. After repeated assaults by the ever-increasing forces of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Soviet Republic in south-central China was overrun. The Red Army, the Party, and the government personnel with their families fled aimlessly at first, simply to survive on what later came to be called the Long March. The revolutionary movement appeared to be on the verge of extinction. The debate concerned the causes behind the fall of the Kiangsi soviets and a general reorientation in the Party's policy in order to extricate itself from the critical strait. It extended well into the early phase of the war against Japan; the final ratification of its results did not come until the Seventh Party Congress in 1945. The debate took many turns in its long course and involved several subsidiary issues and different personalities. But the chief contenders were Mao Tse-tung and Ch'en Shao-yü, the leader of the Internationalists popularly known as Wang Ming.

Few objections will be raised today to the thesis that the Japanese invasion played an indispensable role in the ultimate victory of socialism in China. But as to precisely what role the invasion did play, or how it was acted upon by the CCP, is still very much an open question. One looks in vain for an independent and systematic treatment of this question beyond the brilliant pioneering study by Chalmers Johnson of nearly a decade ago. Many of us have accepted Mao's own account of his strategy—summarized in the phrase "surrounding the cities from the countryside"—as though his final victory were a *prima facie* warranty of its validity. But there is much more to Mao's writings than simply the partial view of the victor, for they were political instruments with which he overcame his intra-party opponents in the very delicate environment of the second United Front. To accept them as an account of the Communist success is analogous to reading only the *Federalist Papers* in order to understand the founding of American government.

A better picture will emerge only through a dialectical interaction of *all* opinions, more or less partial. Thus, we can no more ignore the voices of dissent within the CCP than the deeply-held convictions of the Kuomintang elites as to how China was lost. Just as important is the picture as it appeared to the Japanese both during and after the war. Under the able leadership of Nishiura Susumu, the War History Office of the Defense Board is nearly one-third of the way into its gigantic project of compiling a history of the "Greater East Asian War" from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

official documents in the Japanese archives. *Hokushi no chiansen* [The Pacification War in North China], written by Colonel Morimatsu Toshio, is by far the most comprehensive and authoritative account of how the Japanese Army fought against a "people's war"—some thirty years before Vietnam. As a postwar account, it is marred by no deliberate distortion. It will remain an indispensable work for studying this phase of Chinese communism.

The intra-party debate came to the surface in Moscow when Wang Ming spoke as a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern at its Seventh Congress (July-August, 1935), the Congress that proclaimed the new line of cooperation with democracies in a popular front against fascism. This basic shift in the Comintern's policy, which presumably had primarily the Soviet Union's interests in view, happened to come close on the heels of the Kiangsi debacle. Wang's speech indicated that the Comintern had made peace with the new leadership that had emerged in the CCP at the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935. Still, it is apparent that the Comintern authorized Wang to criticize "some comrades" in the CCP for their part in the major blunders committed in Kiangsi. And Wang rose to the occasion. The enmity between him and Mao was deep and longstanding. There was considerable opportunism and distortion in what they said about each other. We are not interested primarily in establishing the veracity of political charges: we weigh them against each other in order to understand what the CCP as a whole actually did in the war, and in order not to be blinded by partisan accounts.

In sharp contrast to Mao, who, ever since the Tsunyi Conference, would speak critically only of the conduct of the Fourth and the Fifth Campaigns, Wang's criticisms on this and other occasions went to the heart of the matter.[1] He frequently dwelt on the "weakness" of the Chinese soviets themselves: ("Looked at from the standpoint of a political trend, a great majority of the people are today still unable to escape the influence of the other government and party . . . and do not defend the soviets"). He was also very critical of the "weakness" of the Red Army, a point which probably needed little illustration then. These weaknesses were due to the narrow "closed-doorism" of some comrades who failed to unite with the broad masses along the anti-Japanese line. They failed to unite with the warlord Feng Yü-hsiang and again with the Fukien Rebellion. They did not understand the

[1] *Ch'en Shao-yü chiu-kuo yen-lun hsüan-chi* [Collection of Ch'en Shao-yü's Save-the-Nation Speeches] (Hankow 1938), 1-107.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proper relationship between land reform and the anti-imperialist struggle. Land reform was an anti-feudal struggle and could not solve the problems of the anti-imperialist struggle. Experience showed that the anti-imperialist struggle could command much wider support than an anti-feudal struggle. Thus Wang Ming seemed to be pointing to a basic limitation in a peasant mass movement.

The true import and scope of Wang Ming's criticisms can be fathomed when we take a long view of Chinese Communist history to see what Mao Tse-tung stood for by this time. Benjamin Schwartz, in his study of 1958, noted five "essential features" in what he called the "Maoist strategy." These features are: (1) a peasant mass base resting on a program of land reform designed to satisfy the basic grievances of the bulk of the peasantry; (2) the existence of a strong Leninist party; (3) the existence of a strong Red Army; (4) the control of a strategically located territorial base; and (5) self-sufficiency of the territorial base.[2] Thus we see a close correspondence between Wang Ming's charges and Schwartz's definition of Maoism. Wang's political intent appeared to be to identify these features as Mao's own and to hold them responsible for the fall of the Kiangsi soviets. Especially noteworthy is the charge that the Kiangsi soviets went down in defeat because they could not depend on the diversionary effect of a revolution in urban areas.[3]

Wang was apparently incensed by the outcome of the debate at the Tsunyi Conference, held in his absence some six months before. Mao had not only managed to escape being blamed for the fall of the Kiangsi soviets, but had emerged as the supreme leader of the Party. This was an aberration in the Party's history in which a major mistake was always linked up with some individual who was then retired from leadership. Mao was fortunate in having been temporarily out of power during the last campaign in Kiangsi. At Tsunyi he succeeded in passing a resolution which avoided basic issues of the type Wang wished to raise, and only concerned itself with the tactical aspect of the last campaign.[4] Mao is reported to have had a slim majority, most of which was

[2] *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958), 189-90.

[3] Ch'en Shao-yü (fn. 1), 79. For a correct understanding of the Party line established at its Sixth Congress, see Richard C. Thornton, *The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928–1931* (Seattle 1969). The struggle between Mao and Li Li-san parallels that between Mao and Wang Ming.

[4] Jerome Ch'en, "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference," *China Quarterly*, No. 40 (October-December 1969), 1-38; Chi-hsi Hu, "Hua Fu, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the Tsunyi Conference," *China Quarterly*, No. 43 (July-September 1970), 31-46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made up of his military followers. He concentrated on the most tangible and burning question on their minds—how that last battle was lost. The battle was commanded by the Internationalists.

From the Comintern Congress on, Wang Ming kept clamoring for a "change," for a "new policy." He started from a premise with which nobody could disagree: the soviets and the Red Army were utterly powerless. Hence the CCP was to unite with whatever forces, domestic and foreign, that were willing to take up arms against Japan. The controversy as to where the idea of a united front with Chiang Kai-shek originated is still unsettled. At any rate, Stalin was acutely interested in having the Japanese threat against the Russian border in the Far East diverted by opening up a front against Japan in China. After 1937 he offered considerable assistance to China. This aid went mainly to the Kuomintang government—evidently based on the judgment that only it could put up a meaningful resistance against Japan.

Wang's call for close cooperation with the Kuomintang rested on two major considerations. We will deal with one of them here, postponing the other for the moment. Until November 1938, when Wuhan and Canton fell to the Japanese and the Nationalist government withdrew to Chungking, the latter was in control of the urban areas of China. More orthodox Communist activities than Mao was willing to countenance—such as trade-unionism of the industrial proletariat—were possible only by keeping on good terms with the Kuomintang. The second United Front meant, for Wang, a chance to restore the CCP to the cities of China. We may infer that Mao took this as an attempt to wrest control of the CCP from him, from an urban base. It is not known whether the Comintern had a hand in this, too. But on the face of it, the most persuasive point in Wang's case was elsewhere. He had repeatedly noted the spontaneous groundswell and outbursts of anti-Japanese sentiments in the urban areas, of a magnitude that had not been seen since the May Fourth Movement. There was true political "consciousness" independent of any economic reform—something that was absent in the rural soviets in the hinterland. Ride the crest of this groundswell, use anti-Japanese slogans to establish roots among the urban masses, mobilize patriotic public opinion against the reactionary "unification first" inclination of the Kuomintang (eliminating the Communists before dealing with Japan)—this was Wang Ming's position. For him, the resistance against Japan, no less than the restoration of communism in China, was the function of the cities, not of the countryside.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wang was pointing to the coming of a "revolutionary upsurge" in the cities, as it were, and to its connection with the Japanese invasion. But Mao was second to none in his awareness of the bearing that a foreign invasion would have on the revolution. Thus they were agreed on one point: the invasion must be exploited for the revolution. By 1936, Mao found his own means for doing so: "surrounding the cities from the countryside."[5] It was only after Wang's demise that Mao could afford to admit the critical role played by the United Front with the Kuomintang.[6] The discrepancy between the two formulations may be paraphrased as follows: Did the Chinese Communists win their victory by drawing on the resources of the countryside alone? Or did they win by drawing on the resources of both the countryside and the cities? If the latter was the answer, how was it possible for the CCP to use the cities to its advantage? If, furthermore, the CCP relied on both the cities and the countryside to win the war, what was the relative importance of the two?

Professor Johnson has shown conclusively that Chinese Communist power had, during the Japanese invasion, grown to a point where it could challenge the Kuomintang government when Japan surrendered. He implies that the criterion to be used in judging the success of Chinese Communism in its resistance against Japan should not be how much the CCP could contribute to the defeat of Japan, but how it could turn the war of resistance against Japan into a "war of national liberation" against both Japan *and* the Kuomintang government. Victory of socialism was always the fixed end of the CCP; the only questions were how "protracted" the struggle would be, and what strategy should be used at each historical stage.

Clarity as to the CCP's goals in the resistance goes a long way towards a proper evaluation of its success. From the outset, the war against Japan was viewed as a triangular one by both Mao and Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese soon learned this, as they watched the Chinese fighting each other on the battlefield. The Comintern appears to have tried, through Wang Ming, to keep the conflict bipolar, but had failed by 1941. After Pearl Harbor, the United States gradually assumed this task. Washington never fully understood the basic fact that the war

[5] Kataoka, "Strategic Dispute between Mao and P'eng Te-huai in the War Against Japan," paper read at the 32nd annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, April, 1970.

[6] Thus the notion of "Maoism" as Schwartz defined it is incomplete. It is a partisan definition held both by Mao's detractors in their attack *and* by Mao himself in self-defense.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against Japan was a full-scale revolution; hence, the role which the Kuomintang played in the war of resistance against Japan was also its role in the revolution.

The strength of Professor Johnson's model of mass nationalism is that it is sociological—an asset in a study of a popular mass movement. He is successful in accounting for the political fortunes of a movement in terms of the mass support it received. For the same reason, however, his account of the politico-strategic calculus that guided the CCP or, for that matter, Japan or the Kuomintang, is not explicit enough. It is sometimes misleading. By finding a correlation between the Communist expansion in a given area on the one hand, and the fact that the Japanese Army had passed over that area on its march towards the interior on the other, he tries to explain the process by which the CCP expanded the base of its support behind the advancing Japanese lines. He attributes this expansion to the spontaneous rise of nationalistic consciousness among the peasants as a result of the destruction and anarchy wrought by the invaders. He notes that the CCP with its army was the only group to move into this situation, to institutionalize the preexisting patriotic sentiment of the peasants, and in turn to use it as the foundation of its power. The obverse of this reasoning is that where there was no significant Communist expansion, it must be explained by the absence of peasant nationalism after the Japanese destruction. Failure of the Kiangsi soviets and the absence of Communist expansion in the "white area" or the Kuomintang area during the war must therefore be explained in terms of the absence of anti-Japanese nationalism in the rural areas.

As I have shown elsewhere, the Party's purpose in moving in behind the Japanese lines was to get a respite from the relentless pursuit by the Kuomintang,[7] which by all accounts never really ceased until the invasion began. The CCP was using the Japanese forces to segregate itself from the Kuomintang forces. In the early stages, the Japanese army paid scant attention to the Communist forces, a ragtag band of only 80,000, armed with spears and old muskets. Thereafter, the CCP's objective was to expand without unduly alarming either the Japanese or the Kuomintang. Mao ordered his forces to de-escalate their combat operations from mobile warfare to guerrilla warfare so as to give the Japanese a false sense of security. The Kuomintang, though alarmed, could do little to check the expansion of Communist power without first dealing with the Japanese. The CCP was to push its luck right up to, but a little short of, the point where tensions with the Kuomintang

[7] Kataoka (fn. 5).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would culminate in a civil war. A civil war would have meant the end of the war with Japan, and that in turn would have meant the doom of the CCP. Mao was severely criticized by Wang Ming and by his own generals for this opportunistic gamble—especially in December 1937, when the Kuomintang accepted a preliminary peace proposal from Tokyo (*The Pacification War*, p. 57). This was Wang's second point against Mao. For Mao, the second United Front evidently meant simply an absence of peace between Tokyo and Chungking: it mattered little to him that it was shaky so long as it provided a protective umbrella.

Because of the nature of the triangular conflict, Chiang's will to maintain the resistance faltered from time to time. As the government's power increased under wartime conditions, the political influence of the urban population, long since uprooted and relocated to the interior, declined. Hence, what Lin Piao in his speech of 1965 called "the cities of the world" had to be mobilized to keep the war going. In the summer of 1944 we find Mao talking to an American official of the Chungking Embassy as follows: "The hope for preventing civil war in China . . . rests to a very great extent—much more than ever before—on the influence of foreign countries. Among these *by far the most important* is the United States."[8]

How to keep the Kuomintang in the war, how to keep it and the Japanese Army locked in combat with one another—this was the supreme desideratum which guided the Chinese Communists. If one were to superimpose a map of the CCP's bases during the war on a map showing the Japanese-occupied areas, a stunning picture would emerge. With the sole exception of the Shen-Kan-Ning base which enjoyed a legal status, the Chinese Communist forces chose not to move into an area which was not occupied by the Japanese Army. The reason for this was not that the CCP found it easier to live with Japanese pacification than with the Kuomintang's "bandit suppression." The reason was that it had to avoid civil war. This also explains the presence or absence of peasant mobilization: the peasants were mobilized only in those areas where the CCP chose to mobilize them. Destruction by the Japanese Army was no doubt an important factor. But that was secondary, and so was social and economic deprivation.

We may now answer the question posed above: Did the Chinese Communists win the war against Japan by "surrounding the cities from the countryside?" The answer is a most definite No. They depended

[8] John S. Service's report in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Laws, *The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China* (Washington, D.C. 1970), 790; emphasis in original.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

heavily on the forces generated in the cities of China to win. During the first United Front and the subsequent period of civil war, Mao Tse-tung's predecessors failed to carry out the dual policy laid down by Lenin: to unite with and struggle against the national bourgeoisie. It took Mao and the convergence of fortuitous events to realize that goal. If the CCP had cooperated with the Kuomintang wholeheartedly, as Wang Ming demanded, it would have found itself at the end of the war exactly where it was at the beginning. If it had struggled too much against the Kuomintang, China might have surrendered to Japan.

When Mao rewrote the Party's history in 1945 in "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party," he stated that the Party's line as laid down at the Sixth Congress in 1928 was "basically correct."[9] Formally, the Resolution chose not to deal with the period of the war against Japan,[10] though in fact it did. The line of the Sixth Congress steered the Party through the bloody civil war period. It stressed the rural area work, the Red Army, the soviets; it made no provisions for a "united front from above." What Mao meant by the above statement was that the line of the Sixth Congress did not apply beyond 1934. The line was incorrect for the period of the war against Japan. Elsewhere Mao has stated: "It was in these two years [1934–1936] that the Chinese Communist Party, adapting itself to the new situation, decided on and carried out a new, well-integrated political line—the line of the Anti-Japanese United Front. . . ."[11] Why then has Mao misled so many of us to believe that the rural strategy of the Sixth Congress was binding until 1945? The answer lies in the presence of Wang Ming. He returned to China in 1937 with the intention to convene a Seventh Congress early, shelve the line of the Sixth Congress, and establish a new line more in accord with that of the Comintern at its Seventh Congress. For a Caesaro-Papist regime such as the CCP, such a drastic shift in line would almost certainly have meant the fall of the incumbent leader. Mao therefore pigeonholed the resolutions calling for a Seventh Congress.[12] It was not convened until Mao was assured of his absolute power. Thus Mao won the war by appropriating the urban strategy of Wang Ming, but he could not and would not reveal the source from which that strategy came. Nor would he spell out the full significance of his combined strategy: to exploit the national crisis for his revolutionary purpose.

[9] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (New York 1955), IV, 176.
[10] *Ibid.*, 189. [11] *Ibid.*, 251.
[12] See one such resolution in an appendix to Warren Kuo, "The Conflict between Chen Shao-yu and Mao Tse-tung, Part II," *Issues and Studies* (December 1968). It is to be noted that the Sixth Plenum also passed such a Resolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Professor Johnson draws a distinction between two kinds of nationalism. One is a functional model defining nationalism in terms of the scope of the masses mobilized. The other is a traditional one which, in his view, is equivalent to the possession of a distinct culture. He identifies the former with the Chinese Communists and the latter with the Kuomintang. It was probably not his intention to deny the existence of modern nationalism in the cities, nor necessarily in the Nationalist Party which bore the major burden of the resistance. Rather, Professor Johnson is interested more in grasping the "process of coming into being" of the new nationalism. In such a process, propagation from above is implicitly ruled out. The new nationalism must be self-generating. The crux of his definition is not so much that it should involve the masses, as that it should be spontaneous. Involvement of the masses is a consequence of spontaneity. He seems to have grappled with an old riddle that has troubled students of modern China: Why did it fail to unify itself into a modern nation-state under the aegis of warlords or of the Kuomintang? A standard answer has dominated the thinking of American sinologists. It goes back to Max Weber. It held that the failure was due to a prevailing ethos to which China was heir and about which it could do little. Not even the state or politics was immune from the influence of this social or sub-political ethos, e.g., kinship, "particularism."

Long before Max Weber came to the attention of American sinologists, the issue was debated in earnest among the reformers of the May Fourth Movement, the generation to which Mao and the founders of the CCP belonged. Hu Shih, a noted pragmatist and a student of Dewey, took the position I have ascribed to Weber. He argued that in China, reform must start from a social or cultural level and proceed to politics, and that talk of "isms" (i.e., politics) was therefore premature at the time. A reply by Li Ta-chao had a prophetic quality about it: A cultural revolution follows, rather than precedes, a political revolution. Of late, a similar issue has touched off a heated debate among American social scientists. We need not replicate the whole range of issues between the functionalists and their critics. We need to note only the central argument advanced by the latter. Functionalism, according to them, cannot account for the creation of a new value system. It is perhaps no accident that neo-Marxists should be critics of Max Weber, who is to the bourgeoisie what Marx is to the proletariat.[13]

[13] See Barrington Moore's criticism of the functionalists in the context of Chinese history in *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston 1967), 484-508.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hence, class conflict is upheld as the generator of new values. But the most generic category of the source of new values is obscured in this view. That category is politics, of which class conflict is but a species. "Supremacy of politics" was a vital precondition for the Communist victory in China.

When Mao prophesied that, as the Japanese forces took the cities, the Communist forces would be compelled to withdraw into the countryside, Wang Ming retorted: We must "defend Wuhan, China's Madrid." Mao was probably not unhappy to see Wuhan fall, for that was the beginning of the end of the Internationalists. Partisan representation of the cities in the CCP also ended. Thenceforward, so far as the CCP was concerned, resistance appeared to have become solely the function of the countryside. In fact, as the opposition declined, Mao became more explicit on this point. Thus he defined the war simply as a "peasant war" in 1939.[14] Did China's peasants redeem Mao's trust in their potential and prove Wang Ming wrong? Was it really true that the cities of China did not contribute at all to the CCP's, as distinct from China's, resistance?

It seems necessary at the outset to cut through the fantasies generated of late about the power of the people, of undifferentiated peasant masses. Mao himself is responsible for this myth, though he is not a victim of it. This is indicated by the apparent, though not real, contradiction between two well-known attitudes of Mao. One is expressed by such phrases as "man, not weapons, decides a war"; or, "several hundred million peasants will rise like a tornado. . . ."[15] The other attitude is expressed in the dictum, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Since both the gun and the masses are products of China's countryside, understanding the relationship between them should go far towards understanding the function of the countryside in the resistance. Again, clarity as to the overall goal of the CCP in the war is decisive. Mao's analysis of the fall of the Kiangsi soviets ascribed its cause to faulty generalship. This might have looked to Wang Ming like an evasion of responsibility. But Mao's true message seems to have been that the debacle of Kiangsi was due primarily to military factors, to a radical imbalance in the armed might of the two forces, which no

[14] In "Introductory Remark to *The Communist*," *Selected Works* (New York 1955), III, 60.

[15] Mao makes statements like these whenever he is contending with someone for power. It is his favorite rhetorical device to extoll the wisdom, virtue, and power of the people, and then to imply that they support him spontaneously. See an attempt to reconstruct Mao from short sentences like these in Maurice Meisner, "Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China," *China Quarterly*, No. 45 (January-March 1971), 2-36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other factor could alter. That is to say, Mao seemed to imply that even if all had been going well with the governments of the soviets, the mass organizations, the agrarian revolution, and so forth, Kiangsi could not have been held because Communist military power was inadequate.[16] Mao attaches enormous significance to the role played by the gun in a revolution in a "semi-colonial" and "semi-feudal" country like China. To build an army big enough to win the next confrontation with the Kuomintang army was his distant goal.

The contradiction between Mao's attitude towards the people and the gun is only apparent, not real. For Mao, the people play a role that is subordinate, and ancillary, to the army. Without a gun, people are fragile. The Red Army, on the other hand, could survive the Long March without a base, that is, without popular support. "Without a peoples' army," Lin Piao says, "the people have nothing."

This point was demonstrated by the experience of the Japanese army in conducting the pacification war against the CCP. After Japan had failed initially in trying to localize the war, and again in an attempt to win a quick victory in an all-out war, it turned inward to the conquered territory of China. It embarked on a "protracted war" of its own, which lasted until 1942 (when strategy changed again). The Japanese army realized that it had over-extended itself without having brought the Kuomintang government to its knees. Therefore, it sought to undermine the regime by a combination of political and military means. It sought to establish a "Sino-barbarian joint administration" which would gradually strip the mantle of legitimacy from the Chungking government. The Japanese army had to strengthen its hold over the occupied area while reducing its commitment by a gradual "sinification" of the war. In 1941 and 1942, the CCP's mettle was put to the hard test of war; these were the Party's most difficult years.

The Pacification War suggests that wherever the Japanese army carried out a "clear-and-hold" type of operation by dispersing its forces, it succeeded in denying the peasant masses to the Communist forces. Based on intensive research of the methods of "bandit suppression" in China—ranging from Tsen Kuo-fan's suppression of the Taiping Rebels to Chiang Kai-shek's five Encirclement Campaigns—the Japanese

[16] It is interesting to note that Wang Ming conceded this point in a speech made when the Kuomintang forces were about to overrun the soviets. See *Hsin-t'iao-chien yü hsin-ts'e-lüeh* [New Conditions and New Policy] (Report to the Work Personnel Conference of the China Section, The Foreign Worker's Publishing House of the Soviet Union, November 24, 1934) (Moscow and Leningrad 1935). Thus, it seems that he was making apologies for the impending doom of the Kiangsi soviets led by the Internationalists. Then, after the fall, he decided to blame Mao.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

army proceeded to build enormous stretches of blockade lines criss-crossing the countryside, surrounding the Communist bases, along the railway lines, and guarding the pacified zones. As security of an area improved, the garrison duty was entrusted to puppet troops, and the Japanese forces moved on. All of the Communist bases on the plains sustained crippling blows. In 1941 and 1942, the Japanese intensified their efforts to extend the blockade lines into the centers of the bases in mountainous areas, so as to cut them into smaller units. From these lines, large-scale missions of the "search-and-destroy" type were conducted towards the center. There appears to have been no Communist base which was secure against this operation—with the sole exception of the Shen-Kan-Ning. Most of these sweeps into the mountains failed to trap sizable Communist forces: they were too skilled in eluding the pursuit. All the more significant, then, is the great disparity between Communist admissions of their troop losses and Japanese reports of enemy killed or captured. In 1942 in southern Hopei, for instance, one-half of the twenty thousand Communist regulars were lost.[17] Mao admits that the Communist forces lost 200,000 during that period.[18] How do we account for these losses which escaped Japanese attention?

In 1942, the CCP initiated a vast program of demobilization, cutting back its regular forces as well as government personnel of the bases. Also, the CCP started a food production campaign among the army and the government personnel in order to alleviate the burden on the peasants. There are reports of high incidence of death related to malnutrition among party cadres. In memoirs of that period, an officer of the Communist forces recalls that 60 per cent of his men in a regular brigade were night-blind from malnutrition and had to walk hand in hand with others who retained their sight.[19] The Communist forces in the hills were starving.

We may infer that the large troop losses were due mainly to desertion. The CCP was effectively denied access to the fertile and heavily populated plains because it could not hold these areas militarily. Having temporarily lost its gun on the plains, so to speak, it did not have access to the two most important elements of popular support, i.e., grain and new recruits. At the same time, sweep operations by powerful columns were the upper ceiling of the Japanese campaign in the

[17] Chi Wu, *I-ke ke-ming ken-chü-ti ti ch'eng-ch'ang* [The Growth of One Revotionary Base] (Peking 1958), 84-85.

[18] Mao (fn. 9), IV, 162-63.

[19] *Hsing-huo liao-yüan* [A Single Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire] (Peking 1961), VI, 87. This was in northwestern Shansi where Communist power was extremely tenuous.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mountains. The Communist forces are reported to have fought aggressively and admirably whenever the odds favored them. That, combined with a shortage of manpower, prevented the Japanese forces from conducting dispersed "clear-and-hold" operations in the hills. Thus it appears that the Communist forces survived the worst two years of the war by establishing a rough balance between their force level and the support they could procure from areas not controlled by the Japanese. Militarily, they survived by having large areas in which to maneuver and run, thereby avoiding costly confrontations.

The Communist forces chose the sites for their bases primarily with political and military considerations in mind. The peasants of the base areas were usually very backward on any scale of political or economic development. With some exceptions, however, the Communist forces *managed to gain popular support—originally with a lot of arm-twisting* (and consequent desertion), but eventually on a voluntary basis. This is an indisputable fact. How was such a feat accomplished?

Mao has stated that the war against Japan was simultaneously an "anti-imperialist struggle" and an "anti-feudal struggle." Until 1944, when the Party's underground organizations in the "white area" began to lead public opinion against the Central government, the anti-feudal struggle was confined mostly to the rural bases which were in the CCP's hands. In Communist parlance, "anti-feudal struggle" means class warfare. Hitherto we have been led to believe that the CCP's agrarian program was very moderate during the second United Front. This is a one-sided view which originated with the CCP itself. To be accurate, we must stress the continuity and similarity between the Kiangsi period and the war period on the one hand, and the differences between them on the other. To be blunt, we can state that the CCP pursued the same end as in the civil war by different means. The end was the liquidation of the landlord class and the mobilization of the "basic masses," that is, the poor peasants and hired laborers. The Party made every effort to avoid physical liquidation as a means. This stemmed from the Party's desire to minimize the political impact of social change on the Kuomintang government. Again, strategic considerations were supreme. This is indicated by the fact that the agrarian program moved considerably to the right at the end of 1940. In a major directive restraining radicalism Mao said, "We must not sentence too many people to death and should take care not to incriminate any innocent person."[20] This directive and the Communist offensive in the summer of 1940 constituted the CCP's attempts to prevent Chungking's surrender. At

[20] Mao (fn. 9), III, 221.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that time, the Soviet Union and Japan were negotiating for a neutrality pact, while Japan and China were again negotiating in Hong Kong for a political settlement of the war.[21]

The CCP could not have coexisted with the landlord class with its power intact in the rural areas. A contrast with the predecessors of the rural elites during the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) is illuminating. Professor Kuhn's fascinating book now makes this possible. In Shantung Province, the Communist forces encountered strenuous opposition from the landlord organization, could not collect grain, and failed to expand rapidly. The key to the success of the landlord class seems to have been the presence of collaborators who linked up the village organizations with the Japanese or puppet forces. When the Kuomintang government withdrew to the interior, most villages of north China were left to their own devices. Their vertical link with the government and their horizontal links with other villages were cut off. They were fair game for the Communist partisans. The Crooks and Hinton both make clear that the alliance of the rural elites with the gendarmes in the market towns was the cornerstone of the traditional structure of dominion in China's countryside. As long as that military power existed, the peasants refused to support the CCP's programs which went contrary to the interests of the landlords and the rich peasants. Therefore, the presence of the Communist forces was an indispensable condition for mobilization of the peasants. The armed organization of peasants must be seen as an instrument of class struggle as well as an anti-Japanese measure.

Mobilization of the poor was impossible without class struggle. Without a personalized symbol of their suffering, without dividends from the struggle, the masses would not rise. Still, the landlord class could not be slaughtered as in the Kiangsi days. An ingenious scheme was evolved by the end of 1940. A complex of institutions was set up, consisting of steep progressive taxes, reductions in rent and interest, labor laws stipulating minimum wages, land laws, etc. The landlords were taxed heavily. A small minority of the rich bore the expenditure of the Communist base governments. Commerce and industry, on the other hand, were left relatively free of taxes. The landlords were encouraged to sell their land to the poor and transfer the assets to business enterprises. Thereafter, the prosperity of the Communist bases behind the Japanese and the Kuomintang blockade depended considerably on the contribu-

[21] Defense Board, Defense Research Institute, War History Office, *Dai-toa senso kokanshi*, XX: *Daihonei rikugunbu* [The Imperial Headquarters, the Army General Staff] (Tokyo 1968), Part II, 31-33, 237-39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions by the CCP's class enemy; the poor peasants did not have the competence to run an enterprise. The impact of these measures was far-reaching and revolutionary. The Crooks report an extensive change in ownership of land by 1943. The poorest quarter of the village population, they observed, emerged as the "new middle peasants," firmly committed to their benefactor, the CCP. "Without these reforms the Anti-Japanese Village Government could never have survived" (Crook, p. 49).

Mao stated that it takes three or four years to build a good Communist base.[22] During this time in a series of waves the Communist cadres would patiently undo the entire social and economic fabric of a village, then reweave and tie it into the infrastructure of the base. No aspect of the peasants' lives was untouched. Most of the activities were part of the ordinary life cycle of peasants. They were innocuous. An occasional outside visitor would be hard put to discern their connection with the Communist infrastructure. How deep the Communist forces set their roots in the soil of north China was a testimony to their experiences in Kiangsi. Again, there was a striking parallel between the infrastructure of the Communist base and the traditional organization of armed self-defense. In 1943, the CCP introduced a four-tier organization in its infrastructure: compulsory enrollment of all peasants in village self-defense; a voluntary militia which served as a self-sufficient reserve for the following two forces; regional forces; and fully mobile, regular forces.[23] The most irregular forces were coeval with the undifferentiated peasant masses. They and the militia were tied down to their villages. The Party's appeal to them was not defense of the fatherland, but defense of their newly acquired interests, of their homes and villages. Since the regular units recruited their troops from the lower tier in their own area, the army was related to the villages by ties of blood. A cluster of half a dozen or so counties might yield enough surplus grain to support a regiment or a brigade. When several such clusters coalesced and had a corresponding superstructure, a border region (or a military district) was born. When a Communist base reached this stage, it could not be uprooted when the area was overrun by the military. A pacification force had to hold the Communist regulars at bay while dispersing itself in the villages and carefully undoing the Communists' work in two, three, or even four years. Mao's strategy in the war was to build up several such bases in time for the outbreak of civil war.

[22] Mao (fn. 9), V, 81.
[23] *The Amerasia Papers* (fn. 8), 814.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The foregoing is intended to show, in a limited space, that it is a mistake to view the mobilization of the peasants as the function of popular support which antedated the coming of the Communist Party. This view underrates the role played by the Communist Party and the army. It stresses only one side of Mao's famous adage concerning the mass line, "from the masses, to the masses." What came from the masses was an amorphous frustration in its pure psychological sense which would have led to a Jacquerie at best.[24] The real question is whether to regard the mobilization of the peasantry in the hands of the CCP as manipulation or as unleashing the "new spontaneity," so to speak. The latter is to view the spontaneity as a function of mobilization. This is a conceptual problem having to do with the interpretation of the "New Democracy," which was in force till the coming of the first Five-Year Plan. We leave this question unanswered.

If the acquisitive instinct and love of home and village were the only tangible energy indigenous to Chinese peasants that could be harnessed to agrarian revolution, the role of the organizers who managed their transformation was very great indeed. The role of the army in this has already been referred to, but that was only during a very early stage. As a matter of fact, the CCP made it a cardinal rule not to let its troops enter a village to collect grain and recruits. Then who were the counter-elites? Who had possessed the literacy, dedication, and vision that reached further than that of the peasants? The answer lies in the fluid *Lumpenproletariat* of the cities of China. After the December Ninth Movement of 1935, the Party's machine in the cities went into a full-swing operation to send radical ideologues of student or intellectual background into the countryside. A steady stream was maintained throughout the war from the enemy-occupied and "white" areas, via underground tunnels through the Japanese or the Kuomintang blockade lines. These students and intellectuals, by no means all of them CCP members, appear to have been recruited mostly into border region government work. In the Shen-Kan-Ning border region, more than 70 per cent of the government personnel at the second tier (between the border region and the county governments) and above were intellectuals who had come from the outside after the war.[25] Efforts were also

[24] Our thesis can be substantiated by reference to the impressive case history compiled by Hinton. Hinton, however, draws an opposite conclusion, namely, that the revolution was spontaneous. Moreover, he has gone to the extreme in a sequel to *Fanshen*—a regrettable event, since it casts aspersion on *Fanshen* itself. " 'Fanshen' Re-examined in the Light of the Cultural Revolution," *PL*, No. 6 (February 1969).

[25] *Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ü chien-cheng shih-shih yao-kang* [Program for Implementing the Simplified Government in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region] (The Northwestern Bureau of the CCP, December 1942).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made to attach some intellectuals to the lower-echelon governments since, for one thing, cadres of peasant origin could not read, write, or speak effectively in public.

The position of the intellectuals in the Maoist machine in the countryside seems always to have been precarious and ambiguous. By 1940, the countryside was generating its own cadres. The former Red Army men of the generation of the Long March disliked the youths of the city. The movement came to take on an aspect of peasant authoritarianism, with a very strong strain of anti-intellectualism. Evidently, this had something to do with the struggle between Mao and Wang Ming. When the Cheng-feng movement began in 1942, intellectuals and their literary products became one of the chief targets of criticism. This basic mistrust of the city was perhaps related to the fact that these youths had, by and large, been kept out of the regular line units of the army, and the fact that their role went relatively unnoticed in Mao's own political theory. It is very certain, however, that without their assistance the CCP's expansion in the countryside of north China would have been much slower.[26] They wielded a disproportionate influence among the peasants because they were, after all, the "new mandarines." We may infer that their subjective universe was governed by patriotism.

In conclusion, we uphold Chalmers Johnson's thesis as basically correct. Nationalism was the most important factor which aided the CCP in the revolution. That is the meaning of Mao's statement that "contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation . . . is the principal one. . . ."[27] We have pushed Professor Johnson's thesis one step further by removing its inconsistency. The locus of nationalism was in China's cities. A "war of national liberation" was able to succeed in a "half-feudal" (usually translated as "semi-feudal") country like China because one-half of it contained large sophisticated urban areas.

[26] See how the Taiping Rebellion was frustrated by the lack of competent cadres in Kuhn, 189-96.

[27] Mao (fn. 9), III, 81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL COMPETITION:

The Italian Case

By ALAN ZUCKERMAN*

Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1970, 364 pp., $15.00.

Sidney G. Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1967, 389 pp., $8.75.

WITH the end of the Fourth French Republic and the apparently effective performance of the Fifth Republic, France no longer provides an obvious touchstone for studies of "unstable" democracies. Perhaps as a result of the search for another such example, there has been an increase in American scholarly interest in Italy. Recent research—when combined with the studies of LaPalombara, Barnes, and Zariski, and with the studies conducted by Italian political scientists—provides a fund of organized and readily available information which may be used to test both general hypotheses and specific ones about Italian politics.[1]

Although the new volumes may be utilized to study various aspects of Italian politics, my focus will be upon structures of political competition—patterns of behavior through which primarily nonviolent and organized conflict for the making of authoritative decisions of the society occurs. I shall examine hypotheses that relate patterns of political competition to the general social structure, and hope to shed some light on the specific links between social divisions and political groups, and on patterns of modernization and political groups.

Analyses of political competition in Italy most often focus on the political parties and their interactions. Their point of departure is the existence of several national political parties engaged in political com-

* For helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this manuscript I would like to thank Erwin C. Hargrove, Harold Quinley, and Ira Strauber of the Department of Political Science, Brown University, and my wife, Roberta Brenner Zuckerman.

[1] Among the best recent studies of Italian politics are Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton 1964); Samuel J. Barnes, *Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation* (New Haven and London 1967): Raphael Zariski, "Intra-Party Conflict in a Dominant Party: The Experience of Italian Christian Democracy," *Journal of Politics*, XXVII (February 1965), 3-34; Joseph LaPalombara and Alberto Spreafico, eds., *Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia* (Milan 1963); and Mattei Dogan and Orazio Maria Petracca, eds., *Partiti politici e strutture sociali in Italia* (Milan 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

petition. This leads to the study of the electoral support of the parties as a means of establishing their relative strength in Parliament and of determining the links between the parties and the general members of the society. The kinds of social sectors that generally support the different parties and their ideologies are then used as determinants of the policy preferences expressed by the parties. Thus, Italy is described as a "multi-party" system composed of parties of the "left," "right," and "center." The lack of a single majority party and the existence of the multi-party system are attributed to the many and highly divisive cleavages existing in the society. Thus, it is argued that governments that are of necessity based upon such coalitions of parties are highly fragile and collapse relatively easily.[2]

In order to analyze political competition in Italy, I will posit a two-tiered approach. At the first level, the units of analysis are the political parties. Here one examines the causes of the numbers and kinds of parties, as well as their patterns of cooperation and conflict. Competition between the parties occurs primarily in respect to elections, the outcomes of which determine the relative power of each party in the parliament. The two most powerful parties to be noted are the Christian Democrat Party (DC), and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Between them, they have accounted for approximately 65 per cent of all ballots cast and parliamentary seats filled in Italy since 1948, while the six or seven other national parties have divided the remainder.

With the allocation of seats in the parliament, competition occurs for the right to form a governing coalition. The outcome of the electoral contest, plus ideological and policy positions, has generally been the crucial determinant for success in entering political competition at the level of coalition formation. In Italy a clear pattern of possible coalition partners for any given legislature has long existed. It has been virtually certain that the PCI, the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP), the neo-Fascists (MSI), and the Monarchists would never take part in the governing coalition; the need for the parliamentary support of any one of them could topple a government. Competition at this second level occurs among the possible coalition-forming parties. Since the acceptance of the "Center-Left" coalition formula in 1963, governments have been formed with the participation and/or parliamentary support of only the DC, the Republicans, and the socialists.

[2] For an example of this kind of analysis, see Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton 1966) 137-76.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indeed, there have been only two kinds of governments: a coalition including all the parties of the Center-Left, and a *monocolore* DC government that had the parliamentary support of the others.[3]

The unit of analysis at this second level differs from that of the first. The political groups that have competed for authoritative positions in the government, and for control of governmental policy, have generally been political party factions. I define a party faction as a structured group within a political party which seeks, at a minimum, to govern, or influence the governing of, the party. Competition here occurs on an intra-party as well as an inter-party level. Governing alliances are composed of party faction groupings that occur within the specific parties and across party lines. Intra-party factions seek to control the given political party and the make-up and policy initiatives of the government. It is rather common for a faction of party *A* to establish alliances with faction(s) of party *B* in opposition to rival factions of the first party. Frequently, minority factions of a party influence their own party's decisions only through the intervention of another of the coalition parties.

A brief survey of recent DC party factions will serve to exemplify the intricacies of intra-party and inter-party competition. The National Council elected at the June, 1969, Congress contained eight national party factions. The ruling alliance that accounted for approximately 65 per cent of the seats of the National Council was composed of three party factions: the *Dorotei*, the *Fanfaniani*, and the *Tavianei*. Of these, the dominant faction was the *Dorotei*, which controlled approximately 40 per cent of the seats on the Council, and which was the largest faction then and during the preceding ten years. The five minority factions were divided into "left" and "right" oppositions. The three major factions of the "left" were the *Morotei*, the *Base*, and the *Forze Nuove*; together, they controlled approximately 31 per cent of the Council seats. Another "left-wing" faction was newly formed and not clearly within the united opposition of the other "left" factions. This faction, called the *Nuova Sinistra*, accounted for somewhat more than 2 per cent of National Council members. The remaining members of the National Council, approximately 3 per cent of the total, belonged to the newly formed *Forze Libere* faction, the inheritors of the "right-wing" position of the defunct *Ex-centristi*. The recently re-split socialists of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the Social Democrats (PSU) were divided

[3] The exception from this pattern was the March, 1971, withdrawal of the Republican Party's representative from the cabinet without removal of parliamentary support.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into several identifiable party factions. Only the tiny Republican Party (PRI) had no identifiable factions.

The bases of coherence between these competing political groups vary and therefore affect inter-faction alliances differently. Notwithstanding the differences within the parties that lead to the formation of party factions, there is often a rather high degree of party cohesion on specific issues. This is obviously less the case for the socialists than for the Christian Democrats, given the patterns of party formation and dissolution among the former. Indeed, in spite of several highly organized and extremely competitive party factions, an official split in the DC has never occurred. Calls for party loyalty, however, are relatively rare and usually succeed only when the life of a national government is at stake—and only when they are perceived to be in the interest of the dissenting faction(s).

Another important basis for division among those engaged in political competition at this second level is related to the majority-minority status of the faction in its home party. The general exclusion of minority factions from party policy-making and the often similar policy preferences of, for example, the *Base* and the *Forze Nuove* factions in the DC and the PSI on the one hand and the dominant factions in the DC and the PSU on the other has brought about cross-party alliances on policy preferences and coalition strategy. Prior to the successful formation of the Colombo-led four-party coalition, the above two groupings differed fundamentally over coalition-formation strategy. The majority factions in the DC and the PSU argued that if it proved impossible to form a four-party coalition, it would be best to call for general elections. The PSI and the "left-wing" factions of the DC contended that if the four-party coalition failed to be established, a two-party DC and PSI government would be preferable to dissolving the Parliament and holding new general elections.

The formation of national governments is, then, a bargaining process carried on among the recognized coalition parties and their factions. Divisions at the "within-party" level play crucial roles in the formation and dissolution of Italian governments, which fall as a result of removal of support by the coalition parties and not by the opposition parties. Decisions as to whether to support a given coalition are generally based on the changes in relative strength and position of the party factions. The only way in which a party such as the PCI can have any effect on the coalition process is indirectly, through the factions of the coalition parties, especially through those of the DC and the PSI. Indeed, DC party factions are so important at this second level of po-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

litical competition that in most instances the removal of the support of a specific faction from the governing coalition is sufficient to bring down the government.

Thus, I would argue that it is of crucial importance to examine the process through which organized groups in Italy compete for the positions through which authoritative public policy is made at two different levels. The first level includes the national political parties and their competition for power in the parliament, which takes place through electoral competition. The conclusion of this first level of political competition sets the stage and the conditions for the second. Given the division of parliamentary seats and the ideological and policy differences between the national parties, the possible coalition-forming partners for any given legislature are known to all. It is this second level at which the decisions are made as to who will occupy the governing positions and as to the nature of government policies. The competing groups here differ both in number and in kind from those at the first level. Party factions and the alliances of party factions, whether within or across the coalition parties, play a determinant role. Thus, in order to explain the structures of political competition in Italy, one needs to deal not only with the national parties and their sources of electoral support, but also with the phenomena of party factions.

Students of Italian politics have generally not dealt with the patterns of political competition at the coalition level. The studies under examination here, for example, by and large describe and explain party competition only in regard to elections. To the extent, however, that it is not possible to explain coalition politics as being dependent only upon electoral politics and its sources, it is important to expand one's attempts at explanation to include coalition politics. Indeed, one cannot determine the patterns through which competition for the crucial cabinet positions are formed if one terminates research and analysis on political competition at the electoral-parliamentary level.

With the recent studies of Italian politics, it is now possible to draw some conclusions about Italian political competition, especially at the electoral-parliamentary level. In *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*, Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi present an English-language condensation of five monumental studies carried out under their direction by the researchers of the Carlo Cattaneo Institute of Bologna.[4]

[4] Francesco Alberoni and others, *L'attavista di partito* (Bologna 1967); Vittorio Capecchi and others, *Il comportamento elettorale in Italia* (Bologna 1968); Franca

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The publication of these volumes marks a milestone in the systematic study of Italian politics; no future works on contemporary Italian politics can afford to ignore them. In addition, they serve as models for the analysis of these topics in other societies. Indeed, for few countries do we possess the kind of organized data that these studies provide for Italy. Galli and Prandi, the directors of the Institute, provide a fine introduction to the Italian volumes for the reader with no command of Italian. Their work stands by itself as a broad survey of the major findings of the other volumes, and provides one of the best studies of political competition, especially at the electoral and party level, for any country.

Given the heretofore almost complete absence of organized and systematic descriptive studies of this type, it is perhaps too much to ask of the same political scientists that they provide systematic explanations of the phenomena they have detailed. The sets of explanations they do suggest reflect their particular interest in Italy, and are framed at a level that links them to specifically Italian factors. Thus, the study of voting behavior in Italy between 1946 and 1963 specifies determinants of the vote, and the study of the party activists in the DC and the PCI sets forth hypotheses that link the patterns of behavior of the activists to their socialization. There is, however, no systematic effort to connect the results with more general studies of these structures.

Sidney Tarrow's excellent study, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*, combines a detailed description of politics in the Italian South and in the Communist Party with more general theories of political behavior. Indeed, Tarrow's volume is not only a contribution to the cross-national analysis of Communist parties and to the politics of relatively underdeveloped areas, but also a study of the PCI in general, particularly in the South. Tarrow's work is of special interest because of his systematic attempts to explain Italian political patterns, particularly "political dualism" and its ramifications, by linking them to more general theories.

In the massive survey of Italian voting patterns conducted by the Carlo Cattaneo Institute, Galli and Prandi contend that electoral behavior in Italy has been marked by the coexistence of general stability with some fluctuations in partisan votes. According to their argument: (1) This has persisted over a long period of time, as in all representa-

---

Cervellati Cantelli and others, *L'organizzazione partitica del PCI e della DC* (Bologna 1968); Luigi Brunelli and others, *La presenza sociale del PCI e della DC* (Bologna 1969); and Silvia A. Tozzi and others, *Il PCI e la DC nelle amministrazione locale e in Parlamento* (Bologna 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive and pluralist democracies; (2) Stability has emerged after a period of initial assessment, which, as in all democracies of this type, underwent various strains and still faces an uncertain future; (3) It is increasingly apparent that the electorate may be divided historically into two blocs—the Left of socialist inspiration and a moderate Catholic group; (4) Within this substantially stable Left, the PCI has expanded up to the point of hegemony. The expansion has been limited because its gains in the South have been balanced by its stagnation in the Center and the North; (5) The expansion of the DC is linked to its absorption of the moderate and conservative electorate, which is a most difficult task when there is an articulate and aggressive political organization on the right (as was the case in 1946, 1953, and 1963). They contend that this stability has been caused by a traditional left-right split among the Italian voters and the attendant weakening of the socialists on the left and the conservatives on the right (p. 47).

The analysis of regional voting patterns leads the Carlo Cattaneo researchers to conclude that electoral behavior in southern Italy is becoming more like that of the provinces of the northern industrial areas. It is in the traditional areas of support for the PCI and the DC, the Red Belt in the Center, and the White areas of the Northeast, respectively, that general voting trends differ from the rest of Italy. The latter two areas, they contend, are destined to remain different in an increasingly homogeneous electorate (pp. 42-47).

It is possible to link voting patterns with specific social determinants. An important variable for predicting national voting patterns in Italy relates to the two subcultures—the Red Belt in the Center and the White areas of the Northeast. Whereas voting patterns in the largely industrial Northwest and the southern areas have come to resemble one another, the Red Belt and the White areas show patterns that are different from the national norm. Here, the two parties around which much of the electoral competition revolves, the DC and the PCI, are supported by large and rather constant portions of the population. Individuals are most likely to vote for the DC if they are not members of the traditional left subculture and live in relatively rural areas in which few persons have completed middle school. Within certain of the areas of Italy this prediction must include new factors and drop some others, but predictions of this sort can now be made rather easily and with a high probability of being correct. Similar predictions can now also be made for the other voting blocs and parties. Assuming, as is plausible, a continuity of voting patterns, it is quite safe to predict

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the percentage of the vote that each party will get at the next national election, in the nation as a whole and by area. The DC will probably be within 2 per cent of 40 per cent of the national totals, the PCI at approximately 26 per cent, the PSI and PSU at 15 per cent, the PSIUP at 4 per cent, the PRI at 3 per cent, the Liberals (PLI) at 6 per cent, and the MSI and Monarchists at 5 per cent.

Whereas the previous analysis allows one to go quite far in establishing the determinants of electoral competition among the parties at the level of electoral-parliamentary competition, it does not necessarily allow for an explanation of the second level of political competition, coalition politics. Though the Carlo Cattaneo researchers study the rank-and-file activists of the DC and the PCI as well as the general membership composition and organizational structure of both parties, they make no explicit attempt to deal with the determinants of those political groups that are especially important in coalition politics. If it were indeed possible to contend that party factions are a function of the different social groups to whom a party must respond, or which are represented in the party, the existence and kinds of party factions might be deduced from these different groups within the party or in the party's electorate. This, however, is not the case.

Large numbers of DC members and voters may be found in all the social divisions in Italy, but Christian Democrat party factions do not split along class or other obvious social divisions. The *Dorotei*, for example, were an inter-class faction; so are the two factions that have replaced it and, in varying degrees, all the other factions. While some of the factions have a pronounced regional character, all, especially the larger ones, have members in all parts of Italy. The exigencies of political competition at the electoral level and the social divisions within the party's membership are not sufficient to determine the existence, kinds, and activities of the party factions. In order to do that it is necessary to move beyond the explanatory variables used by the political scientists at the Carlo Cattaneo Institute.

In an effort to derive hypotheses for the explanation of Italian politics from more general concepts, Tarrow links the structures of political competition to general Italian social structures, especially as related to the modernization process. Not only is the Italian North relatively developed economically, and the South relatively underdeveloped, but the particular nature of the modernization of the southern social structure is of special significance. The differences in the social structure of the North and South have led to "political dualism"; the outstand-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing element of the southern social structure has been the clientele system. Tarrow contends that "the major cause of political dualism has been the clientele system of southern Italy" (p. 11).

In Tarrow's usage, the clientele system refers to vertical and independent ties between those with high status (landlords or professionals), and those with low status (usually peasants) (p. 68). He notes, "*Clientelismo*—as it is called—permeates southern Italian society" (p. 68). It differs from feudalism in that it is "shifting and informal and has no institutional recognition in concrete institutions. Equally important, it is antithetical to modern society's emphasis upon scale, horizontal solidarity, and large-scale organization. This has particular significance in the patterns of politics that evolve" (p. 69). Thus the social structure of southern Italy is marked by the lack of class formation and a developed secondary organization. In their places are *clientelismo* and primary-group-like personalist activities.

Those who engage in formal and society-wide political competition usually control a network of vertical relations. Individuals are linked to those in authority through patterns of personal ties of loyalty and obligation and not through a merger of interests. Tarrow concludes, "Hence, politics is nonideological, broad functional interests cannot be expressed in politics, and access to authority can expand only through the vertical extension of clientele links . . ." (p. 74).

The crucial function of the clientele structure must be kept in mind in examining political competition in southern Italy. The individual does not seek to effect his political demands through a coalition with others at the same status level, but rather through personal relationships with those of higher status who control political power. Political competition can thus be of two types: between those with low status in conflict for the favors of a patron, and between the patrons themselves.

Tarrow proceeds to link *clientelismo* to political activities in the South. Using the data gathered by Almond and Verba in the *Civic Culture* as support, he contends, "Southern Italians have great interest in politics, broadly understood" (p. 76). By this, Tarrow apparently means competition for power and authority, especially at the local level. *Clientelismo* leads to a greater knowledge of local issues by southern Italians than by northern Italians; it is also related specifically to voting behavior. Tarrow notes, "Voting consistency is very low, since loyalties and obligations are personal and shifting" (p. 77). This in turn leads to a higher usage of the *preferenza* vote in the South than in the North. Elections are therefore based less upon issues and ideologies than upon the personal attributes of the candidates. Finally, *clientelismo*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has infiltrated the structures of the political parties of the South. Party leaders, argues Tarrow, act as patrons of groups of clients, and the personalist patronage-based style of competition found in *clientelismo* is transferred to competition within political parties (p. 81).

Within this framework, Tarrow then proceeds to analyze the Italian Communist Party, and, in a comparative chapter, the Christian Democrat Party. He concludes that not only are the ideologies, organizational structures, and sources of electoral support of the two political parties in the South affected by *clientelismo*, but so are the patterns of inner party politics. Neither class interest nor ideology is of significance when compared with the power of *clientelismo* as an explanatory variable for structures of political competition. Whereas the old clientelism of the notable still persists in the PCI, it is rapidly being replaced by new "horizontal clienteles" in the DC. This new clientele system has changed the pattern of at least the sources of electoral power of the DC by linking them to the development bureaucracy and its ability to provide mass patronage in return for votes. As such, it has come to resemble the political machines in the politics of many American cities at the turn of the century (p. 340).

Although he deals rather broadly with the social structures of southern Italy that are of particular importance in determining patterns of political competition, Tarrow does not address himself directly to the sources of party factions. The bulk of his analysis links *clientelismo* to the ideological and policy pronouncements of the parties as well as to their sources of electoral support. Because he does not make clear distinctions within the universe of those engaged in political competition, he is unable to account for the competitive styles and patterns of interactions of the party factions which exist in the North as well as the South.

Tarrow's general thesis is based upon the following argument. Differences in the modernization process have caused variations in the social structures of the North and South, and thereby a "dual polity." The North is predominantly class-based, which produces organized political competition and class- or organized group-linked political parties with efficient organizations, mass memberships, and coherent ideologies. The breakdown in the modernization process in the South produced *clientelismo*. This has led to unorganized and personalist conflicts and, as related to parties, weak organization, little actual membership, and weak ideological consistency. Party factions that are not linked to classes or ideological differences should indeed be non-existent in the North, while they are the general rule in the South. The dif-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ferences between the parties in the North and the South are indicators of political dualism which, for Tarrow, is crucial to the understanding and explaining of Italian politics.

The argument for the existence of a "dual polity" in Italy in general does not hold. As noted above, voting patterns in the "industrial" North and the "underdeveloped" South have become quite similar. At the level of general political norms and attitudes, responses found in the data gathered by Almond and Verba show little or no evidence of a bifurcated polity.

Of greater significance for the argument presented here is the issue of political competition *within* the Christian Democrat Party, specifically the kinds and patterns of interactions of the party factions. Tarrow juxtaposes the DC in the North to the party in the South. He writes, "In the North, the DC has a mass organization, a broad membership, and a coherent ideology, all of which set it apart from the DC in the South" (p. 340). Nowhere in the volume, however, does he elaborate upon the description of the DC in the North; he apparently relies upon a conception of the party in that area as another example of the ideal-typical political party associated with "industrial societies."[5]

An analysis of the party structure of the DC enables one to show that party branches in the North do not greatly resemble the kind of political party set forth by Tarrow. Indeed, there exist striking similarities between the patterns of inner party competition, membership patterns, and activities, as well as ideological consistencies throughout the party, both in the North and the South. Thus, along these variables as well as others, the DC is pretty much the same in provinces as diverse as Milan, Vicenza, and Potenza. In each of these cases, for example, the vast majority of the members are not at all interested, and certainly not active, in party activities. The party's actual scope and organization rarely extends beyond the province level, and is engaged in only by party leaders. The provincial organizations are divided into party factions split into majority and minority groupings, and party activities and policies are controlled by the majority factions, while the minority factions are consistently excluded from the decision-making process. In no case is a given ideology consistently held by party members, whether or not they are leaders, nor is ideology a potent determinant of party behavior and policy in any of the cases.[6]

[5] For Tarrow's further development of the DC party structure in the Italian north, see his "Economic Development and the Transformation of the Italian Party System," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (January 1969), 161-83.

[6] For an elaboration of the authority relations and the factional politics at the provincial and national levels of the DC, see Alan S. Zuckerman, *Hierarchal Social Divisions*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Given the paucity of detailed studies, it is impossible to elaborate on the social and political structure of northern Italy. It is, however, possible to go to indirect sources. While I do not argue that no differences exist between the two areas, I would contend the following: (1) The North-South distinction as found in the "dual polity" model is derived from differences in the economic structures, especially degrees of industrialization; for the purposes of the study of political competition this is not a particularly useful classification. (2) There are considerable differences within the North, a fact which can be easily demonstrated in voting patterns and general political norms and attitudes. Indeed, data gathered by Almond and Verba show sharp differences between the "North" and the "Center," and the voting patterns point to differences between the Center, the Northeast, and the Northwest—from each other and from the other two. (3) Patterns of political competition among political leaders throughout Italy show few differences. Although in the South most political groups are not based upon horizontal class differences, in the North some of them are. With specific regard to the Christian Democrat Party and the existence and behavior of the party factions present, the latter is certainly the case.

By cutting into the Almond and Verba data at one level lower than is reported in the *Civic Culture*, it is possible to compare responses to the questions in four sections of Italy: "North," "Center," "South," and the "Islands."[7] Rather than reproduce the responses to the Almond and Verba questions, I will briefly summarize them and elucidate their importance for the argument presented here.

The data point to the conclusions that political attitudes and behavior, at least as evidenced in the survey, are rather similar throughout Italy, and that the differences that are present are not as predicted by the "dual polity" model. Indeed, the respondents in the South evidence more of the traits associated with the "civic culture" than do the respondents in any other region.

Italians in general agree that it is best not to trust others. The respondents in the Center deviate from the pattern in that they seem to be relatively more trusting.

In regard to "general political awareness" of issues and government affairs on the national as well as the local level, the professions of southerners are higher than those of any of the other regions. Thus, for

and Political Groups: Factions in the Italian Christian Democrat Party (unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1971).

[7] For the questionnaire used in the Almond and Verba study, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963), Appendix B, 526-49. An Italian regional breakdown of the responses may be found in Zuckerman (fn. 6), chap. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

example, 27 per cent in the North, 18 per cent in the Center, 35 per cent in the South, and 23 per cent of the islanders professed to understand "very well" or "moderately well" the issues facing the government as a whole. The alleged ability to comprehend local issues was higher than this in all four areas, with greater relative increases in the South and the Islands.

Concerning patterns of political action and perceived political effectiveness, the differences in regional patterns are rather slight, and not as predicted by the "dual polity" model. In all areas, most respondents stated that they did not know how to effect policy changes, that they would do "nothing" in instances of bad national or local laws, or did not answer. Greater numbers of those who claimed to be politically effective resided in the South and the North than in the Center or on the Islands.

In general, Italians perceived that the government has little effect on their lives and believed that the effect that the government does have is not positive. However, this is less so in the South. In regard to the national government, 36 per cent of the southerners, 23 per cent of the northerners, 14 per cent of those in the Center, and 7 per cent of those living on the Islands responded that the national government does affect their lives. Of those in the South, 61 per cent felt that the national government tends to improve their lives, as opposed to 49 per cent in the North, 40 per cent in the Center, and 51 per cent on the Islands. Similar responses were given in regard to the local government and its effects. In addition, the responses concerning the perceived "fairness" of the bureaucracy in its relation with the individual reveal the existence of similar patterns in the North, the South, and the Islands, and a different pattern in the Center.

In conclusion, the data gathered by Almond and Verba lend support neither to the conception of a "dual polity" nor to the proposition that political attitudes and behavior as evidenced by the Italians interviewed may be explained as functions of economic differences. Northern as well as southern political attitudes and stated patterns of behavior seem to be rather far removed from the politics tied to a bureaucratic-industrial model.

By relating *clientelismo* to a transitional stage of the modernization process, Tarrow obscures its sources. Indeed, it is not an uncommon error among political sociologists to assume that horizontal divisions are more frequently found in societies, and are of greater importance in determining the structures of political competition. The patron-client

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tie need not be linked only to those societies which have not "successfully modernized." Hierarchal social groups (of which patron-client ties are but one example) are found in most societies, and are of special importance in determining patterns of political competition in societies with sharp divisions between horizontal groups.[8]

Though objective social class divisions may exist in a society, these need not be turned into subjective ones and become important for the formation of political groups. Indeed, hierarchal social groups are explicitly those which link together individuals of different status levels through ties of authority. The sharp status differences among the members of such a social group makes interaction on the part of the members in general rare; on the part of those with lower status it is formal and deferential.

The members associate for various reasons, but always because it is in their mutual interest to do so. The patron desires the maintenance of interaction not only for political support in organized political competition. Frequently patrons are members of a "traditional society" in the sense that they believe in the value of what is perceived to have always existed, and they thereby support these traditional social relationships. In addition, clients often work the land and perform other services not done by patrons but needed for their existence. The deference that clients show to patrons is also highly valued. Often this alone is enough to ensure the persistence of the relationship. In addition, the continued existence of these vertical ties is expected to ensure the maintenance of the existing structure of social stratification, and thus ensure the continued dominant position of the patron.

From the point of view of the client, the vertical relationship enables him to conquer some of the insecurities attached to his daily existence. The patron offers him physical and legal protection and, usually, the resources necessary for his economic existence: land, a steady job, or access to distant markets.

The interaction of members of different social strata also carries with it patterns of attitudes and behavior that relate to power and authority. The granting of favors by a patron effects the reciprocal notion of thanks on the part of a client. This is translated by the client into loyalty to the patron. Success in the competition for the scarce resources of existence is perceived to require a regularized relationship with the provider. When this kind of social tie exists in a society with deep and

[8] Eric Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," in Michael Banton, ed., *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies* (London 1966) 1-22, provides a fine introduction to the patron-client concept.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wide divisions between members of different social strata, the loyalty owed the patron and his concomitant authority increase.

Competition occurs, then, between potential clients in conflict over the favor of a patron, and between the patrons themselves. The style of competition is, as Tarrow notes, highly personalist on both levels. The clients seek to enter into personalist and often family-like relationships with the patrons. (Often the selection of a godfather for their children reflects this.) Competition between patrons is also highly personalist and rather constant. This is a reflection of the manner in which individuals seek to influence the patrons, as well as of the general norms of competition in the society.

Political competition within the formal institutions of the society, such as the government and the political parties, takes place in this setting. Individuals who are members of the government and/or leaders of the political parties are patrons of numerous clients, or act as if they were. With particular reference to DC party competition, those individuals who are active in the party factions are usually either patrons in the old sense, that is, linked to peasants or day-laborers, or are treated by others as if they were patrons. In the South, changes in the resources of the patron in view of the new development projects have not changed the way in which their clients relate to them. Just as important to the study of the party, many faction members relate to faction leaders as clients do to patrons. The link between party activists and faction leaders throughout Italy may be described in much the same way as that between client and patron. Political groups are perceived as being composed of individuals joining together for mutual interest; greater status and power for the leader is sought by all the members, for the benefit of all. This in particular reflects the sharp authority divisions in the society. Political competition in Italy is seen as an activity engaged in by the few, and of special benefit to them. If an individual wishes to turn his private demand into a public policy, he must align himself with a political patron.

Hierarchal social groups are more common in southern Italy than in northern Italy. For, along with the vertical social ties existing in the North, there are also class-based ties. The effect of the latter on the party factions in the DC is minimal. Although the class-based party factions of the Christian Democrat Party are generally found in the North, factions based upon hierarchal groups may also be found there. It would seem that most class-based political groups have entered the parties of the Left, leaving only those with direct ties to the Catholic Church to enter the DC. All other party factions in the DC, in what-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ever region of the country (with the general exception of the union-linked *Forze Nuove* faction) reflect in varying degrees the importance of hierarchal social groups to structures of political competition. They act so as to further the interest of the specific faction, often at the expense of the general party, in the name of no specific ideology or social division. At the national level, the factions are composed of patrons of long chains of political leaders and activists dispensing "patronage" whenever and wherever possible.

Thus, Italian political competition at the coalition level is determined neither by horizontally-based political groups nor by differences in the patterns of economic modernization. The existence of highly competitive, relatively issue-free political party factions in the Christian Democrat Party does not reflect the social-class divisions in the party's electorate or membership. It is only in the northern, industrial parts of Italy that factions linked to social classes are of any importance. Throughout all of Italy, including the industrial parts of the North, party factions reflect the existence of hierarchal social groups in the society. The divisions that exist between the politically inactive members of the society and the "political class" exist throughout Italy—with little regard to differences in degree of economic modernization. At the first level of political competition, differences in degree of modernization, especially as related to the tendency of members of the society to identify themselves politically in terms of social class, are an important determinant of electoral behavior. They are, however, less important than the political and cultural traditions of the region in which the individual lives.

In sum, in order to determine patterns of political competition in Italy which relate to the formation of governing coalitions, and thus to the making of authoritative policy for the society, it is necessary to go beyond an analysis of social classes and patterns of modernization. Variables that affect competition among political leaders are of extreme importance at this level. In Italy, and in societies with similar social and authority structures, hierarchal social groups are an important determinant.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR

By ERIK P. HOFFMANN

Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969, 416 pp., $12.50.

I

FEW scholars have utilized contemporary social science theory in designing research on Communist countries. And fewer still have systematically incorporated data from Communist countries into the existing body of social science theory. That is, middle-range theories such as organization, development, and socialization theory have not significantly shaped Western research on Communist systems. And surprisingly few one-, two-, and multivariable generalizations from the existing social science literature have been confirmed, rejected, or refined—even tentatively—with data from Communist countries. In a word, good social science and good area studies research have rarely been combined. Considering these endeavors to be unrelated or irrelevant to one another, many specialists on Communist states have neither sought to construct nor to test empirical theory.

This state of affairs is unfortunate. Despite the formidable problems of cross-national studies, and despite the conceptual and theoretical limitations of contemporary social science, the Communist area specialist may have much to *contribute* to, and much to *gain* from, social science theory. Particularly important are theories and hypotheses of a "puzzle-solving" or an anomaly-reducing nature.[1] Also of considerable importance are hypotheses that are both logically and topically related —hypotheses that have been deduced from insightful and rigorous causal models or sets of carefully formulated axioms and theorems. Greater confirmation, disconfirmation, or refinement of the latter propositions helps to confirm, disconfirm, or refine the other propositions to which they are logically related and the larger theories of which they are a part. Deductive empiricism also helps to forestall a serious methodological problem common to both social scientists and area specialists—namely, the formulation of hypotheses from essentially

[1] See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (2d enl. ed., Chicago 1970), 35-42ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the same body of data with which they are then "tested" and, not surprisingly, "confirmed."

At a minimum, a general knowledge of organizational behavior, interpersonal relations, or belief systems is likely to benefit one's study of *Communist* organizations, interpersonal relations, or belief systems. For social scientists and comparativists are sensitized to concepts, factors, questions, approaches, and theories that give them distinct cognitive orientations. These frequently conflicting and confusing orientations are not in any sense "better" than those of the area specialist, but they are clearly different. It is probable, though not necessarily the case, that the nongeographical or topical "area" specialist will possess insights, methodologies, and techniques that can assist the geographical area specialist in designing and executing research. The extent of this assistance will depend, of course, on the nature of the subject and the questions or problems raised. But to reject out of hand the social scientist's potential contribution is tantamount to assuming that Soviet administrative behavior, for example, does not have any important characteristics in common with administrative behavior elsewhere.

For various reasons, then, the scholar with social science training *may* have a decided advantage over a fellow geographical area specialist with comparable ideographic skills. Robert K. Merton asserts that the theoretical conflict between nomothetic and ideographic research is a "mock problem."[2] But the important practical questions are *how* to make the work of the social scientist and the area specialist mutually beneficial and reinforcing, and whether training in social science is indeed necessary to produce significant research in comparative Communist studies.

The book under review sheds light on the utility of social science theory in the study of Communist bureaucracies, and on the contributions Soviet area specialists have made, and can make, to this body of theory. I have in mind especially organization theory, role theory, development theory, decision theory, and communication theory—orientations clearly relevant to the subjects Jerry F. Hough has chosen to study.[3] These concerns raise two main questions: (1) Would Hough's book have made a greater contribution to our understanding of Soviet politics and comparative administration if, in its design and execution,

[2] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. enl. ed., New York 1968), 44. Cf. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York 1970), 5-8ff.

[3] See Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory* (Chicago 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it had systematically utilized, and sought to contribute to, social science theory? (2) Can and should future studies of Communist bureaucracies pursue both of these objectives, possibly in conjunction with a "puzzle-solving" or "problem-centered" approach to research?[4]

II

Hough's book is ambitious and important. It is very nearly an administrative history of regional and local government in the Soviet Union during the entire post-purge (post-1938) period. Primarily, this work is a detailed analysis and interpretation of the economic activities of the regional Communist Party (CPSU) apparatus. The focus is on the republic, provincial, city, and district Party committees. National policy-making and the operations of the primary Party organizations are discussed only as they directly affect the behavior of regional CPSU, government, and industrial officials.

The data base of Hough's study is also impressive. Not only has he combed the national and regional Party, state, and specialized presses for more than a three-decade period, but he has also gleaned information from biographical sources, contemporary Soviet fiction, and personal interviews. Most important, he has given careful thought to the strengths and weaknesses of written Soviet sources and has handled his evidence judiciously. For instance, several important responsibilities of provincial Party committees are not frequently discussed or alluded to in the press. On the other hand, some activities, though often criticized in print, are not seriously proscribed. To ascertain which obligations actually influence the behavior of provincial officials is an acquired—I am tempted to say, an ideographic—skill. Even explicit statements by Party leaders may not reveal their salient or operative beliefs, let alone provide an accurate description of Soviet administrative practices and the forces that shape them.

To study organizational behavior primarily from written sources, one must develop numerous inferences and assumptions about the meaning, purposes, and effects of various kinds of public statements in different contexts. Hough's skillful gathering and interpretation of data —indeed his very ability to determine what his data *are*—clearly demonstrate considerable sovietological talent and experience. It is no mean task to relate disparate assertions by Soviet officials to general concepts that can in turn be employed to describe and explain Soviet administrative behavior. Also, the author convincingly demonstrates the advan-

[4] See Richard W. Wilson, "Chinese Studies in Crisis," *World Politics*, XXIII (January 1971), 295-317.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tages of longitudinal analysis of Soviet bureaucratic practices. Almost without question, Hough is the preeminent Western student of the regional Party apparatus.

For what purposes has Hough collected his data? What is his basic research design? What are his major conclusions?

Hough discusses at the outset what he calls "Soviet administrative theory." But it is crucial to note that these chapters primarily describe important *expectations* held by leading Party officials. Hough meticulously elucidates the meaning and practical implications of concepts such as "executive leadership" (*rukovodstvo*) by local Party committees and "one-man management" (*edinonachalie*) by factory directors. These "principles" of Soviet administrative theory are part of a prolonged Politburo effort to establish and maintain a rough division of responsibility among Party, state, and industrial organs. In a word, these concepts contain and *communicate* expectations. The former legitimizes local Party intervention in major ("political") matters and nonintervention in minor ones; the latter obligates factory managers to decide less important matters independently and assigns to them consultative responsibilities (with right of appeal to higher Party committees) on major regional economic questions. There are, of course, ambiguous situations where responsibilities are intentionally or unintentionally blurred, but where local officials are clearly expected to develop diverse, flexible, and efficient cooperative practices.

Having outlined the general nature and intent of the expectations of leading Party officials, Hough virtually promises to analyze those sets of expectations that have had the greatest impact on the actual behavior of regional cadres. The author notes that provincial (*obkom*) first secretaries "have been assigned a multiplicity of roles, many of them mutually contradictory. . . . Even if there were no contradictions among these roles, the pressure of time would prevent full realization of all of them." Hough then asserts: "The rest of the book will be concerned with ascertaining how, in fact, the Party officials resolve the dilemmas of their position. Which roles do the local Party organs tend to emphasize and which do they tend to ignore? How is each of them 'reinterpreted' by the pressure of events?" (pp. 124-25).

From the above, one might reasonably expect clear conceptualization of "role" and role-related concepts, and a systematic effort to utilize and/or contribute to the existing body of role theory, particularly role relationships in complex organizations. But no theoretical or operational definition of "role" is offered—despite repeated use of the concept in diverse, if usually distinct, ways. The term "role" is variously employed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EVERY STUDENT'S
EVERY TEACHER'S
EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS



The "Eighth Edition" contains the basic history of the Organization from 1945 to 1965 and is a complete handbook of the functions and activities of the United Nations and its related agencies during those twenty years.

The "Supplement" covers the years 1966 to 1970.

Together they constitute a complete history for the past twenty-five years.

Eighth Edition	Clothbound $6.00
	Paperbound $2.50
Supplement	Clothbound $4.00
	Paperbound $1.95

Special Price for both volumes: Clothbound $7.50 Paperbound $3.95

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS Room LX-2300, New York, N.Y. 10017

Transnational Relations and World Politics

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., editors

Rejecting the traditional view of world politics as simply interstate politics, the editors argue for an examination of transnational processes and their role in international affairs. In this volume of essays political scientists, economists, historians, and sociologists look at aspects of world politics in which states are not utterly dominant—that is, at transnational relations. The essays cover several types of transnational actors: (1) multinational enterprise, the Ford Foundation, racial minorities; (2) different fields in which transnational processes occur; and (3) the effects of these relations on peace, American foreign policy and international organizations. Cloth: $15.00, Paper: $4.95.

Center for International Affairs

Also available from Harvard University Press: REGIONAL INTEGRATION: Theory and Research, edited by Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold. Cloth: $12.50, Paper: $4.95

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the sense of "position," "function," "influence," "perceived responsibility," "expected behavior," and "actual behavior." Propositions containing this concept are thus difficult to assess. Furthermore, Hough makes no use of—apparently not even for suggestive or heuristic purposes—the major scholarly literature on organizational and social roles. The works by Gross and others, Kahn and others, Rommetveit, and Biddle and Thomas, for example, are not included in his bibliography; only Merton is cited.[5]

These are damning criticisms in some circles. Indeed, the conceptual confusion surrounding the term "role" raises serious questions about the *validity* of some of Hough's data—that is, the extent to which the data do in fact measure certain properties or dimensions called "roles," role "conflict," role "ambiguity," and "resolution" of role conflict and ambiguity. Most concepts very probably are "fact-gathering" and "fact-storing containers," as diverse schools of thought argue.[6] If so, the social scientist needs reasonably clear, discrete, and theoretically significant concepts *prior* to measurement, data collection, quantification, theory testing, or comparative analysis.[7] If the major phenomena to be studied are not identified rather clearly, how can one muster empirical and logical evidence to ascertain their presence or absence, let alone weigh their importance in specific contexts, or determine their relationship to other variables under different conditions? And in the case of Hough's study, role relationships *are* an important part of the subject the author has chosen to examine.

However, the surprising fact is that Hough's book is clearly superior to many that explicitly utilize and seek to contribute to role theory. First of all, Hough goes way beyond studies that content themselves primarily with describing the different duties expected of, and perceived by, actors holding the same formal position in an organization.[8] Hough intuitively understands that this is the beginning, not the goal or final product, of serious role analysis. Rather than merely "factor analyzing"

[5] Merton (fn. 2); Neal Gross and others, *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York 1958); Robert Kahn and others, *Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity* (New York 1964); Ragnar Rommetveit, *Social Norms and Roles* (Oslo 1954); Bruce Biddle and Edwin Thomas, eds., *Role Theory: Concepts and Research* (New York 1966). See also Theodore Sarbin and Vernon Allen, "Role Theory," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (2d ed., Reading, Mass. 1968), 488-567.

[6] E.g., Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (December 1970), 1033-53.

[7] For a forceful defense of this view, see *ibid.*

[8] Cf. John Wahlke and others, *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York 1962); Roger Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Jewish Bund in Russia From its Origins to 1905

Henry J. Tobias. One of the leading elements in the Russian Social Democratic movement of the late nineteenth century was the organization known as the Jewish Bund. Founded in 1897, its origins can be traced to the 1880's, when a group of Jewish Democrats began to regard the Jewish worker as the proper target of their efforts. In this first history of the Bund in English, the author describes not only its internal organization and tactics, but also its relations with other political forces, notably the Zionists, the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, and the Polish revolutionary parties, and with the antagonistic elements within the Jewish community

$16.50

Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo

Jean-Claude Willame. The usual view of Congolese politics as an example of anarchy and chaos, of a disorderly course of events inimical to sustained analysis, is sharply challenged by this book that demonstrates that the Congolese political experience can be intellectually understood and conceptualized. Using Max Weber's concept of patrimonialism, the author examines the various phases the Congo has gone through since it achieved independence in 1960. With the help of much primary evidence and historical comparison, the author concludes that since Joseph Mobutu's military coup in 1965, the Congo has been in a state of transition away from patrimonialism. $8.50

Stanford University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the main responsibilities associated with specific administrative positions, Hough assesses in a fairly systematic way the causes and consequences of various expectations. Five major clusters of responsibilities are identified early in the study (by page 125). Then, in the seven chapters that follow, Hough proceeds to the more important task of describing and explaining numerous complex patterns of *behavior*. Explanations are generally constructed by identifying and then evaluating the relative importance of many factors that appear to have shaped the observed behavior. These factors include contextual variables, relatively permanent elements of Soviet bureaucracy, and, to a much lesser extent, general characteristics of other organizations. In a field where data on behavior are difficult to obtain, Hough has with some success analyzed the expectations and other factors that generally influence the economic activities of local Party organs, tend to influence them in various situations, or tended to influence them in past temporal and situational contexts.

For example, Hough observes that while many official expectations have remained relatively unchanged over the years, their respective influence on local administrative practices has been significantly altered by factors such as changing recruitment policies, changing resource allocation priorities, and changing institutional arrangements (pp. 108ff.). Hough also suggests numerous factors that tend to limit the influence of local Party cadres in technical intraplant decision-making, and he evaluates, and generalizes about, the relative impact of these variables (pp. 192-213).

One may object that weak conceptualization and measurement of the major phenomena to be studied—in this case the "role" behavior of local Party officials—seriously reduce the credibility of propositions that employ role-related concepts and that purport to assess the causes and consequences of these behavioral dimensions. But Hough's study is literally saved by the fact that few of the empirical generalizations he seeks to verify employ the concept of "role." This book is rich in descriptive generalizations about the activities of certain types of Party officials; about the size, composition, and growth of various CPSU organs; about staffing, recruitment, and *nomenklatura* practices; about the background, training, and skills of different cadres; about Party leaders' broad expectations of local officials; about common responses to similar problems; about types of conflict situations; and about where and how certain kinds of disputes are resolved.

All the social science theory in the world would probably not produce as much understanding of these topics as a moderate amount of struc-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from Columbia

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, 1941-1947

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS

A broad interpretation of Soviet-American relations during and after World War II, this volume also considers bureaucratic inertia, quirks of personality, and both accurate and inaccurate perceptions of Soviet intentions which affected Washington officials. **cloth $12.50 paper $3.95**

LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

JAMES CHIEH HSIUNG

An inquiry into Communist China's foreign policy and world view, this study focuses on the question, "To what extent can Communist China, armed with a militant ideology, be expected to accept the existing rules of the game in international relations?" **$12.50**

20TH CENTURY CHINA

New Revised Edition

O. EDMUND CLUBB

This edition has new chapters on the great proletarian cultural revolution and its impact on China internally, on Chinese foreign affairs during the period, and on the wide range of other domestic and external developments which affected China during these years. **cloth $12.00 paper $3.95**

REVOLUTIONARY WAR:

Western Response

DAVID S. SULLIVAN and MARTIN J. SATTLER, Editors

An anthology of five articles prepared for a special issue of the **Journal of International Affairs** devoted to the question of U.S. foreign policy in its relation to peasant movements and revolutionary wars in various countries. **cloth $8.00 paper $2.25**

BULGARIAN COMMUNISM:

The Road to Power, 1934-1944

NISSAN OREN

Based on extensive research in original and hitherto untapped sources, this is a detailed survey of one of Europe's most powerful and original Communist parties during the decade preceding the establishment of its rule in Bulgaria. **$12.50**

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tured or unstructured interview data. But even in fields where information is difficult to obtain, social science theory can often help to elicit and organize data. For example, basic concepts and analytical variables of role analysis include the ideas that *roles* are *behavioral* patterns *expected* of the occupant of a *position*; that roles are *communicated* by *senders* in diverse ways; that the expectations of identifiable *role-sets* or *audiences* have a particularly strong influence on the *role-taking* and *role-enactment* of focal persons; that expectations may be perceived as *legitimate, obligatory*, or *optional* (sanction-free); that *conflicting* expectations may be *antithetical* or *nonantithetical*; that intrapersonal, interpersonal, or interdepartmental *role conflict* and *ambiguity* may be *resolved* in numerous ways, depending on personality factors, interpersonal relations, and organizational characteristics; and that these behavioral dimensions can and should be studied as independent, dependent, and intervening variables.[9]

The study of dimensions such as these is important because a Soviet official's understanding of his own responsibilities is more likely to influence his behavior than, say, treatises on Soviet administrative theory and law, or even national Party and government decrees. When the latter influence behavior, they generally do so by first altering one's understanding about his duties and obligations. But other expectations are sometimes perceived as more compelling, more legitimate, or more likely to promote a personal or professional goal. Demands, cues, and sanctions from regional Party and state organs, local institutions, or face-to-face work groups are obvious general examples. The pressures of time, technology, resources, and costs are also vital. For the researcher, it is relatively easy to identify the Soviet leaders' broad expectations of factory managers or municipal officials, and to note that these expectations or attempts to change organizational relationships do not always have the desired result. But the more important and difficult task is to identify the factors that *do* significantly affect the behavior of

[9] See fn. 5. "Role-taking" is used here to refer to one's conscious or subconscious understandings of his own roles, not his perceptions or "imaginative reconstruction" of other people's roles. This usage follows, among others, Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York 1957), and Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York 1966), rather than George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* (Chicago 1934), Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference-Group Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (January 1956), 316-28, and "Role-Taking: Process Versus Conformity," in Arnold Rose, ed., *Human Behavior and Social Processes* (Boston 1962), 20-40, and others. See also Alvin Magid, "Dimensions of Administrative Role and Conflict Resolution among Local Officials in Northern Nigeria," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, XII (September 1967), 321-38, "Methodological Considerations in the Study of African Political and Administrative Behavior: The Case of Role Conflict Analysis," *African Studies Review*, XIII (April 1970), and *Men in the Middle: Leadership and Role Conflict in a Nigerian Society* (forthcoming).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the elusive enemy:

American Foreign Policy Since World War II

Simon Serfaty
University of California at Los Angeles

A careful appraisal of American foreign policy in Europe and Asia since World War II. The book places the development of an interventionary policy in historical perspective, examining some of the main events which have helped shape American foreign policy. It also gives balanced coverage to the Vietnam debate, and to the policies of the Nixon administration on Vietnam. This is a brief, selective, up-to-date study which blends description and analysis in a highly readable style. An excellent feature of the book is its willingness to reappraise "traditional" views as well as to criticize "revisionist" ones.
paper approx. 224 pages April 1972
tentatively $3.95

trends and tragedies in american foreign policy

Michael Parenti
University of Vermont

Michael Parenti has gathered together articles on American foreign policy that focus their attention on *issues*, descriptive events, concrete conditions and policy content. As he says in his Introduction, "In this book we examine some long-muted dissenting notions and heretical views about the intent, purposes, and unhappy consequences of American foreign policy and the interests that shape that policy. We explore the history of American expansionism, the origins and causes of the cold war—that most critical international conflict—the interests that keep the United States involved in so many places, in so many ways, and the effects of those interests on other nations. Then we investigate specific instances of American involvement in order to identify the stakes, the justifications, and the outcomes. Finally, in a concluding essay, I suggest an alternative interpretation of America's role in the world."
paper 228 pages 1971 $3.95

power, action, and interaction

Readings on International Politics

George H. Quester
Cornell University

A rational and reasonable understanding of international politics is vital in today's world. This book brings together all the essential points needed for a basic introduction to the field of international relations. All of the articles are reprinted in their entirety and have been chosen for their sophistication and substantive depth. Each section is preceded by an introduction by the author.
paper 573 pages 1971 $5.95

the use of force

International Politics and Foreign Policy

Robert J. Art
Kenneth N. Waltz
both of Brandeis University

The use of force is a central theme in the study of international politics. The authors of this book point up three major aspects of that theme: technology, strategy, and armament races, dealing with them from both a theoretical and an historical perspective. Devoted to the major issues of war, peace, and peace-keeping, and emphasizing the relation of technology to military strategy and foreign policy, this reader contains the best case studies available, from both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to support and illustrate the theoretical articles.
paper 547 pages 1971 $5.95

College Division
Little, Brown and Company
34 Beacon Street
Boston, Mass.
02106

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet administrative and technical personnel under various circumstances. Any attempt to study systematically the role-taking and role-enactment of similar Soviet officials would be a very important step in this direction. By identifying the role senders whose expectations are generally or in specific situations considered most legitimate or obligatory—that is, by determining role-sets empirically, not merely postulating them—one can add much to our understanding of Soviet administrative behavior. Indeed, detailed knowledge of Party and government officials' perceptions of their responsibilities is essential to understanding their behavior and the environment in which they work. This is true not only of expectations that are perceived as legitimate, obligatory, or optional, but also of different conflicting and ambiguous expectations. The latter too have important, if usually less direct, intrapersonal, interpersonal, and organizational consequences.

Attempts to study some of these consequences in the Soviet context are perhaps premature. But one can begin by systematically studying the ways in which certain types of officials perceive their own responsibilities. To inquire about the kind of work a man performs is a standard interview procedure. More important are specific questions regarding an administrator's perceptions of his duties and his expectations of others, especially those whose work is closely tied to his own. Does a city soviet official, for example, know exactly what is expected of him? From whom or how did he learn about these responsibilities? To what extent does he think he is fulfilling, or can fulfill, his duties? Are some duties more important than others, and why? Have these obligations or their relative importance changed in any way since he took office? How did he learn about these changes? Why does he think the changes took place? Do they make any difference in his dealings with other officials in the same or different city administrations and departments? Does he know how much authority he has in most situations? Does he have to "feel his way" in performing some of his duties? How does he know when he is doing a good job under these circumstances? Does he do things that are likely to be accepted by some people but not by others? What does he do, and how does he feel, in such situations? Does he sometimes receive assignments without having adequate resources or personnel to fulfill them? Does he receive assignments that are "not part of his job"? Will he ever perform work that is not part of his job? Under what circumstances? Why?[10]

Surely Hough could have improved his study by carefully defining

[10] A few of these questions were adapted from John Rizzo and others, "Role Conflict and Ambiguity in Complex Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, XV (June 1970), 150-63.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Institute of International Studies

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Announcing the Publication of Two New Monographs:

The International Imperatives of Technology

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

Eugene B. Skolnikoff

What will be the effects of technological development and the ever-widening application of modern technology on the international order during the next two decades? What international machinery now exists for handling the increasingly complex problems created by technological advance, and how effective is it? What are the key factors in determining the effectiveness of international organizations? What changes will be necessary in the international political structure in order to establish and enforce appropriate standards and regulations, allocate costs and benefits on an equitable basis, and settle disputes as these relate to weather modification, pollution, exploitation of the oceans, space technology, population control, conservation of natural resources? What is the likelihood that such changes will be brought about?

RESEARCH SERIES, NO. 16 — 194 PAGES; PAPER — $2.95

World Urbanization 1950-1970

VOLUME II: ANALYSIS OF TRENDS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND DEVELOPMENT

Kingsley Davis

The eagerly awaited companion volume to I: BASIC DATA FOR CITIES, COUNTRIES, AND REGIONS, which gives the rural, urban, and city populations for every country and region of the world in 1950, 1960, and 1970. VOLUME II projects the future growth of the world's rural, urban, and city populations on the basis of contrasting models, analyzes the relationship between urban and rural growth rates, assesses the effects of city size on growth, and examines urbanization patterns by geographic, cultural, and economic regions.

POPULATION MONOGRAPH SERIES — VOLUME I: $3.00 — VOLUME II: $3.00

RECENT I.I.S. MONOGRAPHS OF INTEREST:

RESEARCH SERIES

Central American Economic Integration: The Politics of Unequal Benefits / STUART I. FAGAN #15; $1.75

Community Development in Israel and The Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis / RALPH M. KRAMER #14; $2.50

The Pink Yo-Yo: Occupational Mobility in Belgrade, 1915-1965 / EUGENE A. HAMMEL #13; $2.00

POPULATION MONOGRAPH SERIES

Western European Censuses, 1960: An English Language Guide / JUDITH BLAKE & JERRY J. DONOVAN #8; $3.25

Mortality Decline and Its Demographic Effects in Latin America / EDUARDO E. ARRIAGA #6; $3.00

The Female Labor Force in the U.S.: Demographic and Economic Factors / VALERIE K. OPPENHEIMER #5; $2.50

POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION SERIES

Social Stratification in Peru / M. S. LARSON & A. E. BERGMAN #5; $3.50

Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup / J. NUN #7; $1.50

Address orders for monographs and/or requests for additional information to:

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and distinguishing among various dimensions of role relationships, and by asking more questions such as these of the data he gathered and of the officials he interviewed. This might well have enabled him to measure the prevalence and distribution of role dimensions more systematically and to analyze their origins and effects more precisely. Role analysis would seem to be especially useful in areas where official expectations are deliberately or unintentionally flexible, unclear, or perhaps antithetical—for example, in the relationships of lower-level Party cadres to higher state officials. Furthermore, the author might have been induced to seek important kinds of additional data from interviews and published sources. Repeated observations that local officials are "assigned" certain "duties" and "responsibilities," not all of them "precisely defined" or "mutually reconcilable," just beg for systematic role analysis. But quite possibly these phenomena cannot be studied without ample interview data.[11] Awareness of this difficulty should at least alert one to the pitfalls of employing role-related concepts, and might stimulate the researcher to seek fresh kinds of data to study significant questions. Interviews, for example, are a particularly important way of ascertaining how officials perceive their responsibilities. Yet Hough apparently uses interview data merely to supplement his extensive and intensive analysis of written sources. The author's bibliographical appendix, which offers an excellent brief evaluation of written primary sources, gives no indication of the number or kinds of Soviet officials interviewed.

Philip Selznick long ago noted that similar role behavior is not necessarily or always associated with specific formal positions or tasks; that organizational roles are significantly shaped by the human, material, and technological capabilities of an organization; that, in turn, the clarity and routinization of administrative roles greatly affect the type of leadership required of an organization's executives; and that organizations with relatively few routinized roles demand more leadership and distinct kinds of leadership skills.[12] Hough is fully aware of these considerations; but, everything considered, he makes little use of the relevant general literature on organizational leadership, decision-making, power, authority, control, coordination, effectiveness, communication, change, or regional economic development. Here, to a far greater extent than in the case of role theory, there exists a fairly well-

[11] See Erik P. Hoffmann, "Role Conflict and Ambiguity in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in Roger Kanet, ed., *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies* (New York 1971), 233-58.

[12] Selznick (fn. 9), 82-89ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from Yale

The French Communist Party versus the Students
Revolutionary Politics in May-June 1968

by RICHARD JOHNSON

In an outstanding Yale undergraduate essay, Richard Johnson shows that the events of May-June 1968 are indication of the ultimately unbridgeable gap between contemporary communism in Western Europe and revolutionary thought and action. The author was in Paris at the time of the rebellion and therefore bases his analysis on firsthand observation as well as an extensive study of the pertinent literature. ". . . well written with a scholar's sensitivity for bibliographic support and analytical insight. . . . a first-rate book on a fascinating subject."—Thomas H. Greene

Yale College Series, 13 paper $1.95 cloth $8.00

Civil Disobedience and Political Obligation
A Study in Christian Social Ethics

by JAMES F. CHILDRESS

Too often it has been assumed that civil disobedience requires no justification in the wake of revolutionary violence. While observing that such resistance usually occurs in situations where objectivity is difficult to attain, Mr. Childress insists that intellectual justification is necessary. Supporting his analysis with specific examples which range from Thoreau to Gandhi to the Catonsville 9, he has written an exploratory examination of this phenomena in the light of theological-ethical reasoning.

Yale Publications in Religion, 16 $7.95

The Foreign Policy System of Israel
Setting, Images, Process

by MICHAEL BRECHER

In this wide-ranging inquiry into a foreign policy system in action, Michael Brecher *examines the total web of relationships involved in the formulation and execution of* Israel's foreign policy. Central to the book is an exploration of how the decision makers view their environment and the effect this has on foreign policy choices. ". . . a model for the analysis of any country's foreign policy system . . . makes an important contribution to the systematic study of comparative foreign policy."—Peter G. Bock **$17.50**

Polyarchy
Participation and Opposition

by ROBERT A. DAHL

Given a regime in which the opponents of the government cannot openly and legally organize into political parties in order to oppose the government in free and fair elections, *what conditions favor or impede a transformation into a regime in which* they can? This is the question to which Robert Dahl addresses himself in this new and important study of democracy in theory and in action. "Dahl has collected fascinating data, and he speaks with a reasoned civility that makes dialogue possible." Michael Harrington, **The New York Times** paper **$2.75** cloth **$7.95**

Yale University Press New Haven and London
in Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confirmed body of empirical generalizations that might have been used extensively for heuristic purposes, or possibly even retested (recast first, if necessary, and then retested) in the Soviet context.[13] Hough's study demonstrates that with personal insights and area expertise one can do very well with minimal use of general literature. But it is equally important to note that this practice is sometimes hazardous and wasteful. These assertions are not paradoxical. For if only to gain greater insights into the connotative and denotative aspects of key concepts, Hough could have benefited from further utilization of contemporary organization theory. Role analysis is my chief illustration of this point. Let the reader decide for himself whether future studies of Soviet bureaucracy might not benefit from such diverse and provocative contributions as Charles E. Lindblom's analyses of incremental decision-making and "coordination through mutual adjustment,"[14] or James D. Thompson's emphasis on technological and environmental factors and an organization's need to "reduce uncertainty but at the same time search for flexibility."[15] Thompson concludes: "Uncertainty appears as the fundamental problem for complex organizations, and coping with uncertainty, as the essence of the administrative process."[16]

III

Hough does make a deliberate attempt to contribute to one body of empirical theory—the theory of development administration. To be sure, this effort is not the kind of ambitious, highly purposeful theorizing one finds in, say, Michel Crozier's *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*.[17] But Hough does attempt to analyze broader implications of his data and to relate his findings to a not very well-developed but growing literature.

[13] For a first attempt to do the latter, see Erik P. Hoffmann, "Ideological Administration under Khrushchev: A Study of Intra-Party Communication," *Canadian Slavic Studies*, IV (Winter 1970), 736-66. A purely illustrative list of general literature pertinent to Hough's central concerns might include: James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York 1958); Katz and Kahn (fn. 9); James March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago 1965); Lee Thayer, *Communication and Communication Systems in Organization, Management, and Interpersonal Relations* (Homewood, Ill. 1968); James Price, *Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions* (Homewood, Ill. 1968); Robert Golembiewski, *Organizing Men and Power: Patterns of Behavior and Line-Staff Models* (Chicago 1967); Walter Buckley, *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1967); Harry Richardson, *Regional Economics* (New York 1969); and many articles in *Administrative Science Quarterly*.

[14] Charles E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making through Mutual Adjustment* (New York 1965); David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York 1963).

[15] James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York 1967).

[16] *Ibid.*, 159. Thompson's study does not employ role analysis.

[17] Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New in 1972

SURVIVING TO 3000: An Introduction To The Study Of Lethal Conflict
Roy L. Prosterman, University of Washington
SURVIVING TO 3000 is a pioneering introduction to the field of conflict studies. The book's novel format combines essays-syntheses by the author, readings, commentary and a semi-Socratic questioning technique involving the reader.

Contents: 1. The Dimensions of Lethal Conflict. 2. Views of Causation: Biological and Psychological Approaches. 3. Views of Causation: Lethal Followers and Deadly Leaders. 4. Lethal Conflict in Prehistoric and Primitive Societies. 5. War and Revolution in the Contemporary World. 6. Contemporary Conflict in the U.S.A. 7. The Technology of Lethal Conflict. 8. Understanding and Ending Lethal Conflict. Extensive Bibliography. 384 pages, 6½x9¼, Softcover. Spring 1972.

Reviewer's Comments: In my opinion Roy L. Prosterman's SURVIVING TO 3000, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LETHAL CONFLICT is a remarkable manuscript — insightful, objective, readable . . . and well planned. It certainly should be published, and I, for one, will use it in my classes and as a reference book.
Robert C. North, Stanford University

THE MIDDLE-EAST: ITS GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS
Abid A. Al-Marayati, University of Toledo, and associates.
A Team-written, comprehensive and thoroughly interdisciplinary text on the political systems of the Middle-East. 512 pages, May 1972, clothbound.

THE POLITICAL THEMES OF INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS, *by Edward Williams*, University of Arizona, 178 pages, 1971, softcover.

POLITICAL MODERNIZATION: A READER IN COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CHANGE, 2nd edition, *by Claude E. Welch, Jr.*, SUNY at Buffalo, 373 pages, 1971, softcover.

For more information, write to: **Duxbury Press**
6 Bound Brook Court
North Scituate, Massachusetts 02060

Forthcoming from the

Center of International Studies

Princeton University

THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

Volume IV, The Structure of the International Environment,
edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk

The issues of conflict management treated in this volume are relatively recent consequences of the scientific and technological revolution, and are in significant respects unprecedented in man's history: food distribution, population, ocean resources, air and water pollution. Seventeen lawyers and specialists in international affairs suggest solutions by adjustments to the present international system.

About 600 pages. May. $17.50
Limited Paperback Edition LPE 6, $9.50

Order from your bookstore, or

Princeton University Press
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hough contends that the "prefect" system of field administration in continental Europe and non-Western bureaucracies, past and present, is of considerable heuristic value in understanding Soviet administrative behavior. Republic, *obkom*, and *gorkom* first secretaries do indeed have extensive general responsibilities, and in this sense the Soviet system is a prefectoral one. Hough's important observations on "regional coordination" by local Party bureaus may well have been stimulated by his general knowledge of prefectoral systems. His sensitivity to political and economic coordinating activities may in turn have produced other insights—for example, his analysis of "patronage" (*shefstvo*) as a form of regional coordination.[18]

But how important really is the "prefect" analogy? Careful comparison with Chinese provincial and local government, or that of other Communist and non-Communist one-party systems, might well have proved of greater suggestive value than comparison with prefectoral systems such as the French. Franz Schurmann's discussion of regional government in Communist China, for example, and especially his comparison of the major Soviet and Chinese administrative decentralization measures of 1957, repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the principle of "dual rule," the coordinative functions of provincial Party committees, and the activities of various interbranch coordination agencies during the Great Leap Forward. ("The main purpose of dual rule was coordination, and nobody could better coordinate across branch and agency lines than the [regional] Party committees.")[19] Also, one is reminded of Robert A. Nisbet's observation that the usefulness of a metaphor may be directly proportional to "the cognitive distance" of the subject to which the metaphor is applied.[20] Hough's detailed investigations

[18] From my own interviews I gather that about one-third of the school budget of some republics is provided by local "patrons"—mostly factories and, to a lesser extent, state and collective farms that assist schools in diverse ways. This support may be financial, technical, or in kind. Under the general supervision of the local Party organs, city soviets assign, and schools themselves solicit, as many as three or four "patrons" per school. Local Party organs have created and direct these systems of interinstitutional assistance. Sometimes Party officials must prod factories to increase or maintain systematic aid to other local institutions. But these arrangements, once established, can become mutually beneficial and self-sustaining. In return for support to a local school, a factory may be able to recruit more and better young workers, secure additional instructional and recreational facilities, and help give the children of its employees a better education. In these and many other ways—for example, by speeding up or bypassing entirely the cumbersome state ministerial funding process—the local "prefects" help to foster regional economic integration.

[19] Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley 1966), 191. See also A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China* (New York 1967).

[20] Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (New York 1969), 240 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FORO INTERNACIONAL

Revista Trimestral Publicada Por el Colegio de Mexico

Fundador: DANIEL COSIO VILLEGAS
Director: ROQUE GONZALEZ SALAZAR
Director Adjunto: MARIA DEL ROSARIO GREEN

VOL. XII ENERO-MARZO, 1972 NÚM. 3

INDICE

Artículos

OLGA P. DE BRODY, Cuba y América Latina. ¿Coexistencia pacifica o solidaridad revolucionaria?.

J. S. NYE, La UNCTAD bajo Prebisch.

BERNARDO SEPÚLVEDA AMOR, GATT, ALALC y el trato de más favor.

WILLIAM P. AVERY Y JAMES D. COCHRANE, El Mercado Común Andino: un enfoque subregional de la integración.

BABEUF, El desarrollo económico y social del Ecuador: estructura, proceso y perspectivas.

Reseñas de Libros

Libros Recibidos

Precio del ejemplar: Pesos $18.00; U.S. Dls. 1.60
Suscripción anual (4 números): Pesos $60.00; U.S. Dls. 6.00

EL COLEGIO DE MEXICO
Departamento de Ventas
Guanajuato 125
México 7, D. F.

The quarterly journal of the Political Science Program, The City University of New York.

Comparative Politics

Volume 4, Number 2 April 1972

CONTENTS

John R. Mathiason and John D. Powell
Participation and Efficacy: Aspects of Peasant Involvement in Political Mobilization

Gerald J. Bender
The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case

J. A. Laponce
In Search of the Stable Elements of the Left-Right Landscape

Pi-chao Chen
Overurbanization, Rustication of Urban-Educated Youths, and Politics of Rural Transformation: The Case of China

RESEARCH NOTES

William R. Keech
Linguistic Diversity and Political Conflict: Some Observations Based on Four Swiss Cantons

Lawrence S. Mayer
An Analysis of Measures of Crosscutting and Fragmentation

REVIEW ARTICLES:

T. H. Rigby
"Totalitarianism" and Change in Communist Systems

Arend Lijphart
Toward Empirical Democratic Theory: Research Strategies and Tactics

Order Form

Subscription Fulfillment, *Comparative Politics*, 49 Sheridan Avenue, Albany, N.Y. 12210

at $..... (Individuals, 1 year, $8.00; 2 years, $15.00; 3 years, $21.50. Institutions, $12.00 per year. Add $1.00 per year foreign postage.)

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... State ..... Zip .....

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Soviet provincial and local administration can probably contribute to existing theories of regional government or "developmental prefects" more than they can profit from them. For example, how much is really known about relationships among "regional coordinators" when there is more than one "regional coordinator" per region—that is, when republic, province, city, and district "prefects" have overlapping spheres of jurisdiction and responsibility? Power, influence, bargaining, collaborative, competitive, and role relationships among the "coordinators" ("vertical coordination," if you will) become subjects of critical importance. This would seem to be especially true where clear lines of responsibility for economic decision-making are lacking, and where "different levels of the Party hierarchy actually have strikingly different functions and relationships to the state apparatus" (p. 2).

This is not to say that Hough misinterprets or neglects these important considerations, but simply to suggest that the concept of the "prefect" does not appear to be of exceptional value in studying Communist bureaucracies. Perhaps, as Hough suggests, the "prefect" analogy does help to convey the important idea that "the most basic functions of the local Party organs have remained fundamentally the same during the last forty years" (p. 272). But the literature on prefects in two- and multiparty systems probably did not generate, nor does it contribute significantly to the verification of, that thesis. Virtually all of Hough's key observations about the local Party organs—for instance, the crucial importance of having a regional Party organization empowered to authorize or even to compel certain kinds of *lawbreaking* (pp. 253ff.)—were probably derived almost entirely from careful study of Soviet experience.

Hough's more explicit contribution to the theory of development administration begins with comparison of Soviet data to Barrington Moore, Jr.'s hypothetical "rational-technical society," the most familiar of Max Weber's bureaucratic "ideal types," and the "monistic model" of early twentieth-century American administrative theory—all of which are considered to be similar in important respects. Hough observes several significant ways in which Soviet experience "deviates" from these constructs, and he considers it "crucial" to investigate the "meaning" of these deviations (p. 284). Maintaining that "Many of the Soviet deviations from the model constitute an answer to real problems of large-scale organizations—problems that must receive some analogous answers in any large organization if it is effectively to fulfill the tasks given it" (p. 292), Hough concludes that a "model of effective development administration must include a number of these deviations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF INDIAN STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

Vol. V: Nos. 1-2 **Jan.-July 1971**

CONTENTS

Which Discount Rate for Social Investment Analysis?
by M. K. Muthoo, St. John College, Oxford.

Diminishing Employment opportunities for women in India by J. P. Ambannavar, Department of Demography, The Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, Act, Australia.

Employment Structure and Economic Development
by Dr. D. L. Narayana, Prof. & Head of the Economics Department, S.V. University, Tirupati.

Trends in Sectoral Distribution of India's working force
by Dr. R. R. Sinha, Prof. of Economics, Agra College, Agra.

Report of the Committee of Experts on unemployment Estimates. (Dantwala Committee appointed by the Planning Commission, GOI, New Delhi.)

Educational Research in India: Retrospect and Prospect
by Dr. S. P. Ahluwalia, Department of Education, B.H.U, Varanasi-5.

A Note on Basics
by G. L. Karkal, National Institute of Bank Management, Bombay.

Annual subscription rate: Rs 50: $25 : £ 6

Available from

ASIAN STUDIES PRESS, 23/354 Azadnagar, J. P. Road, Andheri, Bombay-58

The Journal of

conflict RESOLUTION

A quarterly for research related to war and peace

DECEMBER 1971 (XV, 4):

The Demand for Local Political Autonomy: An Individualistic Theory ..... *Douglas G. Hartle and Richard M. Bird*

Foreign-Linked Factionalism as a Historical Pattern ..... *Alan Dowty*

The Multinational Corporation: Expanding the Frontiers of World Politics ..... *David Osterberg and Fouad Ajami*

Inter-Nation Influence Revisited ..... *David A. Baldwin*

Other articles; gaming section, books received

$10.00 per year for individuals, $18.00 for institutions; single issues $3.00

Published by The Journal of Conflict Resolution
The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among its most basic features" (p. 296). Particular emphasis is placed on the need to stimulate "creativity, initiative, and discretion" by not precisely defining and enforcing many rules and expectations, and by creating a system of "dual supervision" in which industrial managers and technical specialists are not merely cogs in a single, hierarchically-structured chain of command.

The logical status of ideal types is a thorny issue in the social sciences. Some argue that ideal types must perform an explanatory function and should be interpreted as "theoretical systems embodying testable general hypotheses."[21] Others maintain that ideal-type constructs are not theories and that observed differences from them can only serve a heuristic, not an explanatory, function.[22] In either case, one is inclined to conclude that Hough might have devoted less effort to the identification of "deviations" from monistic models, and more effort to the systematic elaboration and construction of the nascent theory of development administration. *What is important is the relationship of Soviet data to "contemporary administrative theory" (p. 7), not to the monistic models of Weber, Moore, et al.* The latter warrant our attention only to the extent that they help to elucidate Soviet experience, and Soviet experience must be further integrated into contemporary theories of organizational behavior. Hough indicates his purposes by asserting that monistic models have had an excessive and unfortunate influence in the fields of comparative government and political development. Perhaps this is true. But in the same sentence he makes the very pertinent observation that "administrative theorists of the last two decades have increasingly rejected the monistic model of administration" (pp. 6-7). So why belabor the fact that Soviet experience differs from monistic models, when this is precisely what one would have expected from contemporary administrative theory?[23]

Of what explanatory and suggestive value are certain social science theories or *parts* of theories, and what can data from the Soviet context contribute to the verification, rejection, or reformulation of those theories? Here, it would seem, are crucial research questions. The

[21] Carl G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York 1965), 155-71.

[22] E.g., Don Martindale, "Sociological Theory and the Ideal Type," in L. Gross, ed., *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (New York 1959), 58-59ff.

[23] See Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes, eds., *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor 1962), 81-82ff.; and Stanley Udy, "'Bureaucracy' and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organization Theory: An Empirical Study," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December 1959), 791-95. For criticism of the latter effort, see Tom Burns, "The Comparative Study of Organizations," in Victor Vroom, ed., *Methods of Organizational Research* (Pittsburgh 1967), 142-45ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISSUES & STUDIES

A Monthly Journal of Communist Problems and World Affairs

Founded in 1964, **Issues & Studies** is edited and published monthly by the Institute of International Relations, Republic of China.

Annual Subscription (12 issues a year)

including postage by surface-mail	U.S. $ 8.00
including postage by air-mail	U.S. $14.00

Subscription may be sent to the

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

P.O. Box 1189

Taipei, Republic of China

JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH POLITICAL STUDIES

Vol. X No. 1 *March 1972*

Political Conflict and Trade Union Factionalism in Kenya
by Richard Sandbrook

Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter? New Zealand and the Commonwealth in the Inter-War Years
by Angus Ross

Indian Communism and the Kerala Experience of Coalition Government, 1967-1969
by Thelma Hunter

Reviews of Books

Annual subscription rate £2.75 (U.S. $8.00). Single issues £1.10.

LEICESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS

2 University Road, Leicester LE1 7RB, England

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hough study sheds little light on the first, for, despite occasional references to works by Herbert Simon, Dahl and Lindblom, and Brian Chapman, and a thoughtful speculative conclusion entitled "Rationality, Bargaining, and Political Development," Hough does not systematically utilize any body of theory in the design and execution of his research (for example, to guide his collection of data).

However, one clearly sees the influence of monistic models in his initial statement of purpose: "The major task of this book is to explain how it is that in the Soviet Union 'public administration can be managed—even managed well in terms of measurable outputs—without the existence of every ideal element of classical bureaucracy'" (p. 7). But what exactly is a "well-managed" administrative system? Is it by definition one that achieves a fairly high degree of "area coordination," or are regional political and economic "coordinative" activities particularly important *consequences* of skillful administration? "Effective" administration is defined in the second-to-last chapter as an "organization's ability to fulfill the tasks assigned it by those at its head" (p. 296). But this familiar definition avoids at least one very important conceptual and empirical consideration—namely, that "organizational goals are often, indeed usually, in dispute."[24] This is perhaps especially true of a huge, complex, and differentiated organization such as the CPSU, despite its allegedly "monolithic" tradition.[25] In short, Hough's main dependent variable—that which he seeks to explain—is highly significant, but not very well delineated. This would seem to be of considerable importance if, as I suspect, Hough wishes not merely to note the non-Weberian characteristics of Soviet bureaucracy, but to argue that (1) Soviet bureaucracy is "managed well" or "effective" in certain important respects, and (2) Soviet bureaucracy is "effective" in some spheres *because* of its non-Weberian characteristics.

Hough's statement of purpose brings to mind the idea that significant research is essentially "puzzle-solving." Thomas S. Kuhn argues that "Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the expected."[26] Hough makes contributions in each of these

[24] Burns (fn. 23), 123.

[25] See Carl Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957–1964* (Baltimore 1966); and Robert Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960).

[26] Kuhn (fn. 1), 52-53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social science INFORMATION sur les sciences sociales

An international journal in English and French published six times yearly by the International Social Science Council.

Volume XI **Number 1** **February 1972**

FROM THE CONTENTS

Articles by:

Wilfred BECKERMAN	*Environmental policy and the challenge to economic theory.*
K. William KAPP	Social costs, neo-classical economics, environmental planning: A reply
Elizabeth WHITCOMBE	Development projects and environmental disruption: *The case of Uttar Pradesh, India.*
Irving Louis HOROWITZ	The sociology textbook: The treatment of conflict in American sociological literature.
Victor KARADY	Notes sur les thèses de doctorat consacrées à l'Afrique dans les universités françaises de 1884-1961.
Renaud DULONG, Werner ACKERMANN	Popularisation of science for adults.

and the sections: Man and his environment, Sociology of the social sciences, Trends and developments, Inventories and bibliographies.

Subscription price $18 or 90 F yearly payable to the publisher:

Mouton & Co., Periodicals Department, P.O. Box 482, The Hague, Netherlands.

Editorial address: International Social Science Council, Unesco, 1 rue Miollis, Paris 15e, France.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

areas, as we have seen. His statement of purpose in a sense identifies and promises to help solve a puzzle. But the anomaly he presents is not really all that anomalous. For part of the "violated" paradigm is Weber's ideal type, not the existing body of organization theory. Indeed, greater use of empirical theory and clearer conceptualization probably would have helped Hough to formulate more theoretically significant and perplexing puzzles.

I, for one, believe there should be more problem-centered research in Communist studies. Careful examination of social science theories, especially middle-range empirical theories, probably will make one more aware of significant problems and less prone to unwarranted puzzlement. Earlier students of Soviet bureaucracy and industrial administration, for example, should have been less surprised by the prevalence of informal patterns of behavior (e.g., *blat, mestnichestvo*), even considering the state of organization theory at that time. Indeed, Soviet area specialists ought to have expected certain types of informal behavior, or looked for distinctive Soviet responses to problems that confront all or most complex organizations. Not finding the expected, the researcher might have been induced to try to resolve the anomaly, and perhaps, in the process, have discovered behavior truly unique to the Soviet context. The issue, then, is not puzzle-solving *versus* social science theory or area studies. For even in its loosest sense, problem-centered research reduces anomaly by establishing what happened, what generally happens, and possible reasons why. In the last analysis, these are the areas of Hough's major contribution.

Hough's study dramatically illustrates the potential contributions of Communist area specialists to empirical social science theory. The author presents numerous insights and a vast quantity of difficult-to-obtain evidence on a wide range of important topics: role relationships, decision-making, political development, organizational communication, and so forth. Hough's emphasis on the complexity and importance of role relationships in the regional CPSU apparatus gives promise of a major contribution to the theory of organizational roles. Of particular significance are the apparently beneficial effects (such as regional coordination, economic growth, and organizational flexibility) of numerous imprecise and ill-enforced rules, obligations, and expectations. The formulation and testing of hypotheses is surely not the only worthwhile kind of comparative research, for many very basic theoretical, conceptual, and measurement problems are still unresolved, disputed, or simply ignored. But, if only to help dispose of some of the less fruitful "approaches," "models," and "orientations" that currently abound in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ROUND TABLE

The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs

Editor—Robert Jackson of All Souls College, Oxford

THE ROUND TABLE offers a combination of scholarship and controversy on current international political and economic affairs with special reference to the Commonwealth.

ISSUE NO. 246 APRIL 1972

The Future of Nuclear Deterrence in Europe

Robert Ellsworth (former U.S. Ambassador to NATO)—
The View of the United States.
Rainer Barzel (Leader of the CDU/CSU in West Germany)—
The German View.
Alexandre Sanguinetti (President of the Commission de la Defense National in the National Assembly, Paris)—
The French View.
Rt. Hon. George Thomson MP (Labour Party spokesman on Defence)—
The British View.
Rt. Hon. Lord Sherfield (former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority)—
The Industrial/Civil Aspects of Nuclear Energy in Europe.
Ian Smart (Fellow of the International Institute for Strategic Studies)—
The Strategic/Technological Perspective.
Rt. Hon. Lord Caradon (former UK Ambassador to the UN)—
International Aspects of the Rhodesian Settlement.
Jeyaratnam Wilson—
Recent Political Developments in Ceylon.
The Australian Group of the Round Table—
Recent Political Developments in Australia.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION: £3
(four issues: Jan., April, July and October)
from the Journals Manager, Oxford University Press, Neasden, London, NW10
and from all booksellers
(Rates for Overseas Subscriptions on application)

THE ROUND TABLE
18 Northumberland Avenue, London W.C. 2N 5AP England.

Comparative Political Studies

a quarterly journal

. . . publishes theoretical and empirical research articles by scholars engaged in cross-national comparative study.

Yearly rate: $18.00; $12.00 with professional discount; $9.00 to full-time students.

Published quarterly in April, July, October and January.

SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC.
275 South Beverly Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90212

Editorial Board:

Gabriel Almond
David E. Apter
Samuel H. Barnes
Leonard Binder
Ralph Braibanti
Jack Dennis
Harry Eckstein
Ted Robert Gurr
Seymour Martin Lipset
A. F. K. Organski
Lucian W. Pye
Douglas Rae
Fred W. Riggs
Bruce M. Russett
Robert A. Scalapino
Robert E. Scott
Henry Tuene
Sidney Verba
Myron Weiner
Aristide R. Zolberg

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the literature of political science, Communist area specialists might put their data and talents to good use. Even more important, students of Communist bureaucracies have much information and much potential data they can contribute to general theories of organizational behavior. These contributions may not be as easy to make as they might have been if students of Soviet organizations had not worked in relative isolation from students of other organizations for so long. In conception and design—in the problems formulated, the questions raised, the concepts employed—studies of Soviet bureaucracy are essentially a-theoretical, and thus outside the mainstream of present-day organizational analysis. This gap can be and is being profitably bridged, as Hough himself has demonstrated elsewhere.[27] To date this trend is hesitant and slow, but there is hope that it will accelerate in the near future.

In sum, *The Soviet Prefects* is one of the finest books yet written on Soviet bureaucracy. The author's descriptive generalizations alone refute the claim that multivariable propositions are the only, or even the best path toward explanation and understanding. His insights also belie assertions that social science theorizing is necessary or sufficient to produce significant scholarly research. But Hough could have made an even more valuable contribution to our understanding of Soviet politics, and a much greater contribution to our general knowledge of Communist and non-Communist organizations, if initially he had attempted to utilize and contribute to the more explicitly theoretical literature on administrative behavior. The analysis of role relationships is a good example of opportunities missed. There is evidence that the author attempted to relate his data to more general concerns in the middle or later stages of his research. But in the absence of a research design and conceptual orientation tailored to this purpose in the initial stages of data collection, any attempt to change focus significantly in midstream is bound to be less than completely satisfactory. Also, attempts to compare data already collected to ideal types, rather than to existing empirical theory, are not likely to be particularly fruitful. It is to be hoped that future students of Soviet administrative behavior will keep these considerations in mind.

[27] "The Party *Apparatchiki*," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton 1971), 47-92; "The Prerequisites of Areal Deconcentration: the Soviet Experience," in James Heaphey, ed., *Spatial Dimensions of Development Administration* (Durham, N. C. 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lexington Books

New Titles

Development Reconsidered
Edgar Owens, Robert Shaw, A.I.D.
"The rich countries can help the poor only if the latter possess the political will . . . the search for an effective foreign aid policy begins in the developing countries, not in the United States. . . We must learn to think like the illiterate and poorly educated in the villages and shanty towns of the Third World."
Writing on this subject of intensive Congressional hearings to be held this spring, the authors set forth a new strategy of "Third World" development and propose a complete change in U.S. foreign aid thinking.
160 pages May $7.95

Peasant Revolutionary Potential in Latin America
Gerrit Jan Huizer, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
A critical examination of peasant movements in Latin America and their effect on current development programs and projects. Based on case studies involving several Latin American areas, this book evaluates peasant movements as a political force, highlighting the possibilities of radical or revolutionary peasant action.
256 pages March $12.50

Food Aid and International Trade
A Study in Legal and Administrative Control
Robert L. Bard, University of Connecticut
A major study of food aid programs and their impact on international trade, the recipient country's development and the donor country. Contributes toward a more effective use of food aid as a development tool by analyzing and evaluating all major administrative and legal devices for keeping food aid transactions within acceptable grounds.
240 pages April $12.50

The Passport in International Law
Daniel Turack, Capital University
This book is the first rigorous study of the role of the passport in international law. It traces the development of travel documents through the years and evaluates today's established regulations against today's travel requirements.
ca. 352 pages April $20.00

Available Titles

Indochina in Conflict: A Political Assessment
Edited by **Joseph J. Zasloff**, University of Pittsburgh
Allan E. Goodman, Clark University
256 pages $10.00

China and Southeast Asia: The Politics of Survival
A Study of Foreign Policy Interaction
Melvin R. Gurtov, University of California, Riverside
256 pages $10.00

Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics
Miles D. Wolpin, St. Francis Xavier University
308 pages $15.00

Regional Integration in Central America
Isaac Cohen Orantes, Harvard University
160 pages $10.00

D. C. Heath and Company, 125 Spring Street, Lexington, Massachusetts 02173

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PEACE, JUSTICE, ECOLOGICAL BALANCE

new books on creating A New World Order

THIS ENDANGERED PLANET by Richard A. Falk, Princeton—Random House; $8.95
"[Falk] has written a radical and realistic manual for human survival. . . . It is the essence of Falk's book that a drastic system change is possible without violence."
Charles Bolté, **New Republic**

ECONOMICS AND WORLD ORDER by Jagdish H. Bhagwati, MIT—The Macmillan Company; $11.95
Scholars from the East, West, and Third World discuss general problems such as the world monetary system, the multinational corporation, and regional integration.

BUILDING THE CITY OF MAN: OUTLINES OF A WORLD CIVILIZATION by W. Warren Wagar, SUNY Binghamton—Grossman Publishers; $10 cloth, $3.95 paper
"[A] bold, opinionated, and exciting book. An incisive analysis and a blueprint for a global society."
Richard Barnet, **Saturday Review**

GUERRILLA STRUGGLE IN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS AND PREVIEW by Kenneth W. Grundy, Case Western Reserve—Grossman Publishers; $12.50 cloth; $4.95 paper
A future of Southern Africa and a scenario for the end of apartheid.

OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
Advanced and specialized research papers on world order issues.
#1—STABILITY AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS by Philipp Sonntag and Horst Afheldt, Germany—World Law Fund; $3.00 paper
#2—CAPITALISM, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE FUTURE OF THE POOR COUNTRIES by Thomas Weisskopf, Harvard—World Law Fund; $1.00 paper

Write for Catalog of Books and Materials, and Description of Services.

WORLD LAW FUND
University Program
11 W. 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED